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REPRESSIVE WELFARE STATES: 
THE SPIRAL OF OBLIGATIONS AND 
SANCTIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY
Gijsbert Vonk*
Abstract
Th is article discusses the trend of introducing increasingly strict obligations and 
sanctions for social security claimants in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
It is argued that this trend should be judged critically because it upsets the balance 
between rights and obligations for benefi t claimants and may undermine the 
‘elevating function’ of social security. Courts play an important role in maintaining 
the balance between rights and obligations. Th e article discusses recent case law in 
the three countries and also refers to a remarkable case at the Czech Constitutional 
Court of November 2012, which paves the way for a more fundamental approach to 
scrutinising repressive welfare state excesses.
Keywords: abuse of rights; conditionality; forced labour; fraud; mandatory work 
activity; sanctions
1. INTRODUCTION
In our present climate, social security fraud and abuse of benefi t rights have become 
a real public concern. Individual fraudsters who are caught out are paraded in front 
of the camera and collectively scorned and ridiculed in the newspapers. People 
increasingly report suspected cases of benefi t abuse to specially created complaints 
lines. Politicians from both the left  and the right promise even stricter rules and 
tougher sanctions. While it may be true that the improper use of benefi t rights used to 
be taboo, it has become something of a public obsession.
* Gijsbert Vonk is Professor of Social Security Law at the University of Groningen. Address: 
Department of Administrative Law and Public Administration, Oude Kijk in ‘t Jatstraat 26, 9712 
EK Groningen, the Netherlands; phone: +31 50 363 5765; e-mail: g.j.vonk@rug.nl. Th is article is 
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Th e increasing attention given to benefi t abuse and fraud is not an isolated 
phenomenon, but part of a wider trend which I refer to as the ‘rise of the repressive 
welfare state’. Th is is a trend that has been commented on by several social academics 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Th e uncrowned champion among them is the French 
sociologist Loïc Wacquant, who wrote a stirring account of changes in the welfare 
state in the United States. Th e book bears an ominous title: Punishing the Poor.1 
Wacquant argues that, in the US, problems are no longer solved on the basis of a social 
agenda. Instead, the citizen is made fully responsible for his own life and the degree 
to which he or she can participate in society. Where these policies fail, the state reacts 
with sanctions and criminal measures. In this way, the ‘light’ American liberal state 
has developed a ‘heavy’ substructure to suppress the poor.
A repressive trend in social security policy and legislation has also been reported 
in Australia,2 in Britain3 and in the Scandinavian countries,4 partly as a by-product 
of activation policies. Th is article focuses on the spiral of obligations and sanctions 
in the area of both fraud and the suspected abuse of benefi t rights. Th e purpose is to 
critically refl ect upon this trend in the legislation of three countries, i.e. Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Th e three objectives of this article are:
1. to describe the spiralling obligations and sanctions in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK with reference to legislative developments from a dynamic perspective 
(section 3);
2. to interpret these changes with reference to possible explanations and common 
elements (section 4); and
3. to monitor the responses of the judiciary to the repressive trend in the legislation 
(section 5).
Th e latter point is of particular importance to this article. Our social security systems 
function under the rule of law. Th is means that the balance of rights and obligations 
is, ideally, subject to interaction between the legislature and judiciary. If the legislature 
and the administration focus strongly on the disciplinary function of social security 
and neglect the rights of the benefi ciaries, then it is up to the courts of restore the 
balance. Th e more uncompromising the policies, the more robust and constitutional 
the response of the judiciary can be expected to be; addressing the needs of the 
individual and formulating clear limitations. It is interesting to see how, and to what 
extent, courts have taken up this role. Th e discussion of case law focuses primarily 
on the response to obligatory work activities as a condition for receiving benefi t. By 
way of a short excursion, I will also briefl y pay some attention to a remarkable and 
uncompromising decision of the Czech Constitutional Court on this matter.
1 Wacquant (2009).
2 Carney (2008).
3 Larkin (2007) and further references included in Section 4 of this article.





2. FRAUD AND ABUSE OF BENEFITS RIGHTS: BIRDS OF A 
FEATHER
Before starting on the agenda, I fi rst provide some conceptual clarifi cation. In order 
to capture the repressive trend in our welfare states, I deal not only with the question 
of fraud and the reaction to it but also with the perceived abuse of benefi t rights. Th e 
concept of ‘abuse of rights’ is quite a murky one. I use it to circumscribe the situation 
of a claimant who is deemed to be not entitled to benefi t because he or she is unwilling 
to work and participate in the society. It may be argued that mixing up fraud and 
abuse is unwarranted and unjustifi ed because these are two diff erent things. From 
a legal point of view, this is correct. In social security law a distinction can be made 
between ‘information duties’ and ‘co-operation duties’. If one gives false information 
in order to gain some fi nancial advantage, this is an off ence under criminal law 
which can be sanctioned by fi nes, obligatory community service or a prison sentence. 
Th ese are punitive sanctions and Article 6 ECHR provides a measure of protection 
to persons charged with a criminal off ence. Th e same is the case if one withholds 
information which is relevant for determining the level of benefi t, for example, failing 
to report a change in earnings or in the household situation. However, if one fails to 
apply for a job or to undertake community service, this merely constitutes a breach 
of an administrative obligation which can only be sanctioned by withholding benefi t 
rights. Such sanctions may hit benefi ciaries hard, but they are not part of the criminal 
law system.
Nonetheless, while, technically speaking, fraud and abuse of rights are diff erent 
things, they also touch upon each other. Both forms of conduct are subject to the same 
spiral of formulating increasingly stricter obligations and tougher sanctions. More 
importantly, both operate as boundary markers establishing a line between those 
who are deserving and those who are undeserving of social security support. From 
the latter perspective, there is an interesting grey zone where ‘welfare fraud’ merges 
into ‘welfare as fraud’.5 When policies increasingly emphasise personal responsibility, 
benefi t dependency is more easily perceived as somebody’s failure to take up this 
responsibility. And when such failure is subsequently sanctioned by withholding 
benefi t rights, it easy to see why fraud and the perceived abuse of benefi ts rights are 
birds of a feather. Both types of behaviour are deemed incorrect; both are followed by 
a negative legal response.
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3. SPIRALLING OBLIGATIONS AND SANCTIONS: A TALE 
OF THREE COUNTRIES
3.1. INFORMATION DUTIES AND SANCTIONS
Th e fi rst of the three countries to step up sanctions for social security fraud was the 
Netherlands, which introduced the Wet boeten, maatregelen terug- en invordering 
Sociale zekerheid in 1996. It was felt that various institutions charged with the 
administration of social security acts underperformed in enforcing social security 
obligations. New legislation was supposed to secure a break with the past by imposing 
a duty on the administration of social security always to recover every penny of undue 
payments and to always sanction violations of any obligation by withholding benefi t 
payment or imposing fi nes. Th e Act gave rise to a system of enforcement governance, 
including obligations to develop anti-fraud policies, to monitor progress, and to 
report on this to the Ministry and then to Parliament. With this a whole enforcement 
bureaucracy evolved, with fraud offi  cers, enforcement specialists and policy managers 
partly reporting to the offi  ce of the Attorney General.  Th is branch of activity also 
extended beyond the national borders. Th e Dutch government imposed a ban on 
the export of benefi ts, but allowed for the conclusion of international agreements to 
make such export possible on the condition that the authorities of other countries 
would submit to the Dutch demands for control and information. All this had to 
be monitored. Sometimes Dutch fraud busting teams were sent out to pay visits to 
disabled or old age pensioners abroad, oft en to the great surprise of expatriates who 
left  the country many years ago.
Despite the obvious progress in the fi eld of enforcement,6 in 2011 the Dutch 
government announced a new Act, the Fraudewet, with the aim of drastically 
increasing fi nes; and in the case of reoff ending, barring those involved from the entire 
social security system. Th e latter proposal was strongly rejected by the Council of 
State because, in its view, it violated various constitutional principles. However, this 
did not deter the government from going ahead with the proposal, with only slight 
amendments.
In the fi nal version of the Fraudewet, adopted by Parliament in 2012, fi nes are at 
least as much as the amount of benefi t to be recovered, and higher for reoff enders. 
Th e claimant must pay this fi ne on top of the amount of benefi t to be recovered. Th is 
is harsh. When one compares the severity of the sanctions in social security with 
sanctions applied in other fi elds of legislation, such as under the Health and Safety at 
Work Act or the Employment of Foreign Nationals Act, they are far higher. According 







In the UK, we fi nd a very similar pattern of legislation as in the Netherlands.8 Th e 
Social Security Fraud Act of 1997 introduced more powers to collect and exchange 
information, which established a system of criminal fi nes. In lieu of prosecution, 
the claimant is off ered the chance to repay the amount fraudulently claimed, along 
with an additional 30 per cent of the overpayment. Th ese powers and sanctions were 
increased by the Social Security Fraud Act of 2001, and then again by the Welfare 
Reform Act of 2009. Th ere is now a system of benefi t cuts in operation, which operates 
on the principle of one-strike and two-strike off ences. One strike results in a one-
month benefi t withdrawal but, with two strikes, the claimant faces a much longer 
period without benefi ts.
In Germany, the legislative position in the area of information fraud has been 
less subject to change. Th e Germans rely on the consistency of the Sozial- and the 
Strafgesetzbuch, which include powers to collect information, and treat information 
fraud as a criminal off ence.9 If there has been any intensifi cation of these anti-fraud 
measures, it has not come from the legislature, but rather from the administration, 
particularly the Bundesagentur für Arbeit, which continues to discover increasingly 
large numbers of irregular payments of Arbeitslosengeld II.10
3.2. CO-OPERATION DUTIES AND SANCTIONS
When it comes to co-operation duties, there has been a sharp increase in work-related 
obligations. In particular, the duty to work in exchange for benefi t (instead of a regular 
job in the labour market) is a prominent feature of this. As relevant changes in this 
area in the three countries are systematically analysed by Anja Eleveld in her article 
on the duty to work without a wage,11 I merely give a sketch of these developments.
Tougher work obligations without pay and tougher sanctions were fi rst introduced 
in Germany as part of the systematic overhaul of the social assistance system by the 
Schröder government. Th e overhaul resulted in Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende, 
popularly referred to as Hartz IV (aft er the architect of the system, Peter Hartz), or 
more technically, as Arbeitslosengeld II. Th is system introduced minimum benefi ts, 
strict work conditions and tough sanctions for those not adhering to them. Part 
of the system is the Arbeitsgelegenheiten mit Mehraufwandsentschädigung (work 
opportunities with compensation for additional expenses), oft en referred to as the 
‘one euro job scheme’. Th ese are additional jobs created for Hartz IV recipients in the 
community sphere. Th e recipients keep their benefi ts and can earn one or two euros 
per hour in addition to this.
8 For an overview, see McKeever (2009).
9 Kreikebohm and van Koch (2012).
10 Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Jahresbericht Grundsicherung für Arbeitssuchende, 2010, 2011 and 2012.
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In order to prevent the ‘one euro job scheme, from confl icting with German 
constitutional requirements, the activities and the rights of the benefi ciaries have been 
carefully grounded in the law. For example, the work off ered must be proportional 
and suitable for the benefi ciary. Th e extent, mode and duration of the work carried 
out must be clearly circumscribed in a public law agreement concluded between the 
administration and the benefi ciary. Health and safety must be protected and the 
person must be insured for occupational accidents. Th ere is a two-year time limit, and 
the generally accepted maximum working week is 30 hours.
Hartz IV has been in operation for almost ten years without any substantial 
changes. Around 2010, some politicians, most notably the CDU Ministerpräsident of 
Hessen, Roland Koch, started a campaign to introduce a general Arbeitspfl icht for 
Hartz IV recipients. But these voices were silenced by Angela Merkel, who remarked 
in the Bundestag: ‘Ich glaube, dass die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen, was die 
Notwendigkeit der Arbeitsaufnahme betrifft  , eindeutig ausreichend sind.’ (‘I believe 
that the legal requirements with regard to the necessity of taking up employment are 
clearly suffi  cient’).12 Th is was, seemingly, the end of the matter. And yes, the powers to 
impose sanctions against unwillingness to work included in Hartz IV are already quite 
severe, the minimum being a 30 per cent benefi t cut, going up to a total withdrawal of 
benefi t. In the meantime, as a result of changes introduced in 2012, there is no longer 
a requirement that mandatory work should improve the professional skills of the 
claimant; giving something back to the community is enough. According to Eleveld, 
this is typical of the latest generation of legislative changes, which have introduced 
obligatory work as a civic obligation.13
In the Netherlands, changes in the sphere of work duties have aff ected the 
unemployed, recipients of sickness pay and invalidity benefi ts, and social assistance 
recipients. As far as the latter are concerned, in 2004, the duty to accept suitable 
employment was replaced by a duty to accept ‘generally accepted employment’, a 
concept that is supposed not to take into account the nature of a person’s previous 
employment. Subsequently, workfare practices were introduced, made possible 
by the so-called participation jobs which force benefi ciaries to work without any 
wages for the purposes of gaining work experience for a maximum of two years. 
2012 saw the introduction of a so-called maatschappelijk nuttige tegenprestatie. Th is 
is a duty to make oneself available for community services in addition to the duty 
to fi nd employment. Th e introduction of the tegenprestatie was accompanied by a 
bombardment of moralistic jargon: the reciprocity principle, everything comes at a 
price, voor wat hoort wat.14 Sometimes the tone is more scornful; let them sweep up 
the leaves, or clear the snow! Th is language is mostly symbolic. Collecting autumn 








leaves is a highly professionalised business in the Netherlands, whereas snow clearing 
is diffi  cult when everything has melted away within 24 hours.
In the meantime, patience with benefi ciaries who fail to become active and fi nd a 
job is clearly running out. Despite the fact that, under the present legislative system, 
municipalities have been given extensive opportunities to impose strict sanctions, 
politicians think this is not enough. Th e present Dutch government has announced 
a new Act which centrally prescribes tougher benefi t cuts to which all local councils 
must adhere. In this way, the 2012 Fraud Act is going to have a younger brother in the 
form a Lex Discipline.15
In the United Kingdom, stricter co-operation duties are part of a wider trend that 
Peter Dwyer has described as ‘creeping conditionality’16 – a pattern of formulating 
increasingly strict benefi t conditions, thereby gradually undermining welfare rights 
for recipients. In social security the conditions mostly aff ect unemployed and single 
parents, but in Dwyer’s observations, other areas such as health, housing, education 
and welfare rights are also aff ected. Th e spiral of stricter co-operation duties and 
sanctions in social security was kick-started by policies introduced by Tony Blair’s 
government.
Th e British policies of conditionality have been formulated under the present 
coalition government. In 2011, Mandatory Work Activity was introduced, presented 
as a chance to develop work discipline and behaviour and to contribute to the local 
community. Once a claimant is referred to Mandatory Work Activity, participation is 
mandatory, and sanctions apply if a claimant fails to participate without good cause. 
Th e placements last for four weeks and for 30 hours a week. Th ere are no wages.
Th e latest scheme is the Community Work Placements Programme. It is intended 
for people who have been unemployed for three years, due to a lack of work experience 
or motivation. Under this scheme it is possible to force claimants to perform 
community services for up to a maximum of 26 weeks, again for a maximum of 30 
hours per week.
4. BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW 
REPRESSIVE POLICIES
Th e spiral of obligations and sanctions can be interpreted in various ways. Some will 
point to the diminishing support among the population for, and a lack of solidarity 
15 Th e legislative changes will come into force on 1 January 2015 as part of the new Participatiewet. 
Actually, during the Parliamentary process the Dutch government had to back down somewhat 
on its plans, due to strong societal and political opposition to mandatory work activity. Th e 
introduction of an obligation to perform unpaid work activities (and impose corresponding 
sanctions) has been declared a competence of local government. In June 2014 the newly elected 
Amsterdam City Council decided not to impose any unpaid work activities. Conversely, some other 
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with, some groups of welfare recipients, in particular with single parents, the long-
term unemployed, and immigrants and asylum seekers.17 Others will argue that the 
new repressive policies are rooted in the need to reform social security, by making the 
system more active and by reducing costs.
An alternative explanation comes from the Dutch sociologist Willem Trommel,18 
who points to structural changes which undermine the old welfare state, such as 
globalisation and individualisation, and argues that these changes give rise to a 
new social governance. Th is is, in Trommel’s terms, ‘a greedy government’, which is 
characterised by a state that desperately tries to restore the social fi bre of society. A 
characteristic of its’ policies is that the state is trying to mould society into a uniform 
pattern of values and norms so as to create a responsible civil society using a top-down 
approach.
Th e French sociologist Loïc Wacquant makes an equally interesting remark 
when he points to the role played by the symbolism of repressive welfare policies, 
particularly in the USA.19 According to Wacquant, this symbolism is important from 
the point of view of the legitimacy of the state. By constantly pointing the fi nger at 
those who are not deserving of our support ‒ the unruly classes, the outcasts, the 
irresponsible, newcomers to society, and worst of all, fraudulent immigrants ‒ the 
state attempts to strengthen the bond with the rest of the population, thereby creating 
a basis for its survival.
Such theories off er an alternative to the mainstream marketing arguments for 
tougher obligations and sanctions doled out by politicians. Indeed, there are good 
reasons for being critical of these mainstream arguments. Here I mention fi ve of these 
reasons.
First of all, the new policies are not always based on empirical evidence or rational 
considerations. For example, the latest Dutch Fraud Act was a response to political 
pressure, not at all to increasing levels of fraud and abuse. In fact, the fi gures show 
that these have not increased at all. It is also quite shocking to note how oft en fraud 
cases are reported to the press, suggesting large scale illegal practices involving losses 
of millions of euros, while in the end such cases appear simply not to exist. Th us, in 
the Netherlands, only 12 Moroccans and Turks appear to have claimed double child 
benefi t, not a quarter of the relevant populations, as was earlier suggested by some 
politicians.20 Similarly, in Amsterdam, aft er two years of researching address data, it 
appears there were only six so-called ‘phantom citizens’ claiming benefi ts, instead of 
the hundreds suggested previously.21 Remarkably, no politician is ever held to account 
17 See, for example, van Oorschot (2006).
18 Trommel (2009).
19 Wacquant (2009).







for spreading rumours which subsequently prove to be manifestly exaggerated or 
downright false.
Secondly, it should be pointed out that the call for higher fi nes is made on the 
assumption of wrongful behaviour which, in practice, cannot always be upheld. 
Not all recipients who do not adhere to the rules are intentional fraudsters. Th ere 
is a diff erence between intentionally and unintentionally violating obligations;22 the 
extent of error may far outreach the extent of fraud;23 and suspected fraud is not 
the same as the real extent of fraud.24 Some people just get confused by the rules or 
experience events in their lives that make them unfi t to do what is expected of them.25 
Perhaps it is also for this reason that local administrators oft en fi nd it hard to impose 
the tough sanctions that are prescribed by central guidelines.26
Th irdly, new repressive policies can come with an overdose of paternalistic 
interference, which damages the dignity of benefi t claimants. Th us, the former 
Dutch Secretary of State for Social Aff airs, Henk Kamp, made a serious point in 
describing how social assistance recipients should dress.27 Th ey are not supposed to 
show piercings, tattoos, décolletés or belly buttons, let alone heads scarves or burkas, 
otherwise they are not attractive to employers. However, research has pointed out 
that, in practice, it is very hard for social services to enforce such instructions, borne 
out of the fantasies of some correct politicians.28 In Britain, the popular press targets, 
for example, people who are overweight. No dole for fatties.
Fourthly, the repressive welfare state reforms are so focused on discipline and 
sanctions that they undermine the balance between rights and obligations, thus 
exposing claimants to benefi ts to unwarranted intrusions of their privacy, the arbitrary 
decisions of fraud offi  cers and degrading treatment. In the end this may jeopardise the 
‘elevating function’ social security is supposed to have for citizens. For example, in 
our research into the implementation of the latest Dutch mandatory work activity 
programme, we found that there are fewer regulatory guarantees for this type of work 
than for the obligatory community services that must be carried out by detainees. In 
this way, social security and criminal law will become mutually exchangeable areas 
of government concern. Th e British government at least introduced a set of quality 
guarantees for the British Mandatory Work Activity Scheme. Th ere are internal 
guidelines which deal not only with working times and health and safety matters, 
but which also require that the work is benefi cial for the development of the claimant, 
22 Reindl-Krauskopf and Meissnitzer (2013).
23 van Stolk and Elmerstig (2013).
24 van Oorschot and Roosma (2013).
25 Gustaafson (2012).
26 For the Netherlands, den Uijl, Tollenaar, Bröring, Kwakman, and Keulen (2012).
27 As echoed by legislative proposals made by the present Dutch government.
28 Research carried out by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Offi  ce, Verzorgd uit de bijstand, De 
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and that it does not to go against his or her personal beliefs or lead to any degrading 
practices.29
Finally, one should not turn a blind eye to the possibility that the harsh policies 
may force people to move underground, to resort to marginal activities in the shadows 
of the offi  cial society, to beg and to sleep rough. If the system loses faith in the citizens, 
the citizens may lose faith in the system, thus giving rise to a new underclass which 
does not rely on the formal safety net. Th ere is no empirical evidence of such a causal 
link between sanctions and homelessness, or at least none that I am aware of, but it 
may very well be just one more factor underlying the growing incidence of extreme 
poverty in Europe.30
5. RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIARY
As mentioned in the introduction, it is important that the new repressive welfare 
policies operate under the rule of law, which can help to maintain a just balance 
between rights and obligations for benefi t claimants. In this respect, it is relevant to 
monitor the response of the judiciary to these new policies.
It emerges that the courts are very much in the business of counterbalancing the 
new sanctions regime, both in cases of information fraud and in cases of suspected 
abuse. Th is is not only the case in the Netherlands,31 but also in the UK32 and in 
Germany. A common theme in the case law is that each individual case must 
continue to be judged on its merits, however strict and standardised the rules may 
be. When individual circumstances are taken into account, very oft en the conclusion 
must be that sanctions should be mitigated. For example, legal commentators in the 
Netherlands predict that the Courts will never be in the position to uphold the severe 
sanctions that the legislature has introduced by means of the Fraudewet of 2012.33
Another trend, at least in the Netherlands, is that case law is becoming more 
constitutional in character, meaning that courts do not refrain from taking a 
principled stance, and derive rules from fundamental rights. One of the reasons for 
this may be that the basis for the rights in the social security statutes themselves has 
become so weakened by constant legislative interference that courts must almost 
always resort to higher legal norms, in particular, human rights standards, as a basis 
for their decisions. Examples of the more principle-based case law are the rulings 
dealing with the powers of the administration to enter the homes of claimants for 
29 Mandatory Work Activity Provider Guidance – Incorporating Universal Credit (UC) Guidance 
(August 2013), available at www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/pg-part-p.pdf.
30 epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_
exclusion, accessed at 27 February 2014.
31 Vonk (2012; 2013).
32 McKeever (2009).





verifi cation purposes. According to the Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal, this is not 
permitted, unless the occupant gives his explicit consent.34 Failure to do so may 
not result in any loss of benefi t rights, unless there is a clear indication that there is 
something wrong with the payment of benefi t. In typical fashion, the Dutch legislature 
has reacted to this with a new Act to grant more powers to the administration to enter 
people’s homes, but it is questionable whether this is really going to be successful, as 
the courts will probably remain critical.
Another interesting theme in case law deals with the question of whether it is 
permissible to force benefi ciaries to accept workfare duties, for which benefi ciaries 
receive no, or reduced, earnings. Th e question arises as to what extent this is in line 
with some fundamental rights, such as the right to work (in particular, the freedom of 
occupation) and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, as contained in several 
international human rights instruments, such as Article 4 ECHR.
For a long time there were hardly any national or international cases in which the 
concrete decisions of social security administrations to withhold benefi t rights were 
considered to be in violation of any of these rights. Th e general understanding seems 
to be that work duties may be imposed as a benefi t condition, and that withholding 
benefi t rights does not impede someone’s freedom of occupation, let alone constitute 
forced labour. Up to now this has also been the point of view of the European Court 
of Human rights.35
I have some trouble in accepting the way courts tend to reject outright the 
relevance of the prohibition on forced labour in social security cases. First, by doing 
so, courts fail to appreciate the great responsibility that rests on them to protect the 
proper balance between rights and obligations following the introduction of workfare 
policies. Secondly, case law does not recognise that withholding benefi ts rights may 
constitute a serious form of pressure and coercion on the person involved. According 
to the European Court of Human Rights, forced labour is ‘labour exacted under 
menace of any penalty and performed against the will of the person involved, that is 
doing work for which he has not off ered himself voluntarily.’36 I fail to see why, under 
some circumstances, particularly long-term benefi t dependency, sanctions would not 
amount to such a penalty. In the light of this argument it is interesting to observe that 
some courts seem to be adopting a more critical attitude.
In the Netherlands, the fi rst court to create a breakthrough was the District Court 
of Arnhem.37 Th e case dealt with a social assistance benefi ciary with an academic 
background who had been told to accept certain activities, off ered to him by the 
‘training centre’, a facility set up under the work-fi rst programme of the town of 
34 See the cases of 11 April 2007 by the Central Appeals Tribunal, inter alia, LJN BA2447.
35 ECHR No. 30300/96, decisions of 26  February 1997, J.H. Talmon v. the Netherlands, EHRLR 
1997, 448–449; and more recently, ECtHR in the decision of 4  May 2010 in Schuitemaker v. the 
Netherlands, Application No. 15906/08.
36 ECrtHR judgement of 23 November 1983, Van der Mussele v. Belgium, para 34.
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Arnhem. Th e claimant was told to sign a ‘job experience agreement’, under which 
he was given the choice of either working as a public gardener (weeding, hoeing), or 
packing boxes of super glue. He had signed the agreement, but subsequently refused 
to co-operate in the activities imposed on him by his ‘case manager’. Th is resulted 
in a penalty of a 40 per cent benefi t cut, for a period of one month. In its judgment, 
the Court came to the conclusion that the practices of the local council of Arnhem 
were not contrary to the prohibition on slavery and forced labour contained in 
Article 4 ECHR. Th e fact that the workfare activities were not voluntary because they 
were imposed under the threat of a sanction did not alter this conclusion, because, 
according to the Court, social assistance is merely a safety net which presupposes that 
a person will return to paid employment as soon as possible. But while, on the one 
hand, the Court ruled that, in this case, the activities off ered should not be considered 
as disproportionate and excessive, it did, on the other hand, envisage that work-fi rst 
practices may run contrary to Article 4 ECHR, i.e. in the case of a benefi ciary who 
is forced to carry out activities under threat of a sanction for a longer time, when it 
is clear that such activities are in no way conducive to reintegration into the regular 
labour market.
Later, in another case, the Central Appeals Tribunal upheld the rationale of 
the Arnhem Court and off ered a more extensive abstract framework for deciding 
when workfare may run contrary to the prohibition of forced labour.38 Th is is a new 
approach in the case law.
In the meantime, the UK Supreme Court has delivered a judgment on the 
lawfulness of mandatory Work Activity.39 Th e case was brought by an unemployed 
geology graduate, Miss Caitlin Reilly. She was doing voluntary work in a museum, but 
was then forced to take on unpaid work in a Poundland store in Birmingham. Aft er 
a couple of days work, she quit, because she was not learning anything from doing 
this menial work. Th e Supreme Court rejected the argument that the work activity 
was forced labour within the meaning of Article 4 ECHR. According to the Court, 
the case law of the ECtHR clearly presupposes that the activities should somehow be 
degrading. Th us, quoting from the Van der Mussele case, the Supreme Court ruled:
‘To amount to a violation of Article  4, the work had to be not only compulsory and 
involuntary, but the obligation to work, or its performance, must be “unjust”, “oppressive”, 
“an avoidable hardship”, “needlessly distressing” or “somewhat harassing”.’
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the lower courts that the 
Mandatory Work Activity scheme ran contrary to the Act of Parliament. Lower 
legislation just repeated the vague terms of this Act, instead of providing further 
rules. Actually, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Poundland case has now 
been reversed by the Jobseekers (Back-to-Work Schemes) Act 2013, which purports to 
38 CR v. B, 8 February 2010, LJN BL1093.





have retroactive eff ect. Th e full implications of this Act have yet to be worked through 
and there is ongoing litigation. On 4 July 2014 the Queen’s Bench Division of the High 
Court of Justice (administrative court) found that the retroactivity of the repairs run 
contrary to Articles 6 and 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR.40
In Germany, the ‘one euro’ job scheme under Hartz IV was tested in 2008 by the 
Bundessozialgericht.41 Th is case dealt with a 58-year-old engineer who had to place 
protective casing around young trees for a local council company in Bavaria. For this 
work, he only received a small compensation fee. He refused to do the work because 
his 30-hour working week made it impossible for him to apply for a regular job. Th is 
argument was rejected by the Court on grounds that the labour was organised by the 
local community for public purposes, and had to be regarded as additional work.
Referring to case law, it is interesting to make a small excursion to consider a 
ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court of 27  November 2012.42 In this case the 
argument of forced labour played a prominent role. Th is was a case brought by some 
opposition MPs in the Czech Parliament against a Mandatory Labour Programme 
in the Czech Republic. Th e MPs complained that this scheme was against the Forced 
Labour Convention of the ILO, the prohibition on forced labour of the ECHR, and the 
very right to social security itself. Th e Czech Court’s decision is a remarkable one. It 
smashed the scheme to bits, holding that benefi t cuts were a disproportional means of 
forcing people to accept work that was forced upon them by the authorities.
Th e Czech ruling is an uncompromising and unique one, made possible by the 
harshness of the mandatory work scheme that had been introduced. In the Czech 
Republic, people who are unemployed for longer than two months have to accept any 
unpaid labour. If they refuse, they are removed from the employment register, which 
has the eff ect that they lose their benefi ts all together. Except in some exceptional 
cases, claimants have no infl uence over the work or the conditions under which it has 
to be carried out. According to the Court:
‘the state treats them in the same manner as persons sentenced for a crime, only for the 
reason that they became unemployed and are exercising their legal rights, without violating 
any legal obligation. Th erefore, the obligation to accept an off er of public service does not 
serve to limit social exclusion, but to intensify it, and it can cause those performing it, 
whose work has the same elements externally (for other people) as serving a sentence, 
humiliation to their personal dignity.’
Th is is a relevant judgement which I would recommend to any person who is interested 
in workfare policies. Many aspects also pertaining to the work schemes in other 
countries were critically scrutinised: the curious status of the labour relationship, the 
40 [2014] EWHC 2182 (Admin).
41 BSG, 16 December 2008 AZ: B 4 AS 60/07 R.
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risk of arbitrary practices, the coincidental nature of the type of jobs available, and the 
argument that the work must be done for the purposes of work training. Many of the 
arguments defending such aspects were completely rejected or refuted.
One wonders what the Czech Court would have thought about the Mandatory 
Work Programmes applicable in the Netherlands, Germany and the UK. Would 
they have passed the test? Th e ‘one euro’ job scheme probably would, by reason of its 
strict regulation of rights of benefi ciaries in the SGB. Perhaps the Mandatory Work 
programme would, if only because of the short duration for which the work has to be 
carried out (30 hours a week for four weeks). But what about the Netherlands, where 
the maatschappelijk nuttige tegenprestatie may be imposed for an unlimited duration 
in a way which is left  virtually unregulated by law?
What we can learn from the fresh approach of the Czech Court is that the rights 
of claimants under the workfare schemes should be made explicit. Th e work should 
not be degrading, there should be some right of choice, the work should benefi t the 
claimant, individual circumstances must be taken into account as well personal 
beliefs, working conditions and working times should be adhered to, etc. Th ese things 
must be regulated in the law, not just in internal guidelines like the ones that exist in 
the UK, or not simply unregulated, as was the case in the Czech Republic, and still is 
the case in the Netherlands’ maatschappelijk nuttige tegenprestatie.43
It is lessons such as these which illustrate exactly what role the judiciary can play 
in counterbalancing the rise of the repressive welfare state.
6. CONCLUSION
In this article we discussed the trend of introducing increasingly strict obligations 
and sanctions for social security claimants in Germany, the Netherlands and the 
UK. It was argued that such a welfare state must be looked upon in a critical way 
because it upsets the balance between rights and obligations in social security and 
may result in degrading treatment and an undermining of the ‘elevating function’ 
of social security. Th e article also includes a number of other criticisms: there is no 
empirical evidence which supports the need to introduce repressive policies; there 
are negative consequences in terms of stigmatisation; the policies turn a blind eye to 
benefi ciaries who fail to adhere to obligations unintentionally; and there is a risk of 
persons dropping out of the formal social security system altogether.
Courts play an important role in maintaining the balance between rights and 
obligations. We have discussed some examples of case law in the three countries, but 
the champion of all courts is the Czech Constitutional Court, which, in November 
2012, led the way to a more fundamental human rights approach to scrutinising 
43 A fi rst case of a lower Dutch court is indeed highly critical of the maatschappelijke nuttige 
tegenprestatie as a ground for imposing work duties. See Court of Zeeland-West-Brabant, 





repressive welfare state excesses. Yet, it must be borne in mind that the role of the 
courts should not be overestimated. Th us, for example, when it comes to the duty to 
perform unpaid work under the threat of sanctions, the government has considerable 
leeway to develop schemes according to their beliefs and preferences without 
meeting any constitutional objections. In ECHR terms, this leeway is expressed as 
the state’s ‘margin of appreciation’ and its ‘legitimate aims’. Also the ‘proportionality 
test’ operates as a mitigating factor. Th e result is that only in extreme cases where 
individual rights are infringed, can courts off er a remedy. But otherwise, the judiciary 
in itself is not in a position to curb the rise of the repressive welfare state. In this light, 
the judgement of the Czech Constitutional Court is, indeed, exceptional.
For those who attach importance to a balance between rights and obligations 
in social security, the latter observation is a disconcerting one. If government 
policies upset this balance without meeting any structural opposition, neither from 
parliament nor from the courts, how can it be restored so that vulnerable benefi ciaries 
will be better protected against the popular mood of political majorities? Here lies 
a major task for all actors who operate independently, outside the grasp of offi  cial 
political institutions. Th e judiciary is one of those actors, but not the only one. If we 
want to turn the tide of the repressive welfare state, a wider coalition must be forged: 
academia, the critical press, citizen’s initiatives, complaints authorities, and, last but 
not least, those who are usually the very last to be heard when discussing welfare 
policies, the benefi ciaries themselves.
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Abstract
Since the rise of the activation paradigm in the 1990s, the duty to work without a 
wage has become widespread in European social assistance legislation. Th is paper 
investigates in a precise way the extent to which the duty to work without a wage 
follows the legal logic of a contractual relationship and how this duty is related to 
the fundamental right to an adequate standard of living. A comparison between 
German, Dutch and British social assistance legislation shows that the duty to work 
without a wage increasingly takes the form of a reciprocity requirement. Th at is, 
instead of re-integrating into regular paid work, recipients of social assistance are 
required to show that they are worthy of attaining basic social rights, not only by 
improving their capability to work but, above all, by showing a willingness to work. It 
concludes that the duty to work without a wage enhances governmental control over 
recipients of social assistance rather than improving their employability and notes 
that, in this respect, the Dutch social assistance regime seems to be stricter than the 
German and British ones.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, an increasing number of European welfare states can be characterised 
in terms of the activation paradigm. Comparative social policy studies have shown 
that this new paradigm of social policy has induced a shift  away from a solidaristic 
(and passive) welfare state towards an active and enabling welfare state, whose 
main goal is the re-integration of welfare recipients into paid employment (Betzelt 
and Bothfeld 2011; Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007; Stendahl et al 2008; Van 
Berkel et al. 2011). Some have applauded the rise of this new paradigm, as it aims to 
improve the employability of welfare claimants, while still guaranteeing a minimum 
level of protection (Hemerijck 2013). On the other hand, others have asserted that 
we are seeing a process of convergence to a workfare approach (Handler 2003, 2009; 
Jessop 2002), which, amongst other things, changes the role of the state from being 
a guarantor of social rights to being the regulator of individual’s rights (Betzelt and 
Bothfeld 2011; Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007). Legal scholars have pointed, 
in particular, to the changed contractual relationship between welfare claimants 
and governmental agencies. Whether these contracts are called a ‘re-integration 
agreement’ or a ‘claimant commitment’, they make it clear, fi rst and foremost, that 
the right to safety net benefi ts is conditional on the behaviour of the recipient of social 
assistance (Eichenhofer 2013). However, according to some legal scholars, the image 
of the contract does not match reality. Whereas, theoretically, contracts are founded 
on the idea of the rational self-determining agent who voluntarily enters the contract 
on equal terms with the other party, the ‘re-integration agreement’ and the ‘claimant 
commitment’ are based on asymmetric power relations (Freedland and King 2003).
Th e central aim of this paper is to determine how the duty to work without a 
wage in social assistance legislation formally restructures (basic) social rights in the 
contractual relationship between recipients of social assistance and governmental 
agencies in three European welfare states: Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Usually analyses of activation policies are pursued from a socio-economic perspective, 
answering questions about the (side) eff ects of a certain rule or policies. In that 
approach, questions belonging to a more legal perspective, like legitimisation, legal 
logic and fundamental rights, tend to be neglected. Departing from a legal perspective, 
this paper investigates in a precise way the extent to which the duty to work without a 
wage follows the legal logic of a contractual relationship, and how this duty is related 
to the fundamental right on an adequate standard of living or social assistance, as it 
has been laid down in, inter alia, Article 11 ICESR, Article 13 ESC and Article 34 (3) 
of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU. As such, this analysis aims to 
shed light on the aforementioned views on the activation paradigm: the approach that 
stresses the impact of social investment on the employability of recipients of social 
assistance versus the approach that stresses the emergence of the controlling state. It 






Th is paper is organised in the following way. In Section 2, diff erent kinds of 
activation policies in Europe are briefl y examined, and the choice of Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK justifi ed. Sections 3 and 4 present the results of the legal 
comparative study. Section 5 analyses the results of this study. Finally, Section 6 
outlines a socio-legal research agenda on the duty to work without a wage.
2. COMPARING SOCIAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVATION 
POLICIES IN EUROPE
Comparisons between the national social policies of European welfare states are 
commonly based on Esping Anderson’s three worlds of welfare capitalism (1990), 
which describes three diff erent types of welfare state: First, a liberal regime that is 
based on utilitarian market principles. Entitlements to social benefi ts are targeted, 
needs-based and means-tested, and the replacement rates are low. Second, a social 
democratic or universalistic regime that is citizenship-based, and where entitlements 
to social benefi ts are universal and replacement rates are generous. Th ird, the 
Bismarckian or conservative regime, which is based on an employment-related social 
insurance and usually premised on the conventional male breadwinner family.
Some scholars have argued that Esping Anderson’s classifi cation is not suitable 
for the analysis of activation policies, because the regime types do not refl ect the 
diversity of activation policies that have been adopted by Member States (Lødemel and 
Trickey 2001; Van Berkel 2011). Nevertheless, when it comes to the implementation of 
activation policies, researchers tend to distinguish between two main types, which 
mirror Esping-Anderson’s fi rst two types of welfare regimes: on the one hand a 
universalistic type (representing the Scandinavian countries), which combine high 
benefi ts, universal welfare provisions and active policy instruments; and on the other 
hand, a liberal type, representing countries such as the UK and Ireland. In these latter 
countries benefi ts are much lower and social assistance as a last resort is relatively 
important. Th e liberal type shares its emphasis on activation measures with the 
universalistic type. However, whereas the universalistic type emphasises incentives 
and social investment (also called the ‘carrot approach’), the liberal type instead 
predominantly deploys strict sanctions to ‘activate’ welfare dependants – ‘the stick 
approach’ (Barbier and Knut 2010; Larsen 2005).
Th is dichotomy is not unproblematic. First, even universalistic type countries, 
renowned for their human capital investment policies, increasingly base their 
activation polices on the stick approach.1 As a matter of fact, the duty to work without 
a wage oft en possesses both stick and carrot elements. On the one hand, it aims at 
human capital investments that prepare people to enter the regular labour market. On 
the other hand, it is implemented to prevent people from applying for social benefi ts, 
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or to create an incentive for welfare recipients to fi nd a regular job as soon as possible 
(Van Berkel 2006). A second reason why the dichotomist classifi cation is problematic 
is that it fails to categorise countries belonging to Esping Anderson’s Bismarckian or 
conservative regime, such as Germany, Belgium and France. According to Barbier 
and Knut (2010), it remains to be seen if these countries will develop into a third ideal 
type.
Regarding the shortcomings of this Esping Anderson based classifi cation system 
for a comparative analysis of activation measures in social assistance legislation, I 
propose to use the classifi cation of Cantillon and Van Mechelen (2011). Th ese authors 
divide the social assistance legislation of 27 EU countries into four groups with respect 
to the degree to which active labour market policies are pursued (Cantillon and Van 
Mechelen 2011):2
1. countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania, where national social assistance 
regulations are neither activated nor sanctioned;
2. countries, such as the UK and Romania, where social assistance policies combine 
strong fi nancial incentives with strict sanctions;
3. countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which have integrated large 
numbers of recipients of social assistance into activation programmes, and which 
tend to impose a relatively high number of sanctions; and
4. countries, such as Belgium, Austria and Germany, where the numbers of recipients 
of social assistance targeted is substantially lower than in the Netherlands or 
Denmark, despite this fourth group’s use of activation measures.
Th e countries selected for this study represent the second, third and fourth groups 
(i.e. the UK, the Netherlands and Germany).3
Th ere are also other reasons which justify the selection of these countries. For 
example, all selected countries intensifi ed their activation policies between the late 
1990s and 2005. As a result of these reforms, these countries have either introduced 
or extended the possibility of working without a wage in social assistance legislation, 
such as the new deal in the UK (1998), the Hartz reforms in Germany (2003–2005), 
and the Work and Welfare Act (WWB) in the Netherlands (2004). Yet, as will be 
shown, there is some variation with respect to the implementation of the duty to work 
without a wage.
2 Only Croatia, which became part of the EU in 2013, is not included in this study.
3 Note that, regarding the selected countries, the classifi cation of Cantillon and van Mechelen does not 
necessarily diff er much from Esping Anderson’s classifi cation. Studies updating Esping Anderson’s 
classifi cation in order to take account of activation polices also categorise these countries into 
separate welfare regimes (Powell and Barrientos 2004; Sapir 2006). Th ese studies classify Germany 





3. A LEGAL COMPARISON OF THE DUTY TO WORK 
WITHOUT A WAGE, AS IMPOSED ON RECIPIENTS 
OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE IN GERMANY, 
THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UK
Social assistance legislation comes under diff erent names. Following Bieback (2009), 
I defi ne social assistance legislation as those provisions that regulate needs-related 
(cash) benefi ts. In all investigated countries, the recipient of social assistance who is 
required to work without a wage engages in some kind of contractual relations with 
a governmental agency. Th ere is some variation in the way the relationship between 
the recipient of social assistance and the governmental agency is structured. Th e 
Netherlands has the highest degree of decentralisation, which means that rules on 
re-integration, sanctions, etc. are delegated to the municipal level, where local offi  cials 
enjoy some degree of discretion on re-integration measures and sanctions (Eleveld 
and Van Vliet 2013). In Germany and the UK, social assistance and activation 
programmes are much more centralised. Most social assistance schemes are usually 
operated jointly by the Federal Employment Agency and the municipalities, and, 
as in the Netherlands, offi  cials enjoy some degree of discretion (Becker and Von 
Hardenberg 2010). Th e UK allows the lowest degree of administrative discretion. Even 
judges have little scope to develop law, given the very prescriptive nature of much of 
the social legislation (Harris 2010). Th e Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
is responsible for activating recipients of social assistance, with implementation 
undertaken by Jobcentre Plus and carried out by external contractors.
In this section, I discuss diff erent legal aspects of the requirement to work without a 
wage in social assistance legislation in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK: fi rst, the 
legal basis of the duty to work without a wage in national social assistance legislations, 
including its contract form (Section 3.1); second, the personal scope of application 
(Section 3.2); third, the maximum length of the duty to work without a wage (Section 3.3); 
and fourth, the shift  from re-integration to civic requirement (Section 3.4). Th e following 
section (Section 4) is entirely dedicated to a central aspect of the contractual relationship 
between the recipient of social assistance and the governmental agency, namely the 
sanctions for non-compliance with the duty to work without a wage.
3.1. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE REQUIREMENT TO WORK 
WITHOUT A WAGE
Th e Netherlands currently has the most straightforward social assistance scheme, 
which operates under the Work and Welfare Act (WWB). Alongside this scheme 
there is a special statutory scheme (WAJONG) that provides social assistance to young 
people with a disability, which I do not address in any further detail in this article. 
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scheme, the Participation Act. Th e requirement to work without pay is regulated 
under Article  9(1b) of the WBB, which requires recipients of social assistance to 
participate in an employment programme if this is off ered to them as part of their 
re-integration plan. Under Article 10(a) of the WWB, a municipality can also oblige 
certain welfare recipients to perform work activities in ‘participation placements’. 
Lastly, Article 9(1c) of the WWB stipulates that they can be required to perform non-
remunerated activities that benefi t the community.
Germany has two separate social assistance schemes: Social Code II (SGB II) and 
Social Code XII (SGB XII). Th ese refl ect the earlier distinctions between the non-
deserving poor (i.e. those able to work) and the deserving poor (i.e. those unable to 
work) (Eichenhofer 2008). In this paper I focus on SGB II, which applies to employable 
people and their partners. Article 16(d)(1) of the SGB II stipulates that claimants can 
be required to participate in Arbeitsgelegenheiten in der Mehraufwandsvariante (i.e. 
work opportunities). Th ese work opportunities refer to ‘one euro jobs’ which pay 
between 1 and 2 euros an hour.
Th e UK has various diff erent social assistance schemes, including Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA), Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Income Support (IS), 
Housing Benefi ts (HB) and Universal Credit (UC). In this paper I refer only to UC, as 
this scheme is due to replace the other income-based benefi ts by 2017.4 UC is regulated 
by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (WRA 2012) and the UC Regulations 2013. Welfare 
claimants can be required to participate in ‘work preparation programmes’ under 
Article  16(3)(d) WRA 2012, while also being subject to some specifi c regulations 
under the Mandatory Work Activity programme.
All legislatures have adopted some form of contractual structure in which social 
assistance recipients have to agree to perform labour activities. Th ese re-integration 
agreements (Germany), re-integration plans (the Netherlands) and claimant 
commitments (the UK) generally record the requirements placed on a claimant in 
return for payment of social assistance. Th ey usually also stipulate what happens 
if the claimant does not comply with these requirements. It should be noted that 
Germany and the UK formulate the requirement to sign an agreement more strictly 
than the Netherlands, where the WWB states that a claimant can be required to sign 
a re-integration plan.5 In the UK the right to receive benefi t is conditional upon the 
claimant’s making a signed commitment,6 while the German SGB II requires the Job 
Centre to enter into a re-integration agreement with the claimant.7
4 Note that contribution-based JSA and ESA will exist alongside UC from 2017.
5 However, claimants under 27 must sign a re-integration plan.
6 Article 14(1) WRA 2012. A claimant who refuses to accept the commitment will not be entitled 
to UC. However, according to the Explanatory Memorandum for the Social Security Advocacy 
Committee (12  June 2012), claimants will be allowed a ‘cooling off ’ period to give them the 
opportunity to reconsider and understand the consequences of their decision.
7 Article 15 SGB II. Note that, under this Article, if there is no ‘Eingliederungsvereinbarung’ (i.e. re-
integration agreement), the job centre should issue a ‘Verwaltungsakt’ (i.e. administrative decision). 






Th e spread of the activation paradigm across Europe has involved the targeting of new 
groups, such as disabled people and lone parents, who now constitute ‘the undeserving 
poor’ (Harris and Wikeley 2007; Stendahl 2008). Th is tendency is also evident in the 
social assistance legislation and practices in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
For example, at the start of the fi nancial crisis, the four largest cities in the Netherlands 
imposed the duty to work without a wage on recipients of social assistance who were 
previously classifi ed as not being able to re-integrate in regular paid work within a 
period of fi ve years (Divosa 2008, 2009). Still, there is some variation between the 
investigated countries with respect to the personal scope of the duty to work without 
a wage.
In principle, all social assistance claimants in the investigated countries who are 
aged 18 or older are required to work.8 Th e German law adds an extra condition in 
that the person eligible for worker status must be employable; in other words, the 
social assistance recipient must not be unable to work within a foreseeable period. 
In addition, the claimant must be capable of being employed for at least three hours 
a day. Th e various pieces of national legislation also allow some exemptions from 
the requirement to perform labour activities without a wage. Th e most important of 
these exemptions applies to people whose capacity to work is limited for physical, 
psychological or mental reasons.9 Under the new Participation Act, however, only 
welfare recipients who are fully and permanently incapacitated will be exempted 
from the requirement to work without a wage. Th is is much stricter than the criteria 
currently applied in the Netherlands and the criteria applied in Germany and the 
UK.10
Recipients of social assistance performing care duties are exempted from worker 
status to some degree in each country’s legislation. Th ere is some variation with respect 
to the exemption of persons caring for young children. In the UK, UC claimants who 
are responsible for a child under the age of fi ve cannot be required to work without a 
wage.11 In Germany, parents responsible for a child under three are entirely exempted 
should provide clear information on the work the claimant has to perform, the location where the 
work is to take place, the time and date when the activities will start, the duration in terms of the 
number and distribution of weekly hours and the amount of the compensation. (BSG 16 December 
2008 B 4 AS 60/07 R.).
8 Article 9(1) WWB; Article 7 SGB II; Article 9 UC Regulations. Note that, under the UC Regulations, 
16- and 17-year-old claimants can also get UC if they are not in education.
9 For details of the German regulation, see Article 10(1) SGB II. For details of the British regulation, 
see Article 9 UC Regulations 2013. Under current Dutch Article 9(2) WWB, the municipality may 
exempt recipients of social assistance from the duty to work without a wage if there are urgent 
reasons. Claimants with a limited capability to work oft en invoke Article 9(2) WWB. In 2013 30 per 
cent of the recipients of social assistance were exempted from the duty to work under the WWB.
10 See Article 9(5) Participation Act.
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from the worker status.12 Under the Dutch WWB, it is, to a certain extent, at the 
discretion of the municipality whether lone parents are temporarily exempted from 
their participation in re-integration activities such as the duty to work without a 
wage.13 Th is implies that lone parents with new-born children can be required, in 
theory, to perform this duty. On the basis of the Participation Act, lone parents with 
young children will – at the discretion of the municipality – only be exempted from 
the duty to perform a civic job (see Section 3.5).14 Th ey cannot be exempted from 
their participation in re-integration activities. Yet, compared to Germany and the UK, 
more providers of care to young children are required to work without a wage.
Th ere is also a diff erence between, on the one hand, Germany and the UK, and, on 
the other hand, the Netherlands, when it comes to other care providers’ requirement 
to work without a wage. Th en, in contrast to the Dutch WWB, the German and British 
regulations exempt recipients of social assistance who are responsible for caring 
for other dependants from the requirement to work without a wage.15 Th e British 
legislation is quite explicit in temporarily exempting other groups, such as pregnant 
claimants, adopters, foster parents and students, from this requirement.16 Claimants 
who work in a minimum-wage job for at least 16 hours a week, and whose earnings 
are not suffi  cient to meet their day-to-day cost of living, are also exempted from the 
requirement to work without a wage. In the Netherlands, by contrast, it is not unusual 
for recipients of social assistance to have to work without a wage in addition to holding 
a regular job (FNV 2012).
3.3. THE LENGTH
In Germany, the requirement to accept ‘one euro jobs’ may be imposed on recipients 
of social assistance for a maximum of two years within a fi ve-year period.17 Th is 
limitation in time was introduced by an amendment that was implemented on 1 April 
2012 in order to prevent long-term participation in ‘one euro jobs’ and to emphasise the 
priority of regular jobs.18 Th e maximum of two years is substantially longer than the 
maximum of three months during which claimants could be required to participate in 
work programmes before the introduction of Hartz IV in 2005. Although the German 
legislation does not stipulate the number of hours that a claimant can be required to 
12 Th e term ‘responsible parent’ refers both to a lone parent and to the person in a couple who has been 
nominated by the couple as being responsible for the child. For the defi nition of ‘responsible parent’ 
in British law, see Article 19(6) WRA.
13 Article 9(2) WWB. Th e legislator has narrowed this leeway for municipalities by words like ‘only 
under strict conditions’ and ‘insofar the limitations cannot be solved by childcare services’.
14 See Article 9(2) and Article 9 (7) Participation Act.
15 Article 10(1) point 4 SGB II, Article 19(2b) WRA and Article 89(1c) UC Regulations.
16 Article 89 UC Regulations.
17 Article 16(d)(6) SGB II.





work in a ‘one euro job’, a maximum of 30 hours a week seems to be common (Hohmeyer 
and Jozwiak 2008; Jäger and Th omé 2013), and has also been allowed by the courts.19
In the Netherlands, it is up to the municipalities to decide what kind of employment 
programmes to off er. Initially it was only possible to oblige social assistance claimants 
to work under Article 9(1)(b) WWB, which imposed a general requirement on social 
assistance claimants to cooperate with a re-integration programme. Usually these 
placements did not last for longer than six months, and sought to achieve quick re-
integration into regular employment. Th e fear that longer work project placements 
might confer employment rights on welfare benefi ciaries prompted the government, in 
2008, to introduce Article 10(a) WWB. Th is allows municipalities to oblige recipients 
of social assistance to work without a wage in ‘participation placements’ for up to 
four years. Participation placements are designed for recipients of social assistance 
whose chances of fi nding a regular job are relatively low and who need more time to 
prepare themselves for the labour market.20 Recipients of social assistance who fail to 
fi nd a regular job aft er a six-month placement under Article 9(1)(b) can be required 
to work in a participation placement for a further four years.21 As a result, recipients 
of social assistance can be required to work without a wage for four and a half years. 
In practice, claimants are commonly required to work without a wage for between 16 
and 36 hours a week (FNV 2013; Kok and Houkes 2011).
Th e best-known ‘work preparation programmes’ in the UK are the Work 
Programme and the Mandatory Work Activity scheme. Th e Work Programme 
started in April 2011, and is designed to assist claimants at risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed. Under the programme, private providers help claimants to get back into 
work by providing job search support, skills training and work placements designed 
to benefi t the community.22 Claimants aged 25 or older can be required to enter a 
Work Programme aft er being unemployed for 12 months. Th e Work Programme is 
for a maximum of two years.
Th e other new programme, the Mandatory Work Activity scheme, was also 
introduced in 2011. Th is scheme provides four weeks of work (or work-related activity) 
for up to 30 hours a week, and is ‘aimed at those who require extra support to help 
them re-focus their approach to job search and gain work-related disciplines’, such as 
‘attending on time and every day, following instructions, working in teams’ and so on.23
Th e new scheme, the Community Work Placements Programme, is targeted at 
claimants who have been unemployed for three years. It is no coincidence that this 
19 BSG 16 December 2008 B 4 AS 60/07 R.
20 Parliamentary Papers 30 650 No. 3.
21 Article 10(a)(3) WWB.
22 Jobseeker’s Allowance (Schemes for Assisting Persons to Obtain Employment) Regulations 
2013/276, Article 3(8).
23 Explanatory Memorandum to the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity Scheme) 
Regulations 2011, points 2 and 7.3. See also Article 2(1) of the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory 
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scheme started on 28 April 2014, two years aft er the launch of the Work Programme, 
which had a maximum length of two years. Th e Community Work Placements 
Programme is designed for claimants whose key barriers to work are their lack of work 
experience, lack of motivation, or both. Public, private and volunteer organisations 
will place claimants in work for 30 hours a week for up to 26 weeks (DWP 2013). 
Hence, in the UK the recipient of social assistance can be required to work without a 
wage for a period of up to two years and 30 weeks, which is substantially longer than 
the six months of wage subsidy provided under Tony Blair’s New Deal programme of 
1998.24
In fact, all investigated countries have extended the length of the duty to work 
without a wage fairly recently. Th e question can be raised as to whether this extension 
has improved the chances of fi nding a stable regular job. Scant research does not 
provide evidence of the re-integration into paid employment because of a long-term 
requirement to work without a wage (Crisp and Fletcher 2008).25 Th e duty to work 
without a wage only seems to have a positive eff ect on the re-integration of men into 
regular employment at the very start of the programme (the ‘stick eff ect’), and between 
weeks 10 and 25 of unemployment (Graversen and Van Ours 2008; Pedersen et al 
2012). Th ere also seems to be a group of welfare benefi ciaries that constantly moves 
between poorly paid jobs and a welfare situation (Bruttel and Sol 2006; Eichorst and 
Konle-Seidl 2008). In Dutch policy language persons belonging to this group are 
called ‘fl ex benefi ciaries’ (Divosa monitor 2008 and 2009). In Section 5 I will further 
refl ect on this issue.
3.4. RECIPROCITY
In 2012 the Dutch government introduced the ‘civil community job’ in social assistance 
legislation.26 According to the government, the civil job entails a ‘civic requirement 
in return for the solidarity people receive from the community’.27 As the government 
contended, the principle of reciprocity is more appropriate in a more participative 
society in which everyone contributes according to his or her ability, and where 
citizens take responsibility not only for their own lives, but also for the society in 
which they live.28 Hence, the primary goal of civil community jobs is not to reintegrate 
claimants into regular jobs, but instead to get them to do something in return for their 
24 Claimants who are seriously disadvantaged in the labour market, including those who have recently 
received incapacity benefi t, may be required to enter the Work Programme aft er three months of 
unemployment (Work Programme Provider Guidance, Chapter 2, Annex A, updated 26 November 
2012).
25 Research in the Netherlands has shown that the regional labour market is more eff ective for re-
integration into regular paid employment than municipal re-integration policies (Edzes 2010).
26 Article 9(1)(c) WWB.
27 Parliamentary Papers, 2011–12, 32815, No. 3, 14–15.





allowances. According to the Participation Act, all municipalities will be required to 
develop municipal policy on civil community jobs.29 Th e Participation Act imposes 
a number of conditions on the requirement to perform civil community jobs: (1) the 
performance of civil community jobs should not impede the re-integration of the 
recipient of social assistance into regular jobs; (2) the length of these activities should 
be limited;30 and (3) the municipalities are required to take individual circumstances 
into account in case they impose the requirement to perform civil community jobs. 
Th at is, the recipient of social assistance should be physically, psychologically and 
mentally capable of performing this job. Th e municipality does not, however, need to 
take account of recipients of social assistance’ previous work experience.
Despite the fact that the German and British have not implemented the civic 
requirement into their social assistance legislation, legal and political changes indicate 
that also in these countries, the duty to perform work without a wage no longer 
exclusively serves the goal of re-integration into a regular job. For example, whereas 
the aim of the German ‘one euro jobs’ is to increase employability and opportunities to 
participate in the regular labour market,31 a recent amendment revoked a clause that 
required ‘one euro jobs’ to contribute to improving claimants’ professional knowledge 
and skills.32 We also fi nd evidence for a turn to a civic requirement in the parliamentary 
history. In 2008, for example, the German government argued, in response to questions 
from the left -wing opposition, that the goal of ‘one euro jobs’ was not only to reintegrate 
the unemployed into regular jobs, but that performing ‘one euro jobs’ also served as an 
act of reciprocity by welfare benefi ciaries towards the community.33 In addition, in 2011 
the German Parliament started a petition requiring employable welfare recipients to 
perform public labour activities in return for their allowances, while imposing sanctions 
on those refusing to participate or failing to turn up on time.34 At the same time, the 
responsible Minister, Von der Leyen (CDU), stated that the unemployed should be 
expected to do something in return for their monthly allowance funded by taxpayers.35
We fi nd a comparable trend in the UK. Th e Mandatory Work Activity Provider 
Guidance, for example, states: ‘A community benefi t placement must be of benefi t to 
the community over and above the benefi t of providing a placement to the individual.’36 
In addition, according to the government’s guidance on Mandatory Work Activity: 
‘Th ere is no work experience element for the MWA scheme, instead there is a work 
29 Article 7 (3) Participation Act.
30 Th e Court of Breda has ruled that a 32-hour working week is too long for such jobs (Court of Breda, 
25 February 2013, LJN BZ 5171).
31 Drucksache 17/622:115.
32 Amendment of Article3(2) SGB II of 1 April 2012.
33 DB 16/8934.
34 Petition 16634. Gemeinnützige Arbeit für Arbeitslosengelt II-Empfänger, 17 February 2011.
35 Frankfurter Allgemeine, 20 January 2010.
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placement for community benefi t.’37 Th is suggests that that a reciprocal act by the 
claimant towards the community is even more important than the extent to which the 
work placement contributes to the claimant’s chances of fi nding a regular job. Th is turn 
towards reciprocity is confi rmed in the new political discourse. For instance, in 2008 
the Conservatives, who were still in opposition at the time, argued that they would 
‘not allow anyone claiming Jobseekers Allowances over a long period to do nothing’ 
(Conservative Party 2008:34). And in 2013, Chancellor George Osborne, announcing 
the new Community Work Placements Programme, reiterated the language used by 
the Conservative Party fi ve years earlier, arguing that: ‘Th ere is no option of doing 
nothing for our benefi ts, no something-for-nothing anymore.’38
4. SANCTIONS
In the contractual relationship between the recipient of social assistance and the 
governmental agency, sanctions have a central place. If the recipient of social assistance 
fails to do her part of the agreement (i.e. to work without a wage), the governmental 
agency may also refrain from ITS’ part of the agreement (i.e. to pay benefi ts). In all 
three countries, sanctions can be imposed on recipients of social assistance who do 
not show up for work, who arrive late, or who otherwise misbehave at their designated 
place of work. Usually this means that their allowances will be cut. In this section I 
compare the amount of the sanction, the implemented hardship clauses and the eff ect 
of a sanction on the amount of the benefi t.
4.1. THE AMOUNT OF THE SANCTION
Th e German and British legislators have laid down the sanctions in legislation. 
Sanctions can be imposed on recipients of social assistance in Germany if they refuse 
to perform reasonable labour activities (i.e. to take ‘one euro jobs’) without a good 
reason.39 Th e sanction amounts to a three-month reduction of their allowances by 30 
per cent for a fi rst failure to work, with any second or third failure being punished by 
cuts for three months of 60 per cent and 100 per cent, respectively.40
In the UK, a low-level sanction can be imposed if a claimant fails to meet a work 
preparation requirement, such as participation in the Work Programme, without good 
reason.41 Th e sanction of a cut of 100 per cent in the allowance can be imposed for an 
indefi nite number of days, starting on the date the sanctionable action took place, and 
37 Advice for Decision Making, Chapter K3, K3037.
38 Speech by Chancellor Osborne, 30 September 2013.
39 Article 31(1) SGB II.
40 Article  32(a)(1) and 31(b)(1) SGB II. Th e sanctions are slightly diff erent for welfare benefi ciaries 
under 25.





ending no earlier than the date on which the claimant fulfi ls the condition. A fi xed-
period sanction of between 7 and 28 days may also be imposed. Higher fi xed-period 
sanctions apply if a claimant fails to meet a Mandatory Work Activity without good 
reason. In that case a higher-level sanction of 100 per cent may be imposed for 91 days. 
In the event of a second failure to comply, a reduction may be applied for 182 days.42
In the Netherlands, municipalities reduce the benefi ts in accordance with their 
municipal regulations.43 Municipal regulations usually allow allowances to be cut by 
20 per cent for one month in the event of a minor failure, but the reduction may 
rise to 100 per cent. Although the Central Appeals Tribunal (CRvB), which is the 
highest appeal court for social security cases in the Netherlands, has forbidden the 
imposition of indefi nite sanctions, it has, nevertheless, allowed a sanction of 100 per 
cent for seven months.44 Th e new Participation Act will reduce much of the municipal 
discretion in this respect. From 1  January 2015, municipalities will be required to 
reduce allowances by 100 per cent for one month if social assistance claimants do 
not comply with re-integration duties.45 In the case of recidivism, allowances may 
be reduced by 100 per cent for three months.46 Th e municipal sanction system with 
respect to the civic requirement will not be altered.
4.2. HARDSHIP REGULATIONS
In some cases, imposed sanctions can be soft ened by hardship regulations. In Germany, 
for example, benefi ciaries whose allowances are cut by more than 30 per cent can apply 
for supplementary benefi t in kind. Although it is up to the Job Centre to decide whether 
to grant this, it is required to grant it if the household includes minor children.47
In the UK, benefi ciaries upon whom sanctions have been imposed may claim 
hardship payments (which are usually recoverable) if they cannot meet their 
immediate and most basic and essential needs or those of a child for whom they are 
responsible, providing the claimant (now) meets all work-related requirements.48 In 
addition, the sanction may also be reduced by 40 per cent in certain situations, such 
as if the sanctioned person is responsible for providing care.49 Th e DWP may also visit 
claimants considered vulnerable, such as those with a mental health condition or a 
42 Article 26 WRA 2012.
43 Article 18(2) WWB.
44 CRvB 3 July 2012, RSV 2012/210.
45 See Article 18(5) Participation Act.
46 See Article 18(6), 18(7) and 18(8) Participation Act.
47 Article 31(a)(3) SGB II.
48 Article 28 WRA; Article 116(2) and (3) UC Regulations and Article 16(d)(2)(b-d) and (3) SS (LB) 
Regulations.
49 A 40 per cent reduction can also be granted in the event of pregnancy (in the fi nal 11 weeks of 
pregnancy), childbirth (in the fi rst 15 weeks aft er childbirth), and if the claimant has adopted a child 
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learning disability, before applying a sanction, in order to establish whether there is a 
good reason for the failure to comply.
Under the Dutch WWB, sanctioned recipients of social assistance can only claim 
hardship payments in very exceptional circumstances.50 In practice, these kinds of 
claims hardly ever succeed. For example, in a recent case where the municipality 
imposed a sanction of 100 per cent for six months, the Central Appeals Tribunal 
dismissed an appeal on a general hardship clause, notwithstanding the presence of 
dependent children, major debt problems and imminent eviction.51 Nonetheless, 
the new Participation Act contains hardship clauses similar to those in the German 
and British regulations. For example, according to this Act, a municipality may 
revise the 100 per cent cut before the sanction period has ended, if the benefi ciary 
now complies with the mandatory activities.52 Th e municipality can also decide to 
reduce the sanction in the event of urgent reasons, such as further marginalisation, 
debt problems and eviction.53 And, like the German and British legislation, special 
attention has to be paid to family interests in case sanctions are imposed.54
4.3. THE EFFECT OF A SANCTION ON THE AMOUNT OF THE 
BENEFIT
It is important to notice that the eff ect of a sanction of 100 per cent is not the same 
for all investigated countries. Th at is, for a full understanding of the possible impact 
of sanctions, we need to take a closer look at the composition of the allowances. 
Social assistance allowances in the Netherlands comprise a single monthly sum, 
the amount of which depends on the composition of the household. Th e German 
and British allowances, on the other hand, contain diff ering elements. Whereas, in 
the Netherlands, the sanction is imposed on the total monthly sum received, the 
sanctions in Germany and the UK are imposed only on the cost of living allowance 
(Germany)55 or the standard allowances (UK).56 In the case of Germany, this means 
that sanctioned recipients of social assistance retain their entitlement to, inter alia, 
allowances for women who are more than 12 weeks pregnant, extra allowances for lone 
parents,57allowances for reasonable costs of rent and heating,58 and extra allowances 
for children under 16 who are living in the household.59 In the UK, sanctioned 
50 Article 16 WWB.
51 CRvB 17 December 2013, 12/3121 WWB, USZ 2014/28.
52 Article 18(7) Participation Act.
53 Article 18(6) Participation Act. See also the Parliamentary Papers 2013–14, 33801, No. 3. 3.
54 Article 18(8) Participation Act.
55 Article 31(a)(1) SGB II and Article 20 SGB II.
56 Article 111(1) UC Regulations.
57 Article 21(2) SGB II.
58 Article 22 SGB II.





recipients of social assistance retain their entitlement to additional allowances for 
children and housing costs.60
Th e diff erences between the systems can be illustrated by the example of a 
workable, unemployed lone parent with two children aged seven and nine in the 
household. For the purposes of the example, we will assume that the person pays 
monthly rent of € 350, with heating costs of € 100 a month. If this person receives a 100 
per cent sanction because of refusing to attend a designated work project, the sanction 
hits hardest in the Netherlands, where the total allowance received will reduce by 69 
per cent (from € 1338.61 to € 412.14). Th is is much higher than in Britain, where the 
reduction will be 25 per cent (from € 1484.15 to € 1112.60), and Germany, where the 
reduction will amount to only 21 per cent of the total allowance (from € 1847.52 to 
1465.52).61 Th e relative reduction depends, fi rst of all, on factors such as the number 
and age of children living in the household. In addition, as Table 1 demonstrates, the 
cost of the rent also slightly reduces the diff erences between the countries.62
Table 1. Reduction of total allowance aft er 100 per cent sanction
Rent Germany the Netherlands the United Kingdom
€ 200 23% 77% 28%
€ 350 21% 69% 25%
€ 500 19% 64% 23%
5. CONCLUSION
Th e analysis in Sections 3 and 4 has shown that the contractual relationship between 
recipient of social assistance and government agencies in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK has been restructured in important ways. First, the personal scope of the 
programmes has been extended, as a result of which more and more people a long 
distance from the labour market are subjected to the contractual duty to work without 
a wage. Second, there is a tendency to extend the length of the programmes to work 
without a wage, as a result of which recipients of social assistance can be required to 
perform work activities without receiving a wage for consecutive years. At the same time, 
evidence from empirical research raises doubts as to whether this extension positively 
60 Housing costs are fully subsidised, providing the rent is reasonable and the house is not too large.
61 I have taken into account all social assistance benefi ts and allowances the claimant receives for 
the children, housing and heating. Amounts are based on the monthly rates in 2013 (GBP  1 = 
EUR 1.19, 16 November 2013). Sources used: www.missoc.org, www.belastingdienst.nl (consulted 
on 25 November 2013), Jäger and Th omé (2013) and Child Poverty Action Group (2013/2014).
62 For Germany and the United Kingdom, I assumed that a rent of € 500 was considered reasonable, 
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aff ects the chances of fi nding a regular paid job. In fact, the fi rst and the second trend 
are in line with a third trend, according to which the duty increasingly takes the form 
of a reciprocity requirement. Th at is, instead of re-integrating into regular paid work, 
the recipient of social assistance is increasingly expected to do something in return for 
her benefi ts. Th is probably explains why the extension of the personal scope and the 
length of the requirement to work without a wage has not met with much resistance.
Th e shift  to reciprocity also reveals the increased signifi cance of the contract: in 
order to receive benefi ts, recipients of social assistance are required, fi rst, to show 
that they are worthy of attaining basic social rights, not only by improving their 
capability to work, but, above all, by showing a willingness to work. However, instead 
of refl ecting the contractual norms of consent and voluntariness, this contract is 
characterised by an imbalance of power relations: if the recipient of social assistance 
refuses to fulfi l her part of the contract, she either loses her safety net benefi ts or 
faces a sanction that amounts to a temporary loss of these benefi ts. Th is leaves the 
recipient of social assistance with no choice other than to comply with the duty to 
work without a wage. Only in cases where recipients of social assistance obtain regular 
paid jobs will they be able to enter a contractual relationship with the government on 
fairly equal terms. Until they reach that stage they are in fact ‘virtual citizens’ who 
are ‘in an active state of becoming full citizens’ (Schinkel 2010; Schram 2010). Indeed, 
recipients of social assistance, especially those who are required to work without a 
wage, are bound to be treated diff erently from ‘full citizens’, which means, inter alia, 
that their social rights are constantly at risk of being curtailed. In conclusion, the shift  
to reciprocity has increased the signifi cance of the idea of in the duty to work without a 
wage. Importantly, this idea of contract does not follow the legal logic of a contractual 
relationship in which parties enter the contract voluntarily and on equal terms. 
Instead, recipients of social assistance are at risk of losing fundamental rights. Not 
only because they may lose access to the fundamental right on an adequate standard 
of living or social assistance, but also because, being treated as second class citizens, 
they risk losing access to other basic (social) rights as well. Both points are addressed 
in the agenda for future research (Section 6). If we return to the two views outlined 
in the introduction, this analysis seems to endorse the view that the new contractual 
relationship fi rst and foremost reinforces control mechanisms, which enhance the role 
of the state as the regulator of the behaviour of welfare claimants. What about the 
other view, which stresses the positive eff ects of social investment and improvements 
in the employability of recipients of social assistance? Th ere are two issues that call for 
discussion in this respect. First, the shift  from re-integration to reciprocity shows that 
the duty to work without a wage is not necessarily related to an enhancement of the 
human capital of recipients of social assistance. Second, the question can be raised as 
to whether people really need more than four years of ‘on the job training’ before they 
are able to perform (very) low-skilled jobs. And likewise, should the ‘fl ex benefi ciary’, 
who moves between low skilled jobs and social benefi ts, be ‘retrained’ every time for 





Th is analysis does not provide hard conclusions with respect to the extent to which 
the duty to work without a wage enhances the human capital of recipients of social 
assistance. To address this issue properly would require more empirical evidence that 
provides answers to questions such as:
1. What is the (structural) eff ect of the duty to work without a wage on the 
employment rate? Due to the fact that studies designed to answer this question 
would need a control group, there are not many (European) studies available 
measuring structural eff ects, in particular with respect to the eff ects of long-term 
requirement to work without a wage.
2. What is the education and work experience of recipients of social assistance who 
are required to work without a wage, and to what extent do these characteristics 
match the content of the work programme?63
Anyway, it is clear that, in the Netherlands, the restructuring of the contract between 
the recipient of social assistance and the government agency has not resulted in 
increased (fi nancial) eff orts of the government to enhance the employability of 
recipients of social assistance. Instead, since the introduction of WWB, expenditures 
for active labour market policies in the Netherlands have constantly dropped (Eleveld 
and Van Vliet 2013).
If the conclusion that the duty to work without a wage enhances governmental 
control over recipients of social assistance instead of improving their employability 
is right, the Dutch social assistance regime seems to be stricter than those in the 
other two countries. Th is is remarkable, regarding what might be expected from the 
classifi cation used by Cantillon and Van Mechelen (2011). Th e Dutch legislation not 
only allows long-term work programmes to start earlier than in the UK, but also allows 
for longer programmes and longer working weeks, with fewer exemptions from the 
requirement to work without a wage. In addition, the sanctions in the Netherlands are 
higher, and the Netherlands is the only country that has introduced civic jobs that are 
not specifi cally intended to help claimants to enter the labour market.
5.1. RESEARCH AGENDA
It was not possible to cover all legal issues with respect to the contractual duty to 
work without a wage in social assistance legislation. Th erefore in this section I want to 
design a future agenda for social-legal research on the duty to work without a wage. In 
my opinion this agenda should at least address the following issues:
63 Inquiries of the largest Dutch labour union have revealed that the imposition of the duty to work 
without a wage on recipient of social assistance with fairly recent job experience is not unusual 
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1. Th e question of the extent to which the duty to work without a wage may be in breach 
of the prohibition on compulsory labour in Article 4 ECHR and ILO Convention 
29.64 Th is question is interesting, in particular from the perspective of contract. 
Th e metaphor of the contract, then, does not hold, if recipients of social assistance 
are in fact required to perform certain labour activities.
2. Th e formal employment rights of the recipient of social assistance who is required to 
work without a wage. Employment rights are oft en justifi ed because of the unequal 
bargaining position of employees (Davidov and Langille 2011). Along these lines it 
could be argued that recipients of social assistance should be entitled to even more 
protective rules, because their contractual position is more vulnerable than that 
of employees. However, the reverse is the case. Legal research can pinpoint gaps 
in protective rights between, on the one hand, employees, and on the other hand, 
recipients of social assistance.
3. Th e employment protection of the recipient of social assistance in practice. Although 
recipients of social assistance may formally enjoy some (employment) rights, it is 
not at all clear to what extent these rights are enforced on the work fl oor. Socio-
legal (ethnographic) research could be helpful in mapping the extent to which 
formal legal rights are enforced in practice.
4. Th e use of ‘good reason’ clauses and hardship clauses. As far as access to social 
rights is concerned, hardship clauses would seem to help ensure suffi  cient levels of 
income for sanctioned recipients of social assistance, particularly if children are 
involved. However, further research is needed to establish what counts as a ‘good’ 
reason, and how hardship clauses are interpreted by the court.
5. Th e eff ect of invoking fundamental social rights. Th e question that needs to be 
answered here is whether fundamental social rights can provide a counterweight 
to unbalanced contractual relations between recipients of social assistance and 
governmental agencies.
I believe these are the fi ve core issues for future socio-legal research on the duty to 
work without a wage in social assistance legislation. Together with two socio-economic 
research questions mentioned in Section 5, I have provided a list of at least seven subjects 
for future research. It is important to note, though, that it is impossible to protect the 
position of working recipients of social assistance using formal legal rules alone. Th ere 
will always remain a margin of discretion within which recipients of social assistance 
who are required to work without a wage are at the mercy of the governmental agency 
and/or the ‘employer’. As mentioned above, ethnographic research may be helpful in 
mapping the circumstances of these recipients of social assistance.
64 For Dutch ruling see: CRvB 8 February 2010, LJN BL 1093; RSV 2010/79. For British ruling see: 
[2012] EWHC 2292 (Admin); [2013] EWCA Civ. 66; [2013] UKSC 68. For German ruling see: 
Articles 12(2) and (3) of the German Constitution. See BSG, 16 December 2008 B 4 AS 60/07 SozR 
4–4200 para. 16 No. 4; BSG 13 April 2011 B 14 AS 101/10 R SozR 4–2000 para. 16 No. 8. Also see the 






Barbier, J.C and Knut, M. (2010) Of similarities and divergences: why there is no 
continental ideal-type of “activation reforms”, CES Working Papers 2010.75.
Becker, U. and Von Hardenberg, S. (2010) ‘Country Report on Germany’, in 
Becker, U., Peters, D., Ross, F. and Schoukens, P. (eds.), Security: A general 
principle of social security law in Europe. Europe Law Publishing, 99–146.
Betzelt, S. and Bothfeld, S. (eds.) (2011) Activation and Labour Market Reforms 
in Europe. Challenges to Social Citizenship, Basingstoke: Hampshire and New 
York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Bieback, K. (2009) ‘“Social assistance” in Germany, France and the United Kingdom: 
from the “poor poor” to the “eligible poor”; from “welfare” to “workfare”’, 
Journal of Social Security Law 16(4), 207–227.
Bruttel, O. and Sol, E. (2006) ‘Work First as a European model? Evidence on Work 
First in Germany and the Netherlands’, Policy and Politics 34(1), 68–89.
Cantillon, B. and Van Mechelen, N. (2011) ‘Tussen droom en daad… Over 
armoedebestrijding, minimuminkomensgarantie en het Europese sociale 
model’, CSB Berichten D/2011/6104/03.
Child Poverty Action Group (2013) Welfare Benefi ts and Tax Credits Handbook, 
15th edition, London.
Conservative Party (2008) ‘Work for Welfare. REAL welfare reform to help make 
British poverty history’, Policy Green Paper No. 3, London.
Crisp, R. and Fletcher, D.R. (2008) A comparative review of workfare programmes 
in the United States, Canada and Australia, Department of Work and Pensions, 
Research Report No. 533, London.
Davidov, G. and Langille, B. (eds.) (2011) Th e Idea of Labour Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Department of Work and Pensions (2010) 21st Century Welfare, Green Paper, Cm 
7913, London.
Department of Work and Pensions (2013) Community Work Placement 
Information Package for Delivery Partners, November, London.
Divosa (2008) WWB monitor.
Divosa (2009) WWB monitor.
Edzes, A.J.E. (2010) Werk en Bijstand: arbeidsmarktstrategiëen van gemeenten, 
University of Groningen Th e Netherlands (PhD Th esis).
Eichenhofer, E. (2008) ‘“Hartz” reforms – Hard reconstructions?’ in Stendahl, S., 
Erhag, T. and Devetzi, S. (eds.), A European Work-fi rst Welfare State, 133–143.
Eichenhofer, E. (2013) ‘Social rights and conditional benefi ts’, Paper presented at 
the 10th European Conference of the International Labour and Employment 
Association (ILERA), 20–22 June.
Eichorst, W. and Konle-Seidl, R. (2008) Contingent Convergence: A Comparative 





Th e Duty to Work Without a Wage: a Legal Comparison Between Social Assistance 
Legislation in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
European Journal of Social Security, Volume 16 (2014), No. 3 223
Eleveld, A. and Van Vliet, O.P. (2013), ‘Th e Dutch welfare state: Recent reforms 
in social security and labour law’, Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, 4, 
1371–1399.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) Th e Th ree Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
FNV (2012) Werken in de Bijstand. Allesbehalve Gewoon Goed Werk, Amsterdam.
FNV (2013) Beter Zicht op Werken. Vervolg op het FNV Zwartboek ‘Werken in de 
Bijstand’, Amsterdam.
Freedland, M. and King, D. (2003) ‘Contractual Governance and Illiberal Contracts: 
Some problems of contractualism as an instrument of behaviour management 
by agencies of government’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27, 465–477.
Graversen. B. and Van Ours, J. (2008) ‘How to help unemployed fi nd jobs quickly. 
Experimental evidence from a mandatory activation program’, Journal of Public 
Economics, 92, 2020–2035.
Handler, J.F. (2003) Social citizenship and workfare in the United States and Western 
Europe. Th e paradox of inclusion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Handler, J.F. (2009) ‘Welfare, workfare and citizenship in the developed world’, 
Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, 5, 71–90.
Harris, N. (2010) ‘Country report on the United Kingdom’, in Becker, U., Peters, D. 
Ross, F. and Schoukens, P. (eds.), Security: A general principle of social security 
law in Europe, Europe Law Publishing, 555–603.
Harris, N. and Wikeley, N. (2007) Editorial, Journal of Social Security Law 14 (1), 
1–2.
Hartz Commission (2002) ‘Modern services on the labour market’, Report of the 
Commission.
Hemerijck (2013) Changing Welfare States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hohmeyer, K. and Jozwiak, E. (2008) ‘Who is targeted by One-Euro-Jobs? A 
selectivity analysis’, IAB-Discussion Paper 8.
Jäger, F. and Thomé, H. (2013) Leitfaden Alg. II/ Sozialhilfe van A-Z, Frankfurt: DVS 
Verlag.
Jessop, B. (2002) Th e Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Jorgensen, H. (2009) ‘From a beautiful swan to an ugly duckling: the renewal of 
Danish activation policy since 2003’, European Journal of Social Security 11(4), 
337–367.
Kok, L. and Houkes, A. (2011). Gemeentelijk re-integratiebeleid vergeleken, SEO.
Lødemel I. and Trickey H. (eds.) (2001) An Off er You Can’t Refuse. Workfare in 
International Perspective, Bristol: Policy Press.
Pedersen, J.M., Rosholm, M. and Swarer, M. (2012) Experimental evidence 
on the eff ects of early meetings and activation, Discussion Paper Series, 
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft  der Arbeit, No. 6970.
Powell, M. and Barrientos, A. (2004) ‘Welfare Regimes and the Welfare Mix’, 





Sapir, A. (2006) ‘Globalization and the reform of European social models’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 44(2), 369–390.
Schram, S.F., Soss, J., Houser, L. and Fording, R.C. (2010) ‘Th e Th ird Level of 
US Welfare Reform: Governmentality under Neo-liberal Paternalism, 14(6), 
Citizenship Studies, 739–754.
Schinkel, W. (2010) ‘Th e virtualization of citizenship’, Critical Sociology, 36 (2), 265–
283.
Stendahl, S. (2008), ‘Employment support – a normative step backward, forward or 
nowhere?’ in Stendahl, S., Erhag, T. and Devetzi, S. (eds.) A European Work-
fi rst Welfare State.
Stendahl, S., Erhag, T. and Devetzi, S. (eds.) (2008) A European Work-fi rst Welfare 
State, Gothenburg: Centre for European Research.
Serrano Pascual, A. and Magnusson, L. (eds.) (2007) Reshaping welfare states and 
activation regimes in Europe, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A.
Van Berkel, R. (2006) ‘Th e decentralization of social assistance in the Netherlands’ 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 26(1/2), 20–32.
Van Berkel, R., de Graaf, W. and Sirovatka, T. (2011) Th e Governance of Active 






European Journal of Social Security, Volume 16 (2014), No. 3 225
INCREASING PENSION AGES IN 
GREECE AND IRELAND: 
A QUESTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
Elaine Dewhurst and Dafni Diliagka*
Abstract
Th is paper examines the changes to pension ages in Greece and Ireland precipitated 
by the global fi nancial crisis and introduced as a result of the Greek and Irish 
bail-outs. Th e paper analyses whether pensioners in the two jurisdictions had a 
legitimate expectation that such changes would not occur or whether they had 
a legitimate expectation that such changes would not be introduced without 
transitional measures. It concludes that, while there is no existing legal protection 
of the legitimate expectation in either case, there are some moral arguments in 
support of the introduction of transitional measures to ensure that pensioners can 
make the necessary adjustments to their fi nancial aff airs in the light of the changes 
in pension law.
Keywords: administrative law; legitimate expectations; pension age; pension law; 
transitional arrangements
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e European fi nancial crisis, precipitated by the wider global economic crisis, has 
had a signifi cant infl uence on the social rights of residents of the EU. Illustrative of this 
impact are the alterations to the pension age in many EU Member States. While many 
Member States were considering such changes to the pension age as a consequence 
* Dr. Elaine Dewhurst is a Senior Lecturer in Employment Law, University of Manchester. Address: 
Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, United Kingdom; phone: +44 161 2755785; e-mail: elaine.
dewhurst@manchester.ac.uk. Ms. Dafni Diliagka is a PhD Student at the Max Planck Institute for 
Social Law and Social Policy. Address: Amalienstrasse 33, D-80799 München, Germany; phone: 
+49 89 38602406; e-mail: diliagka@mpisoc.mpg.de. Th ey would like to sincerely thank Professor 
Dr. Ulrich Becker for assisting them in the preparation and fi nalisation of this article and for his 
invaluable insights throughout the process, and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable 
comments. Th e two authors contributed equally to this article.
2e PRO
EF
Elaine Dewhurst and Dafni Diliagka
226 Intersentia
of demographic transformation and its fi nancial impact, in some cases, the change 
occurred much quicker, conditional upon fi nancial aid from the EU and the IMF. 
Greece1 and Ireland2 were the fi rst Member States to seek and receive fi nancial 
aid from the EU and the IMF. However, these fi nancial aid packages also included 
conditions, oft en negotiated very quickly, to increase pension ages in Greece and in 
Ireland (although both Ireland and Greece had been considering such a change prior 
to these events). In Greece, the general pension age of 65 years increased to 67 years 
from 1 January 2013, without the introduction of any transitional period, and special 
treatment for some specifi c groups was abolished.3 Ireland, on the other hand, saw an 
increase in the normal pension age, with a shift  from 65 years to 66 years in 2014 and 
with further shift s to occur in 2021 and 2028.4
Th e rise of the retirement age aff ected the stability and predictability of the law 
in both jurisdictions since prospective pensioners, who had organised and planned 
their economic aff airs based on a lower retirement age, now face very uncertain 
circumstances. In social states, such as Greece and Ireland, the necessity that legal 
provisions are governed by consistency and coherence is protected by the principle 
of legitimate expectation. Th e purpose and function of the concept of legitimate 
expectation is similar in many jurisdictions on the grounds that ‘the law should protect 
the trust that has been reposed in the promise made by an offi  cial. Good government 
depends upon trust between the governed and the governor. Unless that trust is 
sustained, protected offi  cials will not be believed and individuals will not order their 
aff airs on that assumption’.5 Th e German concept of Vertrauensschutz also highlights 
the importance of trust as a central purpose of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. 
Schroeder has commented that the protection of legitimate expectations in English 
law (and similarly Irish law) ‘is derived from the principle of Vertrauensschutz, which 
seeks to ensure that “everyone who trusts the legality of a public administrative 
decision should be protected”’.6 Similar references to trust and confi dence can be 
identifi ed in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union where the 
principle of legitimate expectation ‘extends to any  individual where, by giving him 
1 Th e EU off ered its fi rst fi nancial support to Greece on 25 March 2010 and Greece sought fi nancial 
support on 25 April 2010. A loan package of € 110 billion was agreed on 2 May 2010. Greece also 
received a further fi nancial aid package on 21 February 2012. See European Central Bank, “Key 
Dates of the Financial Crisis”, available at www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html.
2 Ireland sought fi nancial support on 21 November 2010 and a package of measures was agreed on 
7 December 2010. Th is included a loan package of € 85 billion. Details are available at http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_fi nance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010–12–01-fi nancial-assistanceireland_en. 
htm.
3 For further details, see Section 2.1 below.
4 For further details, see Section 2.2 below.
5 Forsyth (2011: 2).
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precise assurances, an institution has led him to entertain reasonable expectations’.7 
Th e notion of the principle of legitimate expectation is also recognised as a general 
principle of European Law.8 According to Advocate General Cosmas, the principle of 
legitimate expectation requires the legislature and the national authorities to exercise 
their powers over a period of time in such a way that situations and relationships 
lawfully created under national law are not aff ected in a manner which could not 
have been foreseen by a diligent person.9 However, the protection of legitimate 
expectations is not an absolute right10 and therefore, there will be cases where the 
legislator is allowed to increase the normal retirement age, taking into consideration 
e.g. the demographic changes occurring in the country or the on-going changes in 
economic and social circumstances, particularly, during an economic crisis.
Th is paper examines three distinct questions based on the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation in Greek and Irish law. Firstly, did prospective pensioners in EU Member 
States and, in particular, Greece and Ireland, have a legitimate expectation that the 
law relating to pensions would not be amended? Secondly, did prospective pensioners 
have a legitimate expectation that the law relating to pensions would not be amended 
without the introduction of suffi  cient transitional measures? Th irdly, if such a 
legitimate expectation exists, can it be protected under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)? Th is paper analyses this question 
through case studies of the legal situation in both Greece and Ireland. Th e paper 
begins with a legal analysis of pension ages in the chosen states both prior to, and 
aft er, the EU and IMF bail-outs. Th is analysis reveals the extent of the alterations 
made to pension ages in both Member States as a result of the bail-out agreements. 
Secondly, the paper addresses one particular legal claim that may be available to 
prospective pensioners in Greece and Ireland, namely the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation.
Th e paper concludes, in relation to the fi rst question, that the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation is unlikely to be of assistance to prospective pensioners in Ireland or in 
Greece, due to the current interpretation of the doctrine in both jurisdictions. In 
both Greece and Ireland, the prospective pensioner will be met by the argument that 
the expectation is either not legitimate, is a fetter on the discretion of the executive 
or is not in the public interest, in light of the severe economic conditions prevailing 
in the state. In relation to the second question, it concludes that a claim for some 
reasonable notice or transitional measures will face similar legal obstacles, although 
7 Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Food Products (Lopik) v EEC (Case C-265/85) at para 243 and 
Joined Cases T-66/96 and T-222/97 Mellett v Court of Justice [1998] ECR-SC I-A-449 and II-1305, 
at para 104, French Republic (T-427/04) and France Télécom SA (T-17/05) v Commission of the 
European Communities at para 259.
8 C- 104/1989, Mulder and other v Council of the European Communities and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment of 19 May 1992 at para 15.
9 Opinion of advocate General Cosmas, delivered on 8 June 1995, C- 63/93 O’ Donovan v Minister for 
Agriculture and Others at paras 24 and 25.
10 Becker and Von Hardenberg (2009:118).
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there appears to be some general acceptance that transitional measures are desirable, 
at least in Ireland. Finally, the paper concludes that a prospective pensioner will not 
have a claim under the ECHR, due to the uncertain basis of the legitimate expectation 
claim in national law.
2. PENSION AGE: PRE AND POST CRISIS
Pension ages across EU Member States diverge greatly and have undergone substantial 
alteration over the decades.11 Ireland is an interesting example as it introduced a 
pension age of 70 years in 190812 which it then lowered to the current age of 65 years 
in the 1970s. In Greece, the pension age was set at 65 in 1951. Th is pension age applied 
mainly to men working in the private-sector. Th e pension ages of civil servants and 
other privileged groups were much lower and rather diverse.13 Th is section of the paper 
outlines the current pension ages in Ireland and Greece and the changes precipitated 
by the EU and IMF fi nancial agreements.
2.1. PENSION AGE IN GREECE AND THE RECENT LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES
Within the framework of the fi nancial facility agreements, the EU, in cooperation 
with the IMF, advised Greece to implement stringent fi scal and monetary policies. To 
meet the conditions of the loans, Greece has had, inter alia, to re-arrange its pension 
system, given that ‘pensions are the dominant part of social security and they form 
a signifi cant component of the entire Greek macro-economy’14, by increasing the 
normal and early retirement age. Th e new pension law (Law No. 4093/2012), which 
came into force in January 2013, foresees an extension of two years to the statutory 
retirement age, bringing the pension age to 67 in most cases.15 Th e early retirement 
age will increase from the age of 55 years (or, in some exceptional cases, earlier than 
55 years) to the age of 62 years.16 Furthermore, civil servants, who were previously 
allowed to receive a pension at any age, as long as they could prove that they had 35 to 
37 years of service, will now receive a pension when they reach the age of 67 years.17 
11 OECD (2011).
12 Old Age Pension Act 1908. For a more detailed consideration of pensions in Ireland see Whelan (2005).
13 E.g. the civil servants appointed before 31 December 1982 and retired before 31 December 1997 
could retire at the age of 55 years for men and 53 for women. See Explanatory Report of Law 
2084/1992 of 31 August 1992, at p. 1.
14 Börsch-Supan and Tinios (2002: 361).
15 Law 4093/2012, Offi  cial Journal (OJ) of 12  November 2012, Fascicle A 222, as amended by Law 
4111/2013, OJ of 25 January 2013, Fascile A 18.
16 Law 3863/2010, OJ of 15 July 2010, Fascicle A 115, as amended by Law 4093/2012.
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No transitional measures were put in place for those close to the retirement age, apart 
from those who had reached the age of 65 years by the 31 December 2012.
Of signifi cant interest for the purposes of this paper is the fact that the extension 
of two years in the normal retirement age (from 65 to 67) was legislated for without 
the introduction of any transitional periods. Th e non-introduction of transitional 
measures arose as a result of the pressures precipitated by the fi nancial agreement 
and increasing public debt. However, this raises signifi cant legal questions which are 
addressed below.
2.2. PENSION AGE IN IRELAND AND RECENT LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES
While the changes to the pension age in Ireland are less complex, they are no less 
signifi cant. Conditional upon the EU/IMF Programme of Financial Support for 
Ireland18 and the Irish Memorandum of Understanding on Specifi c Economic 
Policy Conditionality19, Ireland agreed to implement structural reforms to increase 
progressively the state pension age20 from the standard age of 65 years to the age of 
68 years.21 Th is was to be achieved through a number of measures, including the 
abolition of the State Pension (Transition) from 2014, which is available to persons 
aged 65. Th e State Pension (Transition) was available on fulfi lment of certain criteria, 
among which is that the individual claimant must be 65 years of age. At the age of 
66 years, the individual became entitled to receive a State Pension (Contributory).22 
As from 1  January 2014, the State Pension (Transition) was removed, eff ectively 
raising the pension age to 66.23 In addition, the Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2011 
makes provision for raising the pension age to 67 in 202124 and 68 in 2028.25 Certain 
18 Available at www.socialjustice.ie/sites/default/fi les/fi le/Government%20Docs%20etc/2010–12–01%20
-%20EU-IMF%20Programme%20of%20Financial%20Support%20for%20Irl%20-%20Programme% 
20docs.pdf.
19 Available at www.socialjustice.ie/sites/default/fi les/fi le/Government%20Docs%20etc/2010–12–01%20
-%20EU-IMF%20Programme%20of%20Financial%20Support%20for%20Irl%20-%20Programme% 
20docs.pdf.
20 Available at www.socialjustice.ie/sites/default/fi les/fi le/Government%20Docs%20etc/2010–12–01%20 
-%20EU-IMF%20Programme%20of%20Financial%20Support%20for%20Irl%20-%20Programme% 
20docs.pdf at 12.
21 It should be noted, however, that Ireland had been considering alterations to its pension age since 
early 2010. See Department of Social Protection (2013).
22 Th is applies to both public and private sector workers. See Public Service Superannuation 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (Ireland), section 10.
23 Section 114(9), Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 as inserted by section 6, Social Welfare and 
Pensions Act 2011 (Ireland).
24 Section 2(1), Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 (Ireland) as amended by section 7(1) and (2), 
Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2011 (Ireland).
25 Section 2(1), Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 (Ireland) as amended by section 7(3) and (4), 
Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2011 (Ireland).
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exceptions to these general pension ages exist, including pension entitlement ages for 
members of the permanent defence forces, who receive a pension at 5026, members of 
An Garda Siochana (the police force) who receive a pension at 5527 and members of 
the fi re brigade, who also receive a pension at 55.28 Prison offi  cers likewise receive a 
pension at 55 years.29
3. DO PROSPECTIVE PENSIONERS HAVE A LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION THAT PENSION AGE WILL NOT 
INCREASE?
Th e pension ages in both Greece and Ireland have been altered signifi cantly in recent 
years. Th e legal question which arises is whether individuals aff ected by such legal 
alterations may have a claim that they had a legitimate expectation that they would 
receive a pension at a certain age and that this expectation has now been broken. Th is 
section of the paper explores the potential of such a legal claim in Greece and Ireland. 
It outlines the general basis of a claim, the test that the individuals will be expected 
to meet in each jurisdiction and the potential obstacles to such a claim in each case. 
It concludes that, in both Ireland and Greece, such a claim would fail as a result of 
certain restrictions on the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in this 
context.
3.1. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION IN GREECE AND PENSION AGE 
INCREASES
Th e principle of legitimate expectation in Greece guarantees that the legal order 
and existing and established legal relationships will be sustained and will not be 
unfavourably amended,30 protecting the citizen against any arbitrary action by public 
authorities or the State. It is derived from the principle of the rule of law,31 which 
26 Section 10(2)(a), Public Service Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (Ireland).
27 Section 10(3), Public Service Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (Ireland).
28 Section 10(5), Public Service Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (Ireland).
29 Section 1(1)(a), Superannuation (Prison Offi  cers) Act 1919 as substituted by Section 5(1)(a), Public 
Service Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 (Ireland).
30 Spiliotopoulos (2003: 25).
31 Th e rule of law principle is a constitutional principle deriving from a number of provisions of the 
Greek Constitution, e.g. the principle of separation of powers (Article 26); the right to legal protection 
(Article 20,1); the examination of constitutionality through the national courts (Articles 87,2 and 
93,4); the principle of the protection and exercise of the fundamental rights (Article  25,1) etc. 
Moreover, the principle of the rule of law derives also from Article 6 of the ECHR which secures the 
right to a fair trial and precludes any interference by the legislature on the judicial determination of 
the dispute. See ECtHR, Stran Greek Refi neries and Andreadis v Greece, Application No. 13427/87, 





Increasing Pension Ages in Greece and Ireland: A Question of Legitimate Expectations 
European Journal of Social Security, Volume 16 (2014), No. 3 231
guarantees that the legal provisions are governed by constancy and good governance, 
which is primarily achieved through the protection of the authority and the validity of 
the law.32 Th e doctrine of legitimate expectation in Greek law provides that, before any 
amendment or recall of a specifi c administrative act or administrative practice, the 
expectation of a diligent citizen that his or her rights and legal interests, established 
under national law, will be retained should be taken into consideration and should not 
be amended without transitional periods or the provision of compensation.33 Certain 
requirements must be met before a claim for legitimate expectation can be successful. 
Th e individual must have a representation that the status quo will be maintained, 
must rely on this representation and must have acted in good faith.
3.1.1. Th e Representation Test
In Greek law, an individual attempting to make out a claim for legitimate expectation 
must demonstrate that there has been a generalised, stable and uniform practice of 
the administration.34 Th e ECtHR in Ictigiaroglou v Greece has confi rmed that the 
expectation of an individual concerning the provision of welfare benefi ts is protected 
by the principle of legitimate expectation when this expectation is based on the case-
law of the national courts.35 Th erefore, a demonstration that there is a consistent 
prior administrative practice and consistent prior case law of the national courts are 
essential to grounding a successful claim for legitimate expectation.
In applying this to the facts under consideration, it is unlikely that persons 
approaching pension age in Greece could argue that there has been a uniform practice 
that pension ages are not subject to any change. Th ere are laws which have increased 
the pension age previously (e.g. Law 1902/1990, Law 2084/1992, Law 3655/2008), and 
there is a steady fl ow of national case-law, which has held that the Greek legislator is 
allowed to adopt amendments to the substantive prerequisites required for a pension 
entitlement, even if the legitimate objectives of the pension change are not mentioned 
in the explanatory report of the new pension legislation.36
3.1.2. Th e Reliance Test
Another requirement which must be met in Greek law is that of reliance on a legal 
provision. Th e Supreme Administrative Court has ruled that citizens should be 
legally protected only where they have demonstrated reliance on a legally favourable 
32 Council of State, No. of judgment 247/1980, Databank NOMOS. All judgments of the 
Greek Courts cited in the present article is available in the Nomos database, accessible 
at http://lawdb.intrasoft net.com/.
33 Council of State, No. of judgments 2261/1994; Council of State 2403/97; Council of State 1501/2008.
34 Katrougalos (1993: 948).
35 ECtHR: Ichtigiaroglou v. Greece, Application No. 12045/06, at para 51.
36 Council of State, Judgment Nos. 3451/1985, 1740/1993, 3739/99, 1867/01.
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provision.37 What constitutes reliance is diffi  cult to determine but it has been argued 
that paying contributions for a reasonable period of time might trigger a claim for 
legitimate expectation.38 Th e notion of what constitutes a ‘reasonable period’ has 
never been determined but German jurisprudence requires that a reasonable period 
should be capable of being translated into a pecuniary value.39 However, there is no 
Greek case law on this point so it is very diffi  cult to determine what this would amount 
to in a Greek context.
In applying this reliance principle to the situation of individuals who have had 
their pension age increased, it is arguable that an expectation may be legitimate 
where the prospective pensioners have paid contributions for a reasonable period 
(amounting to a certain pecuniary value) and have shown reliance that the existing 
legal order will not change.
3.1.3. Th e Good Faith Test
Another important principle in Greek law which an individual must prove in order 
to make a claim for legitimate expectation is that he or she has relied on a legitimate 
interest in ‘good faith’.
In applying this particular test, it is arguable that the good faith of the prospective 
pensioners is related to their reliance on pension legislation that ‘promises’ retirement 
at a specifi c pension age. However, as discussed above, such reliance (even if in good 
faith) is not suffi  cient as the State has never claimed that the law will not change.
3.2. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION IN IRELAND AND PENSION AGE 
INCREASES
Similar questions relating to the legitimate expectations of prospective pensioners also 
arise in the Irish context. As the pension provisions will be implemented progressively 
over the next 16 years, the question arises as to whether someone who was expecting 
to retire at 65 in 2014 is entitled to argue that they had a legitimate expectation that the 
law would remain the same and that they are therefore entitled to receive a pension 
or at least be considered to receive a pension at age 65 (this argument applies equally, 
though less forcibly, in relation to the other pension age adjustments).
An important distinction is made in this regard between a legitimate expectation 
which is considered to be a procedural one (the right to have fair procedures followed in 
a particular case) and a legitimate expectation which is considered to be a substantive 
one (the right to claim a substantive benefi t). Th ere is a great deal of divergence as to 
whether a legitimate expectation which is substantive in nature can be claimed under 
37 Council of State, Judgments Nos. 2261/1994; 2403/97; 1501/2008.
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Irish law. Some previous cases have held that the distinction is irrelevant40 while other 
cases have held that only legitimate expectations based on procedural expectations 
can be actionable.41 A more expansive approach has emerged in more recent case 
law.42 In the case of Curran v. Minister for Education and Science43 (hereinaft er 
referred to as ‘Curran’), the applicants claimed that they held a le gitimate expectation 
in their application under the early retirement scheme for the year 2008/2009. Th e 
applicants, initially, characterised the claim as a procedural one (a right to have their 
claim considered in a fair manner) rather than a substantive one (a right to obtain 
the benefi t of the scheme). Th e respondents counter-argued that the nature of the 
applicants’ claim was not procedural but substantive in nature and therefore, as Irish 
law did not recognise such a claim, it could not constitute a ground for legitimate 
expectation. Dunne J held that the benefi t which the applicants claimed was in fact 
a substantive rather than a procedural one but she also adopted a more expansive 
view of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, to the eff ect that both the procedural 
and substantive benefi ts can be the substance of a legitimate expectation claim.44 
Th erefore, the current Irish law would not appear to make any distinction between 
procedural and substantial claims for legitimate expectation.
Whether these claims will be successful, however, will depend upon whether the 
claimant meets the test for legitimate expectation as set out under Irish law. Th is 
section of the paper examines the test for legitimate expectation under Irish law and 
analyses whether a person making a claim in relation to the alterations in pension 
age or the manner in which it was imposed would have a successful claim under the 
current legal rules relating to legitimate expectation in Ireland.
Legitimate expectation45 as a stand-alone legal claim in Ireland is a ‘relatively newly 
established cause of action’46 which had previously been linked to the doctrine of 
estopple.47 It was fi rst asserted as a stand-alone legal claim in the Supreme Court case 
40 See Glencar Exploration PLC. v. Mayo County Council (No. 2) [2002] 1 I.R. 84 at p. 131 (per Keane 
C.J.); Abrahamson v. Th e Law Society of Ireland [1996] 1 I.R. 403 (per McCracken J) and Duggan v. 
An Taoiseach [1989] I.L.R.M. 710 (per Hamilton P).
41 See Tara Prospecting Ltd. v. Minister for Energy [1993] I.L.R.M. 771 at 788 (per Costello J).
42 See for example the cases of Glencar Exploration PLCc v. Mayo County Council (No. 2) [2002] 1 I.R. 
84, Dunleavy v. Dun Laoghaire County Council [2005] IEHC 381, Power v. Minister for Social and 
Family Aff airs [2007] 1 I.R. 543; Lett and Co. Ltd. v. Wexford Borough Corporation [2007] IEHC 195.
43 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300.
44 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300 at 316 (per Dunne J).
45 For more information on the doctrine of legitimate expectation in Ireland see Hogan and Morgan 
(2010); Delaney, H (1993: 192); Brady (1996: 133); Delaney (1997: 217); McDermott and Buckley 
(2007: 29); and O’Connor (1988: 147).
46 Keogh v. Criminal Assets Bureau (2004) 2 I.R. at 174 (per Keane CJ). See also the denial of the 
existence of such a principle in the case of Goldrick v. Dublin Corporation (1987) 6 JISLL 156.
47 See the comments in Webb v. Ireland (1988) IR 353 at 384 (per Finlay J) and in Garda Representative 
Association v. Ireland (1989) IR 193 (per Murphy J). Th ere was also an unsuccessful reference to 
legitimate expectation in the earlier case of Smith v. Ireland and Others (1983) ILRM 300.
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of Webb v. Ireland48 (hereinaft er referred to as “Webb”) and has been since separated 
from the closely related doctrine of estopple.49 In general, the courts have held that a 
claimant has to meet three positive criteria before a claim for legitimate expectation 
can be considered. Th ere are also a number of limitations on the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation which may frustrate the operation of the doctrine in certain cases.
Th e three positive criteria that must exist in order to establish a claim of legitimate 
expectation are:
1. Th e Representation Test: ‘t he public authority must have made a statement or 
adopted a position amounting to a promise or representation, express or implied, 
as to how it will act in respect of an identifi able area of its activity’50
2. Th e Identifi able Individual or Group Reliance Test: ‘the representation must be 
addressed or conveyed, either directly or indirectly, to an identifi able person or 
group of persons, aff ected actually or potentially, in such a way that it forms part 
of a transaction defi nitively entered into or a relationship between that person and 
group and the public authority or that the person or group has acted on the faith 
of the representation’51
3. Th e No-Resiling Test: ‘it must be such as to create an expectation reasonably 
entertained by the person or group that the public authority will abide by the 
representation to the extent that it would be unjust to permit the public authority 
to resile from it’52 However, there are exceptions to this aspect of the test. Th ree 
examples of such exceptions include the legitimacy of the expectation53, the 
potential for fettering the discretion of a public body and overriding considerations 
in the public interest.54
Th erefore, in order for an individual to make a claim that he or she had a legitimate 
expectation that he or she would receive (or at least could legitimately apply to receive) 
a pension at the age of 65 in 2014, the person must show that some representation 
has been made, that this representation was made to a certain individual or group of 
individuals and that it would be unfair for the State to resile from this representation 
in the circumstances. In considering the latter aspect of this test, the individual 
would also have to show that the representation was legitimate, that the discretion 
of the legislature to change pension policy was not being fettered by this expectation 
48 Webb v. Ireland (1988) I.R. 353. Th ere was also an unsuccessful reference to legitimate expectation 
in the earlier case of Smith v. Ireland and Others (1983) ILRM 300.
49 See for example the case of Fakih v. Minister for Justice [1993] 2 I.R. 406 at 423 (per O’Hanlon J).
50 Glencar Exploration PLC v. Mayo County Council (2002) 1 IR 84 at p. 162 (per Fennelly J).
51 Glencar Exploration PLC v. Mayo County Council (2002) 1 IR 84 at p. 162 (per Fennelly J).
52 Glencar Exploration PLC v. Mayo County Council (2002) 1 IR 84 at pp. 162–163 (per Fennelly J).
53 Lett and Co. Ltd. v. Wexford Borough Council (2007) IEHC 195 at paragraph 4.7 (per Clark J).
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and that there were no overriding considerations in the public interest which would 
frustrate the legitimate expectation of the individual in such a case.
3.2.1. Th e Representation Test
Th e individual claimant must show that some form of promise or representation was 
made to them. Th e most important question here is what constitutes a representation 
for the purposes of the test. Th ere have been a number of cases in the Irish context 
which, while not dealing exactly with this question, give some guidance as to what 
constitutes a representation in these cases. Clearly an express statement in writing 
will amount to a representation.55 However, many cases involve more complicated 
forms of representation. So a verbal assurance was suffi  cient in the case of Webb,56 and 
a statement made by a Minister during parliamentary debates was found suffi  cient 
to constitute a representation in the case of Garda Representative Association v. 
Ireland, the Attorney General and the Minister for Justice57 (hereinaft er referred to 
as ‘Garda Representative Association’), and in the case of Galvin v. Chief Appeals 
Offi  cer58 (hereinaft er referred to as ‘Galvin’). Costello P. in the High Court held that a 
representation existed in a case where the claimant had been informed verbally and by 
letter that he did not need to purchase additional contributions in order to qualify for 
a pension.59 However, in the case of Kavanagh v. Government of Ireland60 (hereinaft er 
referred to as ‘Kavanagh’), the representation relied upon was a statement made by 
the Attorney General to a UN Committee. In this case, the court held that as the law 
in Ireland was clearly set out in statute, no representation or utterance could alter the 
eff ect of the law as enacted.
In the case of Curran v. Minister for Education and Science61 (hereinaft er referred 
to as ‘Curran’), Dunne J. considered the situation of eighteen post-primary school 
teachers who wished to apply for early retirement, pursuant to a particular scheme of 
the Department of Education and Skills. Th e Department of Education and Skills in 
Circular 0102/2007 informed qualifying teachers that the scheme would be operating 
in the year in which the claimants made their application (2008/2009) but the scheme 
was then withdrawn due to diffi  culties with the public fi nances. Th e claimants argued 
that this Circular amounted to an express representation which the claimants had 
55 See Egan v. Minister for Defence High Court November 24 (1988); Duggan v. An Taoiseach (1989) 
ILRM 710; Gheim v. Minister for Justice, Th e Irish Times, 2 September (1989).
56 Webb at 385 (per Finlay CJ).
57 Garda Representative Association v. Ireland, the Attorney General and the Minister for Justice (1989) 
1 IR 193.
58 Galvin v. Chief Appeals Offi  cer (1997) 3 I.R. 240.
59 Galvin v. Chief Appeals Offi  cer (1997) 3 I.R. 240 at p. 254 (per Costello P.).
60 Kavanagh v. Government of Ireland (1996)1 IR 321.
61 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300.
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relied on.62 Dunne J held that this did amount to a representation or promise, so as 
to satisfy the fi rst limb of the test.63 However, in the most recent case on legitimate 
expectation in Ireland, McCarthy v. Minister for Education and Skills64 (hereinaft er 
referred to as ‘McCarthy’), the applicants alleged that an alteration of the criteria for 
the award of student support grants payable under the Student Support Act 2011 
amounted to a breach of legitimate expectation. In this case the applicants were not 
alleging that any particular representation had been made to the eff ect that the criteria 
for the grant of the payment would not be altered. However, it would appear that 
Hedigan J considered that the rules, as stated in the grant scheme, were potentially not 
suffi  cient to constitute a representation in this context.
In the case of an individual who wishes to challenge the change in pension age, it 
could be argued that the law, as stated in section 114 of the Social Welfare Consolidation 
Act 2005, to the eff ect that ‘a person who has attained the age of 65 years shall be 
entitled to retirement pension for any period of retirement where he or she satisfi es the 
contribution conditions in section 115’,65 amounts to a specifi c representation that a 
pension is available at the age of 65 years, once certain conditions are met. Th erefore, 
similar to the applicants in the case of McCarthy, it may be that the statement in the 
law constitutes a clear representation which could be relied on by certain individuals 
or groups of individuals.
3.2.2. Th e Identifi able Individual or Group Reliance Test
Secondly, it must be shown that the representation is made to an identifi able 
individual, or group of individuals, who rely on the representation. Th ere are 
therefore two separate aspects to this limb of the test. Firstly, it must be shown that 
the representation is made to an identifi able person or group of persons and secondly, 
it must be shown that the individual or group of individuals relied in some way on 
this representation.
In relation to the fi rst aspect of the test and the establishment of an identifi able 
person or group of persons, some useful examples of what constitutes an identifi able 
person or group of persons can be gleaned from the case of Curran, in which the 
claimants (post-primary school teachers) argued that they constituted a limited class 
of persons to whom an express representation had been made. Th e respondents, 
however, argued that the representation was made to all teachers, who are some 60,000 
in number, and c ould not be said to have been made to an identifi able group, as this 
number was much too large.66 Dunne J agreed that the Circular had been sent to all 
permanent teachers, which was a very large group, but given that the Supreme Court 
62 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300 at 308 (per Dunne J).
63 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300 at 311 (per Dunne J).
64 McCarthy v. Minister for Education and Skills (2012) IEHC 200.
65 Section 114, Social Welfare and Consolidation Act 2005 (as amended).
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in Keogh v. Criminal Assets Bureau67 (hereinaft er referred to as ‘Keogh’) held that a 
statement made by the Revenue Commissioners in the Taxpayers’ Charter of Rights 
gave rise to a binding statement that an individual taxpayer could rely on, despite the 
fact that it was made to all taxpayers (a very large group of individuals), she could not 
accept that the size of the group was too large to be an identifi able one. In a similar 
vein, the identifi able group in Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County 
Council68 (hereinaft er referred to as ‘Glenkerrin’) was also very large, as it consisted of 
all purchasers of property, and yet the court had no diffi  culty in fi nding the group an 
identifi able one. Dunne J therefore held in the case of Curran that the size of the group 
alone could not operate so as to frustrate the application of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation. Th e key consideration is whether the group is identifi able and on the 
facts of the Curran case this consideration was satisfi ed.
Th e second aspect of this test is whether the identifi able group or individual 
relied on the representation made.69 Th is has become an established aspect of the 
case law, with many cases failing to make out a case of legitimate expectation on 
the grounds that they did not rely on the representation made to them.70 However, 
this reliance does not have to be detrimental. In the case of Daly v. Minister for the 
Marine71 (hereinaft er referred to as ‘Daly’), it was held that ‘an expectation may be 
legitimate and cognisable by the courts even in the absence of the sort of action to 
the claimant’s detrimen t’.72 However, there must be ‘some context relevant to fairness 
in the exercise of legal or administrative powers. Th ose who come within the ambit 
of an administrative or regulatory regime may be able to establish that it would be 
unfair, discriminatory or unjust to permit the body exercising a power to change a 
policy or a set of existing rules, or depart from an undertaking or promise without 
taking account of the legitimate expectations created by them. However, the very 
notion of fairness has within it the idea that there is an existing relationship which it 
would be unfair to alter’.73 Th e impact of this statement is perhaps best illustrated by 
the decision of Dunne J in the case of Curran, where she held that the teachers had 
relied on the Circular issued by the Department of Education and that even though 
the Department was not aware of the claims of all of these teachers, the Department 
was aware that such teachers could avail themselves of the scheme if they satisfi ed 
certain criteria. Th e fact that those individual teachers’ thoughts were not known to 
the Department could not be a material factor in determining reliance.
67 Keogh v. Criminal Assets Bureau [2004] 2 I.R. 159.
68 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council [2007] IEHC 298.
69 Cromane Seafoods Limited v. Minister for Agriculture and Others [2013] IEHC 338.
70 Garda Representative Association v. Ireland (1989) IR 193, Devitt v. Minister for Education (1989) 
ILRM 639; Cosgrave v. Legal Aid Board High Court, 14 October (1990).
71 Daly v. Minister for the Marine (2001) 3 IR 513.
72 Daly v. Minister for the Marine (2001) 3 IR 513 at 528 (per Fennelly J).
73 Daly v. Minister for the Marine (2001) 3 IR 513 at 528 (per Fennelly J).
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In applying this law to the situation of a person expecting to retire at 65 in 2014, 
two specifi c questions must be addressed. First, is there an identifi able individual or 
group and secondly, did this individual or group rely on the representation made? In 
relation to the fi rst question in this test, the particular group concerned is the group 
of persons seeking to retire and apply for a pension at the age of 65 in 2014. Th is is 
indeed potentially a very large group of persons, but as Dunne J noted in the case 
of Curran, this will not defeat the doctrine of legitimate expectation as long as this 
group of individuals is identifi able. Th is group is potentially identifi able as they were 
all born in 1949 and satisfy the conditions for applying for a pension. In relation to 
the second aspect of the test, it could be argued that persons born in 1949 relied on the 
law as stated and the criteria set out in that law and organised their working lives and 
savings accordingly and this did not necessarily have to lead to detriment. Th erefore, 
it is possible that this aspect of the test could also be fulfi lled.
 3.2.3. Th e No-Resiling Test
Th irdly, it must be proved that the representation is such that it would be wrong for 
the public authority to resile from it. Th is involves a consideration of whether there is 
any legitimate reason that a public body may have for resiling from the representation 
made. Certain circumstances in which the courts have held that a public body is 
entitled to resile from a representation made will now be discussed.
3.2.3.1. Th e expectation must be legitimate
It has been held that only ‘legitimate’ expectations can form the basis of a claim 
for legitimate expectation and that a public body is entitled to resile from any 
representation made if the expectation claimed is not legitimate. What must therefore 
be determined in each individual case is whether the claim is legitimate. What 
constitutes legitimacy has been determined by the courts in Ireland in a number of 
cases. Most interesting is the case of Wiley v. Revenue Commissioners74 (hereinaft er 
referred to as ‘Wiley’) where the applicant argued that, as he had successfully gained 
a refund under a particular scheme under the Finance Act 1968 on two occasions (for 
which he had not been technically eligible), he had a legitimate expectation that he 
would be successful again. Blaney J held that, in a case where a refund was granted to 
eligible persons, such persons could reasonably expect that refund to continue. If that 
scheme were subsequently altered or ceased entirely without notice, so that persons 
formerly eligible lost their eligibility, this would amount to a breach of legitimate 
expectations.75 However, this was not the case here as the applicant had never been 
74 Wiley v. Revenue Commissioners (1989) IR 350.
75 Wiley v. Revenue Commissioners (1989) IR 350 at 358 (per Blaney J). See the case of Cannon v. 
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entitled under the scheme in the fi rst place.76 Th ere seems to be evidence in the case 
law that the courts will not allow individuals or groups to make claims for which they 
are not entitled.
Th is particular aspect of the test will produce some problems for individuals 
or a group of individuals seeking to argue that they are entitled to a pension at the 
age of 65 in 2014. Th ere are two ways the court could interpret this in the context 
of a legislative representation. Firstly, the court could determine that, as the law has 
changed, a person turning 65 in 2014 is not eligible for a pension under the current law 
as they do not meet the essential criteria for receiving a pension (i.e. that they are 66 
years) and, as such, their claim for legitimate expectation is not legitimate. Th is would 
appear to be in line with the interpretation of the courts in social welfare cases. An 
alternative view might be that as the group of individuals had always been eligible to 
retire at 6577 (according to the old law), the claim is therefore legitimate and that this 
change of law without notice would amount to a breach of legitimate expectations. If 
this interpretation of the law is chosen, then the major issue for consideration would 
be whether the change in policy was made without notice (as required by Blaney J in 
the case of Wiley). Th e case would then turn on the notice that is required to change 
a law that is aff ecting a group or specifi c individual fi nancially. Th ere is an argument 
that no notice would be required in such circumstances. Th e legislature is constantly 
changing tax and social welfare laws. However, the legislature normally provides 
some notice that changes are going to occur so as to give individuals, or groups of 
individuals, suffi  cient time to alter their fi nancial circumstances. Whether they are 
required by law to do this, and whether a judge would be willing to determine that 
they are so required, is doubtful. Th erefore, it appears that this stage of the test might 
prove fatal to any claim for legitimate expectation in these circumstances.
3.2.3.2. Fettering the Discretion of a Public Body Test
Another hurdle for individuals, or groups of individuals, in such a case is the 
argument that a claim for legitimate expectation in such circumstances would fetter 
the discretion of the legislature to such an extent that a legitimate expectation claim 
cannot be allowed. It has been held that the doctrine cannot operate so as to limit 
the scope of a statutory power or to prevent the enactment of legislation.78 A recent 
interesting example of this is the case of Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoighaire Rathdown 
County Council79 (hereinaft er referred to as ‘Glenkerrin’) in which Clark J held that 
76 See also the case of Atlantic Marine Supplies Limited and Sean Rogers v. Minister for Transport, 
Ireland and the Attorney General (2011) 2 ILRM 12 where the court held (at para 7.18) that there was 
no evidence that this was a case of someone getting something to which they were not entitled.
77 Provided that they meet all the other conditions for entitlement to a pension too.
78 See for example the cases of Devitt v. Minister for Education (1989) ILRM 639 and Pesca Valentia 
Ltd. v. Minister for Fisheries High Court June 6, (1989).
79 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council (2011) 1 IR 417.
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the executive enjoys a constitutional entitlement to change policy80 and that bodies 
exercising statutory roles have an entitlement to alter policy, subject to the requirement 
that such an alteration is consistent with their statutory role as defi ned.81 He held that 
it is clear that ‘a le gitimate expectation cannot arise to the eff ect that a policy will not 
be changed’.82 Th e case of Hempenstall v. Minister for the Environment83 (hereinaft er 
referred to as ‘Hempenstall’) is illustrative of this approach. In that case, the Minister 
for the Environment brought in a new policy in respect of taxi licences which would 
have the eff ect of reducing the value of existing licences signifi cantly. Th e court held 
that there could be no claim for legitimate expectation in such a case, as there was an 
overriding entitlement on behalf of the Minister to alter existing policy.
Again the application of this test would appear to present an obstacle to the case 
of the individual or group of individuals making a claim in relation to their pension 
entitlement at the age of 65. Th e main obstacle is that many of the decisions protect 
the right of the legislature to enact legislation and presumably to alter such legislation. 
If this right is absolute, then a claim for legitimate expectation based on a change of 
legislation will be unsuccessful.
3.2 .3.3. Public Interest Considerations Test
Even if the individual, or group of individuals, can overcome the signifi cant hurdles 
presented above, the Irish courts have consistently held that certain public interests 
can override a legitimate expectation. Th e recent fi nancial crisis has brought this 
limitation on legitimate expectation to the fore. It was held in the case of Curran that 
the authorities in Ireland, and in the United Kingdom, were clear that the existence of 
an overriding public interest will always override a leg itimate expectation.84 Dunne  J 
referred to the ‘bleak sketch of the state of the public fi nances at the time the decision 
was taken’ and the fact that the ‘very budget in which the announcement to suspend 
this scheme was announced was brought forward in response to the worsening 
economic circumstances’.85 She was satisfi ed that declining economic circumstances 
were such that the overriding public interest in taking the decision to suspend the 
scheme must outweigh any legitimate expectation the applicants had to pursue 
their applications under the scheme.86 Th is was followed in the case of McCarthy 
80 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council (2011) 1 IR 417 at p. 428 (per Clark J).
81 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council (2011) 1 IR 417 at p. 428 (per Clark J).
82 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council (2011) 1 IR 417 at p. 428 (per Clark J).
83 Hempenstall v. Minister for the Environment [1994] 2 I.R. 20.
84 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300 at 317 (per Dunne J).Dunne J referred 
to the cases of Glencar Exploration p.l.c. v. Mayo County Council (No. 2) [2002] 1 I.R. 84; Power v. 
Minister for Social and Family Aff airs [2006] IEHC 170; R. (Nadarajah) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2005] All E.R. 283; and R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte 
Coughlan [2001] Q.B. 213 in support of this contention.
85 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300 at p. 317 (per Dunne J).
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where it was held that even an expectation that is legitimately held may be qualifi ed 
by considerations of the public interest. With reference to the ‘perilous state of the 
public fi nances’ and the ‘unprecedented economic emergency’ it was held that given 
the obvious requirement for reduction in public expenditure, there was a clear public 
policy basis for the respondent’s actions.87
In this case, it is clear that the public interest in protecting and supporting the 
public fi nances at a time of crisis might outweigh any legitimate expectation that 
might be claimed by individuals. Th e most likely decision of a court would be that the 
fi nancial crisis necessitated these measures and that, therefore, there could be no claim 
to a pension at the age of 65 years. Whether this would also extend to the provision of 
suffi  cient transition or notice periods is unclear, but in Curran and in McCarthy, the 
court found that the public interest overrode this consideration also. Th erefore, the 
current state of the public fi nances would appear to be an insurmountable hurdle for 
individuals or groups of individuals claiming legitimate expectation in Ireland.
4. DO PROSPECTIVE PENSIONERS HAVE A LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION THAT TRANSITIONAL MEASURES 
WILL BE INTRODUCED?
An alternative question, which might arise if it is to be accepted that there is no 
legitimate expectation that pension legislation will not change, is whether there can 
be a legitimate expectation that pension legislation will not change without suffi  cient 
transitional measures being put in place. Th ere has been some support for this 
principle in other jurisdictions.88 Again similar questions arise to those dealt with in 
relation to the question above and the legal arguments in support of such a claim are 
weak. However, it appears that there may be growing acceptance of the introduction 
of such a principle in Ireland.
4.1. GREEK LAW ON TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
In the cases under consideration, the legislature amended the legal situation of the 
prospective pensioners without the introduction of transitional periods during which 
they could alter their fi nances so as to prepare for the increase in pension age. In order 
to demonstrate that this amounted to a breach of their legitimate expectations that 
transitional measures would be introduced, the prospective pensioners must again 
87 McCarthy v. Minister for Education and Skills (2012) IEHC 200 at para 6.6 (per Hedigan J).
88 See the Constitutional Court of Latvia, Case No. 2009–43–01, Judgment of 21 December 2009 at 
para 32. Th e Court ruled that the pension reductions did not comply with the principle of legitimate 
expectation on the grounds that the legislator did not provide for the introduction of an adequate 
transitional period which would have ensured a more reasonable balance between the confi dence of 
the prospective pensioners and the public interest.
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demonstrate that they relied in good faith on established administrative practice 
and case law. It could be argued that the prospective pensioners relied in good faith 
on such practice, since it is arguable that the prospective pensioners could not have 
predicted the introduction of new pension reforms within the period of two years. Th e 
retirement age was raised rather swift ly to the age of 65 in 2010 by Law No. 3863/2010, 
while aft er a further two years the retirement age was increased from 65 to 67 by 
Law No. 4093/2012 without the introduction of any transitional periods. Moreover, 
in the past the introduction of transitional periods was a legislative practice in case of 
pension reforms.89
However, there is consistent previous case-law declaring that the non-introduction 
of a transitional period is lawful and that the national legislator is not obliged to 
introduce transitional periods for the protection of pension rights.90 Th erefore, it is 
more diffi  cult from the Greek perspective to recognise as legitimate the expectations 
of the prospective pensioners, on the ground that there is no specifi c case law which 
would appear to insist that some notice or transitional periods may be required in 
certain cases. Only the minority of the Council of State has held that the legislator is 
obliged to introduce transitional periods, so that individuals that have acted in good 
faith have the opportunity to adjust to their new economic situation.91 Th is was also 
supported by the Court of Audit. Th e latter expressed the view, in its advisory opinion 
for Pension Bill No. 4093/2012,92 that the absence of transitional periods contradicts 
the principle of legitimate expectation, without, however going into further legal 
arguments.93
While the current expectation of prospective pensioners that transitional 
arrangements should have been introduced is unlikely to be accepted at the Greek 
court level, there is growing support for such an argument among academics. Th e 
Greek academic community has put forward interesting arguments in support of the 
introduction of transitional periods in such cases. According to the Greek literature, 
the introduction of transitional periods is essential so that the legitimate expectations 
of the future and current pensioners are not altered in a sudden and unexpected way.94 
According to Lazaratos, the judicial powers should examine the constitutionality of 
true retroactivity by balancing the ratio of the retroactive law and the principle of 
protection of legitimate expectation.95 Angelopoulou supports the contention that the 
more unfavourable the new pension regulations are, the more adequate the transitional 
89 Angelopoulou (2009: 180).
90 E.g. Council of State, Judgment No. 707/06.
91 Council of State, Judgment No. 2346/1978.
92 According to Article 73 par. 2 and Article 98 of the Gr. Const., the Court of Audit has the jurisdiction 
to give advisory opinions concerning statutes on pensions, before the pension bills is submitted by 
the competent Minister and the Minister of Finance to the Parliament.
93 Opinion of the Court of Audit of 30 and 31 October 2012.
94 Chrysogonos (2006: 565).
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periods should be, so that the principle of legitimate expectation is not excessively 
aff ected.96 However, prospective pensioners do not have a legitimate expectation that 
transitional measures will be introduced, on the grounds that their expectations are 
not legitimate, since they cannot demonstrate consistent prior case-law obliging the 
national legislator to introduce transitional periods.
4.2. IRISH LAW ON TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
In order to claim that there was a legitimate expectation that some transitional 
measures would be introduced, the individuals involved would again have to satisfy 
the representation, reliance and non-resiling tests (as set out above). While there 
would appear to be a signifi cant amount of case law which would potentially rule out 
any positive outcome in such cases, there have been statements made in a number of 
cases that indicate a growing judicial preference for adequate notice or transitional 
periods.
In the case of Glenkerrin, Clark J held that, while the existence of a longstanding 
practice does not give rise to any expectation that the practice will not change, where 
third parties reasonably ‘arrange their aff airs by reference to such a practice it seems 
to me that such third parties are entitled to rely upon an expectation that the practice 
will not be changed without reasonable notice being given’.97 Th e level of notice that 
would be required in such circumstances would be that which would ‘reasonably 
allow those who have conducted their aff airs in accordance with the practice to 
consider and implement an alternative means for dealing with the issues arising’.98 
A similar argument also arose in the case of Curran where the applicant teachers 
argued that, while there was a right to abolish or vary a scheme, the manner in which 
the scheme had been withdrawn was unfair. A decision had been taken summarily to 
withdraw the scheme, in the absence of any provision for transitional arrangements 
or notice to enable the applicants to re-organise their aff airs. However, in the case 
of Curran, Dunne J could not see any reason why a reasonable notice period should 
have been introduced. She held that there ‘may be cases where the nature of a change 
of policy is such that it would be appropriate to have a reasonable period of notice 
or transitional arrangements in place for those aff ected by a change of policy’99 but 
that this was not one of them. Th is would appear to be particularly pertinent in cases 
where the retrospective changes aff ect the eligibility of certain parties. In the case of 
Wiley, Blaney J held that where a revenue scheme was subsequently altered or ceased 
96 Angelopoulou (2010), Th e new retirement age provisions of Law 3863/2010 – Th e protection of 
established rights and legitimate expectations under the Constitution and Article  1 of the First 
Protocol ECHR (in Greek), Review of Social Security Law (Greek Journal), 904–922 at 911.
97 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council (2011) 1 IR 417 at p. 428 (per Clark J).
98 Glenkerrin Homes v. Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council (2011) 1 IR 417 at p. 428 (per Clark J).
99 Curran v. Minister for Education and Science (2009) 4 I.R. 300 at p. 316 (per Dunne J).
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entirely without notice, so that persons formerly eligible lost their eligibility, this 
would amount to a breach of legitimate expectations.100
While there would appear to be some judicial statements that support such 
transitional periods, it should not be overlooked that none of these cases involve 
amendments to laws but only amendments to administrative schemes. Th erefore, if it 
is to be argued that an amendment to the law should not be made without transitional 
periods, the traditional restrictions on legitimate expectation, such as non-fettering 
of the discretion of the legislature or the public interest test, may be utilised to defeat 
such a claim. However, the fact remains that there is some support for the idea that, 
where rules are changed and have an impact on individuals’ rights retrospectively, the 
legislature may be legitimately expected to entertain the idea of the introduction of 
transitional periods or reasonable notice.
5. ARE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS PROTECTED BY 
ARTICLE 1, PROTOCOL 1 OF THE ECHR?
Another interesting angle to consider, which has already been considered by the Greek 
Supreme Administrative Court, the Council of State, is that there may be a potential 
claim under Article 1, Protocol 1. While both the Greek and Irish Constitutions protect 
the right to property,101 there is no clear authority in either jurisdiction which clarifi es 
whether the protection of social security benefi ts falls under the constitutional right 
to property. Th erefore, the consideration of this claim will be limited to Article  1, 
Protocol 1 of the ECHR, to which both Greece and Ireland are bound.
Th e concept of a possession within the ECHR is an autonomous one and is not 
dependent on classifi cations in national law.102 However, the fact that the Greek 
courts consider that legitimate expectations fall within the right to property under 
the Greek Constitution does not mean that this will be the case under the ECHR. Th e 
defi nition of possession is extremely broad and is not limited to existing possessions 
but can also apply to claims ‘in respect of which the applicant can argue that he has 
at least a reasonable and “legitimate expectation” of obtaining eff ective enjoyment of 
a property right’.103
In Kopecky v Slovenia104 the ECtHR held that there were diff erent types of 
legitimate expectations and some of these might give rise to a claim under Article 1, 
100 Wiley v. Revenue Commissioners (1989) IR 350 at 358 (per Blaney J). See the case of Cannon v. 
Minister for Marine (1991) ILRM 261.
101 Article 17 of the Greek Constitution and Article 40.3.2 and Article 43 of the Irish Constitution.
102 Iatridis v Greece (Application No. 31107/96) at para 54; Beyeler v Italy (Application No. 33202/96) at 
para 100; Broniowski v Poland (Application No. 31443/96) at 129 and Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Portugal 
(Application No. 73049/01) at para 63.
103 Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany (Application No. 42527/98) at para 83 and 
Öneryildiz v Turkey (Application No. 48939/99) at para 124.
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Protocol 1. First, legitimate expectations based on ‘a reasonably justifi ed reliance 
on a legal act which has a sound legal basis and which bears on property rights’105 
could found a claim under Article 1, Protocol 1. Secondly, an expectation of a claim 
for damages arising under domestic law would also be covered by the ECHR.106 
Th irdly, the applicant must have a ‘currently enforceable claim that was suffi  ciently 
established’.107 In order to meet this requirement, the applicant must have a legitimate 
expectation which is more than a mere hope and which is based on a ‘legal provision 
or a legal act such as a judicial decision’.108
Applying this then to the facts presented, it is unlikely that a prospective pensioner 
would be entitled to claim protection on the basis of this legitimate expectation under 
Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR. Th e Council of State has reaffi  rmed this in a recent 
decision where it held that a legitimate expectation to receive an old-age pension 
benefi t under a previously more favourable pension law is not a possession under 
Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR.109 In this case, an employee of the National Bank 
of Greece and a mother of minor children, who would have been entitled to a pension 
under the previous pension regime, was held not to have a legitimate expectation 
that she could retire aft er completing the contributory period of 15 years required 
under the old legislation. Instead she would not be able to retire until she had met the 
requirements of the new legislation i.e. on reaching the age of 42 years (Law 1976/1991). 
Th e Supreme Administrative Court held that the rise in the retirement age did not 
abolish any pension right, but only postponed the exercise of the pension right until 
the individual reached the new retirement age.110 Th erefore, prospective pensioners 
would not be able to found a claim under Article 1, Protocol 1 due to the fact that they 
would not be able to establish a legal basis for a claim for legitimate expectation in 
national law. Equally, it has been asserted, on a slightly diff erent legal basis, that the 
increase in the retirement age does not interfere with the right to property.111 Th is is 
because pension age is not linked to the property of the prospective pensioners (value 
of pension expectation) but is more accurately said to be linked to the aim of the 
old-age pension scheme which is to determine the age aft er which means cannot be 
acquired through work.
Another interesting angle to consider is the line of case law of the ECtHR, 
which, while not directly referring to legitimate expectations, does refer to the right 
105 Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v Ireland (judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 22) 
at para 47. See also Stretch v United Kingdom (Application No. 44277/98) at para 35.
106 Pressos Compania Naviera SA and Others v Belgium (judgment of the 20 November 1995, Series A 
no. 332) at para 31.
107 Ibid at para 49.
108 Ibid at para 49. See also Gratzinger and Gratzingerova v Czech Republic (Application No. 39794/98) 
at para 73.
109 Council of State No. of judgments 718/2006, 3267/2002, 2118/2005. For more cases see Angelopoulou 
(2009).
110 Council of State, judgment No. 718/2006, point 8.
111 Becker (2005: 236).
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to a pension and other welfare payments in circumstances analogous to legitimate 
expectation. Th e ECtHR has held that where a state has in force ‘legislation providing 
for the payment as of right of a welfare benefi t or pension – whether conditional 
or not on the prior payment of contributions – that legislation must be regarded as 
generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article  1 of Protocol 
No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements’.112 Th e reduction in such an amount, or 
the elimination of such an amount, may constitute an interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions.113 However, the ECtHR has also held that where a person 
does not satisfy, or ceases to satisfy, the ‘legal conditions laid down in domestic law 
for the grant of any particular form of benefi ts or pension, there is no interference 
with the rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’.114 Finally, the ECtHR has reiterated 
that just because a person has entered into and formed part of a State social security 
system ‘does not necessarily mean that that system cannot be changed either as to the 
conditions of eligibility of payment or as to the quantum of the benefi t or pension’.115 
Th is would appear to remove any suggestion of a legitimate expectation to a pension 
at a particular time.
However, the decision in Asmundsson would appear to confl ict with these 
authorities. In this case, the ECtHR held that the applicant who was deprived of a 
disability benefi t due to the manner in which the eligibility entitlements to the 
scheme were redesigned and held that the excessive and disproportionate burden 
on the applicant in this case clearly distinguishes it from the more ‘reasonable and 
commensurate’ reductions in other cases.116 While the Asmundsson case could be 
likened to the case of the prospective pensioners in Greece and in Ireland in that there 
is a total deprivation of entitlement in those cases, rather than a mere reduction, the 
fact that the applicant in the Asmundsson case was made to bear an ‘excessive and 
disproportionate burden’117 coupled with the fact that the prospective pensioners will 
experience a delayed, rather than a total deprivation of their pension rights, suggests 
that the decision in Demanjac would probably be the relevant authority which would 
be followed by the ECtHR. Th is position is supported by the decision of the ECtHR 
112 Damjanac v Croatia (Application No. 52934/10) at para 85. See also Domalewski v Poland 
(Application No. 34610/97) and Jankovic v Croatia (Application No. 43440/98); Supreme 
Administrative Court and other v. UK, Decision of 6 July 2005 (Application No. 65731/01) at para 54; 
Gaygüsüz v. Austria, (Application No. 17371/90) at para 41; Antonakopoulos and others v. Greece, 
(Application No. 37098/97); Apostolakis v. Greece, (Application No. 39574/07); Moskal v. Poland, 
(Application No. 10373/05) at para 45; Kohniakina v. Georgia, (Application No. 17767/08) at para 69; 
Valkov v. Bulgaria, (Application No. 2033/04) at para 84.
113 Ibid at para 85. See also Stec v United Kingdom (Application No. 65731/01) at para 54; Asmundsson 
v Iceland (Application No. 65731/01) at para 39 and Valkov v Bulgaria (Application No. 2033/04) at 
para 84.
114 Ibid at para 86. See also Rasmussen v. Poland (Application No. 38886/05) at para 76; Richardson v. 
the United Kingdom (Application No. 26252/08) at paras 17–18.
115 Ibid at para 86. See also Carson v United Kingdom (Application No.42185/05) at paras 85–89.
116 Asmundsson v Iceland (Application No. 60669/05) at para 45.
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in Arras v Italy118 where the ECtHR held that the harmonisation of a pension scheme 
which aff ected the applicants did not aff ect the basic pension entitlement. All the 
applicants experienced a loss of the more favourable augmentation which amounted 
to a ‘reasonable and commensurate’ reduction rather than a ‘total deprivation’.119 
What was considered essential in Arras was the fact that there was no impairment 
of the essence of the applicant’s pension rights.120 Th erefore, even under this line of 
reasoning, there does not appear to be an avenue for prospective pensioners under 
Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Th is paper has addressed the very topical issue of adjustment to pension ages in 
two countries which have received EU and IMF fi nancial support as a result of the 
European fi nancial crisis: Greece and Ireland. Pension ages have undergone signifi cant 
reform in both of these countries, conditional upon the EU and IMF bail-outs, and 
this has had a signifi cant impact on the social rights of prospective pensioners in both 
jurisdictions. While the changes in Greece have been more complex, the alterations 
to the Irish pension age are no less signifi cant. Th e paper highlights a potential legal 
claim which may be available to such prospective pensioners: the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation. It analyses the current state of the law in both Greece and Ireland in 
relation to legitimate expectation and the potential obstacles facing prospective 
pensioners in both jurisdictions. It concludes that a claim for legitimate expectation 
will face similar obstacles in both jurisdictions.
First, in relation to the question of whether a prospective pensioner has a legitimate 
expectation that the pension laws will not change, it is concluded that while, in both 
jurisdictions, the concept of an expectation will probably be accepted as arising in 
certain cases, whether that expectation can be legally enforced is doubtful. In both 
Greece and Ireland there are substantial restrictions on the operation of the doctrine 
of legitimate expectation which impede its use in this context. A common restriction 
in both jurisdictions is the fi nding that such a claim would not be considered to be a 
legitimate one. In the Irish context, this would arise as a result of the operation of the 
law which, once promulgated, is applicable to the individual, so that if the individual 
does not meet the requirements of the law, then the claim is not a legitimate one. 
In Greece, similar reasoning can be identifi ed, since once the individual is not, in 
good faith, able to base their claim on consistent prior administrative practice and 
consistent prior case-law, then the expectation is not considered to be legitimate. 
Equally, the restriction in Ireland that a claim for legitimate expectation will not be 
allowed where it would fetter the discretion of the legislature is also evident in Greece, 
118 Arras v Italy (Application No. 17972/07).
119 Ibid at para 82.
120 Ibid at para 83.
2e PRO
EF
Elaine Dewhurst and Dafni Diliagka
248 Intersentia
where it has been held in Greek jurisprudence that the legislator should be able to 
amend the existing legal order. Moreover, the reliance of the Irish courts on the public 
interest to restrict certain claims for legitimate expectation will seriously hamper 
any eff orts to found such a claim before the Irish courts. While there have been no 
claims based on exactly this issue, so defi nitive answers cannot be given, the overall 
conclusion of the authors, with reference to the doctrine of legitimate expectation and 
its use in other contexts, is that it would be almost impossible to found a claim for 
legitimate expectation based on an increase in the retirement age.
Th e second issue that is unresolved in both jurisdictions, however, is the issue 
of reasonable notice and the imposition of adequate transitional periods. Th e 
second question examined in this context was whether prospective pensioners 
have a legitimate expectation that pension laws will not change without reasonable 
notice or the introduction of transitional periods. In Greece, the jurisprudence of 
the courts is clear: such transitional periods are not necessary. However, interesting 
arguments have been put forward by Greek academics in support of lengthier 
transitional periods in such cases. A similar approach can be identifi ed in Ireland, 
where the courts have noted that there may be circumstances where such reasonable 
notice or transitional periods might be required to ensure the rights of individuals, 
however, these have been restricted to cases where the individual is challenging an 
administrative scheme, as opposed to a legislative enactment; as a result it is more 
diffi  cult to assess what the approach of the courts would be if such an argument were 
to come before them.
In the case of Greece, the national legislator chose not to introduce transitional 
periods, based on its belief that legislators have an overriding entitlement to adjust 
the existing pension legislation to new economic circumstances. Th e Irish case is 
somewhat diff erent as a transitional period of approximately two and a half years was 
introduced to allow prospective pensioners time to alter their current positions and 
prepare for a longer period at work or for retirement at 65 without a pension. However, 
it is arguable that this is insuffi  cient for those intending to retire at the age of 65 or 
who are mandatorily required to retire at the age of 65 years, as this gives them little 
time to source alternative work and to gather enough fi nance to support them in this 
gap year. Th is is a particular problem for public sector workers who joined the public 
sector prior to 2004. Th ose who joined prior to this date must retire at the age of 65. 
If they are expected to retire at 65 and yet receive no state pension until the age of 66, 
this means that they must either fi nd alternative work (which is particularly diffi  cult at 
this age due to age discrimination) or claim unemployment benefi t, or have suffi  cient 
fi nancial resources to support them during this period. For these individuals, the 
case for a longer notice period or transitional period is certainly stronger than for 
those who can continue in work until the age of 66 years and who therefore will not 
suff er a change as detrimental to their fi nances as those who have to retire at 65. 
Where pension reductions have also been made in combination with this increase in 
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as protected by the European Social Charter and the respective Committee on Social 
Rights.121 Th e answer to this second question is then inconclusive.
Finally, the paper drew on the potential for a claim under Article 1, Protocol 1 of 
the ECHR. However, again due to the failure of the prospective pensioners to be able 
to establish legitimate claims at a national level, it is more than likely that the ECtHR 
would hold that their claim would not constitute a ‘possession’ for the purposes of 
Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR. However, in Ireland at least, there is still a lack of 
any clear resolution of whether the alteration of pension age has a suffi  ciently large 
eff ect on individual rights that it necessitates the imposition of transitional periods, or 
about how long such transitional periods should be. In the case of the increase of the 
pension age, it is arguable that the introduction of adequate transitional arrangements 
is required in order to allow an individual to prepare for the future. Th is requires a 
reasonable balance to be maintained between the need to reform the public pension 
system and the need to protect the legitimate expectations of prospective pensioners. 
One method of achieving this would certainly be the introduction and implementation 
of adequate transitional periods in all cases.
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SHOULD SOCIAL RIGHTS BE INCLUDED IN 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONVENTION BY 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
Maija Dahlberg*
Abstract
Th e European Court of Human Rights frequently incorporates socio-economic rights 
in its applications of the Convention as a result of its broad interpretations of civil 
and political rights, while at the same time emphasising that the Convention does not 
actually entail socio-economic rights. Th is article analyses the arguments concerning 
the inclusion of social rights in the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the 
Convention. Analysis is through use of a case law study which examines how the 
Court legitimises the inclusion of social rights in its interpretations of the Convention 
despite their absence from the text of the Convention itself. Existing social rights 
arguments are categorised under the Convention rights provisions, revealing the 
extent to which including social rights within the interpretations of the Convention 
provisions has become established practice.
Keywords: argumentation; interpretation; legitimacy; social rights; the European 
Convention on Human Rights; the European Court of Human Rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinaft er, the 
Convention) was draft ed in the aft ermath of the Second World War when rights 
were considered from a rather narrow perspective. Th e Convention secures civil 
and political rights, but economic and social rights are not included within it. Th e 
Council of Europe’s legal system protects economic and social rights through the 
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other Convention, namely the European Social Charter.1 Th e European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinaft er, the Court or the ECtHR) has frequently, however, taken 
socio-economic rights into account when interpreting the Convention. Th e rights-
extending interpretation methods make this possible. For example, by applying the 
principle of eff ectiveness and the ‘living instrument’ interpretation, as well as through 
the method of positive obligations, weight may be put on socio-economic rights even 
though the text of the Convention does not include them.
But the question can be posed: Since economic and social rights were not initially 
included in the Convention, is it legitimate for the Court to include them? It has been 
argued that the development of economic and social norms and procedures should 
go hand-in-hand with legitimacy-enhancing strategies. Th is point of view stresses, 
on the one hand, the need to restrain over-anxious human rights interpretations and, 
on the other hand, that to avoid sticking to the draft ers’ intentions.2 Accordingly, 
legitimate interpretations can be found somewhere in between.
It has been claimed that the Court has gone too far with regard to incorporating 
socio-economic rights within the Convention.3 It has been taken for granted that, 
nowadays, the Court’s jurisdiction also entails socio-economic rights, even though 
there is a lack of clear defi nition of them by the Court.4 Yet, at the same time, it has 
been observed that the Court handles socio-economic rights in negative terms: the 
Court has stated several times what the Convention does not provide e.g. the right to 
housing.5
Th e Court frequently de facto incorporates socio-economic rights within the 
Convention through a broad interpretation of civil and political rights while, at the 
same time, emphasising that the Convention does not entail socio-economic rights.6 
Th e aim of this article is to analyse the arguments concerning social rights in the 
Court’s interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Th is analysis is performed 
through a case law study which includes 87 judgments of the Court. In addition, 
the article examines the question of how the Court legitimises its interpretations 
concerning social rights when the text of the Convention does not include social 
rights.
In this article socio-economic rights or social rights are understood broadly.7 
Socio-economic rights cover all the rights which are protected in the European 
1 European Social Charter (revised), CETS No. 163, came into force on 1 July 1999.
2 Shany (2011: 80).
3 Bossuyt (2007).
4 Clements and Simmons (2008: 426) (‘the Court’s starting point is now an unequivocal acceptance of 
the view that the Convention protects a core irreducible set of such rights.’). See also Gerards (2014: 
104) and Leijten (2014: 115).
5 See e.g. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 30696/09, 21 January 2011, GC, para. 249; See more, Leijten 
(2014: 114).
6 Bossuyt (2013: 35).






Social Charter, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union8 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights9, as well as in 
several Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (the ILO).10 Cultural 
rights are, however, set aside and the focus is on economic and social rights.
If legitimacy is understood in a purely formalistic and strictly conservative sense, 
it is not legitimate to incorporate economic and social rights into the Convention.11 
But if instead, legitimacy is understood in a substantive sense, the chain of reasoning 
is no longer that simple. Substantive legitimacy emphasises that the content of the 
judgment must be justifi ed and acceptable in order to be legitimate. Especially in 
human rights cases, the emphasis should be on the content – and not merely on the 
formalistic aspects.12
In this article, substantive legitimacy is taken as a starting point, which means 
that the reasoning of the Court will be kept in focus. Legitimacy is taken to mean 
the extent to which the Court has fulfi lled the promise of its constitutive legitimacy 
through its decisions and through the interpretive principles that guide its decision-
making processes. Th e focus is on how well the Court is perceived to actually protect 
human rights. Th is view of legitimacy concentrates on the performance of the Court, 
and, consequently, the Court either contributes to or takes away from its legitimacy 
through its performance. Th is view of legitimacy is called the normative performance 
dimension.13 Th e article analyses in detail the arguments which the Court gives when 
extending its interpretation by adding economic and social rights to the Convention.
In addition to the chosen view point of normative performance legitimacy, the other 
chosen standpoint in this article is the principle of the indivisibility of human rights: 
‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.14 
Th e principle of indivisibility stresses that the distinction between diff erent categories 
of human rights should not lead to any watertight compartmentalisation between, for 
8 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012: 391–407.
9 GA res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR sup (No. 16) at 49, UN doc A76316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3.
10 See e.g. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
11 Formalism in the ECtHR’s praxis is understood as the necessity to ‘draw the line somewhere’ in 
order to create certainty and steadiness (de Lange 2009: 454). For more on formal legitimacy, see 
Barkhuysen and van Emmerik (2009) and Th omassen (2009). Th e more persistent argument is that 
socio-economic rights adjudication is anti-democratic. Th e role of nationally elected representatives 
is usurped when courts pass judgments on matters of social policy. Additional argument against 
social rights adjudication is based on the principle of separation of powers. See more and also 
counter-arguments, Langford (2008: 31–35).
12 Th e content is inevitably the starting point in theories of constitutional rights, see Alexy (2002); 
Dworkin (1987).
13 Çali (2011: 9).
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instance, civil, political or social rights.15 Th is is also the reason why the Convention 
cannot isolate itself from the infl uence of social rights.
Th is article focuses on the general method by which social rights should be read 
within the Convention through a broad interpretation of civil and political rights. 
Th e diffi  cult methodological question is how to fi nd relevant cases, i.e. what search 
terms should be used. Since interpretation of positive obligations has been the Court’s 
main method for extending the scope of Convention provisions, using the search 
term ‘obligations’ seems a well-justifi ed methodological choice.16 In addition, ‘social 
rights’ or ‘economic rights’ were indicated in the search fi eld. Th ere were no time-
limits in the search, and the outcome was eighty-seven identifi ed cases.
2. BACKGROUND FOR JUSTICIABLE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL RIGHTS: REASONS TO INCLUDE THEM
Economic and social rights have traditionally been described as rights which are not 
fulfi lled without positive actions by the state, whereas civil and political rights are seen 
as being easier for states to fulfi l. Th e view has been that social rights need money and 
resources, while civil and political rights are fulfi lled, basically, by non-interference 
by the state. Traditional arguments against justiciable social rights stress that social 
rights are ensured through a combination of fl exible terms, broad powers of discretion 
and generous limitation provisions that call for progressive implementation.17 On 
the other hand, however, some researchers have declared that the debate over the 
distinction between civil or political rights and social rights is nearly over.18
Th ere are well-known challenges to litigating and implementing vague and 
resource-dependent social rights, such as the following: a lack of adequate standing 
provisions and procedural innovations; conservative judiciaries and powerful 
opponents; a lack of fi nancial and legal sources; and the challenges of trying to 
eff ectively connect claimant communities, social movements and legally-oriented 
human rights advocates and ensure that decisions are implemented.19 However, it has 
been strongly suggested that practice has challenged the theoretical obstacles in the 
debate over the justiciability of social rights.20
15 See more on the notion of indivisibility, interdependence and interrelation of human rights, e.g. 
Eide (2001); Koch (2003) and Nickel (2008).
16 Th e Court operates frequently with obligations arguments (not only including positive obligations, 
but also obligations more generally) when determining whether to extend interpretations, see e.g. 
Shany (2011: 79).
17 See rather recent arguments against justiciable social rights, Dennis and Stewart (2004); Mapulanga-
Hulston (2002).
18 See Clements and Simmons (2008: 409); Scheinin (2005: 17).
19 See Langford (2003: 20–22).





Th ere are strong arguments for social rights, too. As to the vague nature of social 
rights, they are phrased no diff erently than civil and political rights. It has been 
pointed out that it is arguable that ‘open-textured framing’ of all human rights is to 
be favoured.21 Furthermore, as to the stylistic construction and resources argument, 
scholars have long noted that social rights require not only the state’s action, but 
also its restraint. And the opposite argument that civil and political rights would be 
cheaper to provide has been seriously questioned. Consequently, the enforcement of 
civil and political rights oft en needs the state’s positive actions as well.22
Th ere is undeniably a developing consensus in the existing literature that economic 
and social rights are internationally justiciable and can be meaningfully enforced by 
international courts and tribunals.23 Scholars have formulated an integrated approach 
to interpretations of human rights treaties. Th is approach is primarily based on the 
idea that civil and political rights have inherent socio-economic components.24 It has 
been stressed that the present interpretive practice undertaken by the ECtHR, and 
the other international human rights bodies, with regard to positive obligations leads 
eventually to taking into consideration economic and social rights.25
In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court stated in 
the Airey case in 1979 that:
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of 
them have implications of a social or economic nature. […] there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the fi eld covered by the Convention.26
Since then, the Court has taken a few steps back from the Airey formulation and 
now the incorporation of socio-economic rights is more cautious and conservative.27 
Socio-economic rights have, de facto, become part of the Convention through diff erent 
routes. Firstly, the Court has determined that proceedings concerning social rights 
must be considered under the Article of fair trial (Article 6).28 Th e fair trial clause 
has been considered to be the starting point for the most important interpretations 
that give some protection to economic and social rights.29 Secondly, the general non-
21 Nolan, Porter and Langford (2009: 11).
22 Eichenhofer (2011: 635) (‘Menschenrechtsschutz gelingt nicht durch Staatliche Inaktivität, sondern 
erfordert stets und notwendig konkrete gesetzgeberische und administrative Schutzmaßnahmen.’). 
See also Langford (2008: 30–31).
23 Eide, Krause and Rosas (2001); Langford (2008: 43); Shany (2011).
24 Mantouvalou (2005: 573–575); Scheinin (2001: 32–42).
25 See Shany (2011: 79).
26 Airey v. Ireland, 6289/73, 1979, para. 26.
27 See Mantouvalou (2005: 574).
28 See more about the technique by which social rights are indirectly protected under the Convention 
through procedural guarantees, Brems (2011: 157–158); Scheinin (2001: 34–38); Koskinas v. Greece, 
47760/99, 20 June 2002.
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discrimination provision (Article 14) has provided a way to ‘socialise’ the Convention 
and it has been claimed that, in the future, non-discrimination provisions will be the 
most important mechanism for protecting social rights in the Convention system.30 
Th irdly, social rights have been incorporated within the Convention through a broad 
interpretation of the scope of civil and political rights.31 For example, welfare benefi ts 
and entitlements have been interpreted as ‘possessions’ or ‘property’ under Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1.32
Th e non-discrimination clause of the Convention in Article 14 is not an independent 
provision. It forbids discrimination only in ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in the Convention’ and, hence, can only be invoked in conjunction with 
another article in the Convention or its protocols. Th e Twelft h Additional Protocol 
came into force on 1st April 2005.33 Th is protocol sets forth a general, independent 
prohibition in discrimination in the law and by public authorities. Currently this 
Protocol has been ratifi ed by eighteen of the forty-seven Member States.34
Th ere was much hope that social rights would be included within the Convention 
through the provision of a general prohibition of discrimination. It was anticipated 
that it would be possible to contest restrictions on social rights before the Court, and 
that this would be the case not only for those based on the ‘typical’ discrimination 
grounds, such as gender, nationality and sexual orientation, but also for those 
grounded on the many discriminatory distinctions commonly present in social policy 
and legislation, such as age and state of health. Consequently, the Twelft h Protocol 
enables almost all violations of social rights to be framed as discrimination issues.35 
Article  1 of Protocol No. 12 has, however, been applied only three times and the 
interpretation has been rather conservative.36
30 Brems (2011: 158). Eichenhofer (2011: 629–633) has a similar main categorisation: (1) Zugang zu 
Gericht, (2) Eigentumsgarantie, (3) Diskriminierungsverbote.
31 Brems (2011: 138–157).
32 See, e.g., Gaugusuz v. Austria, 17371/90, 16  September 1996; Koua Poirrez v. France, 40892/98, 
30  September 2003. In the legal literature there have been also other ways to categorise socio-
economic rights in judicial human rights adjudication, for example, Scheinin’s categorisations: 1) 
non-discrimination Article, 2) procedural safeguards, 3) economic and social rights as limitations 
to other rights, 4) other potential instances of the integrated approach (Scheinin 2001: 34–42). 
Clements and Simmons have two groups: 1) gross socio-economic defi cits directly or indirectly 
attributable to state action, 2) gross socio-economic destitution for which the state has no direct or 
obviously indirect responsibility (Clements and Simmons 2008: 409–427). O’Cinneide has three 
‘gateways’: 1) Article 3. Destitution as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’, 2) Article 2. Destitution 
as a threat to life; 3) Destitution as threat to meaningful private, home and family life (O’Cinneide 
2008).
33 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
CETS No.: 177.
34 Th is is the situation on 19 June 2014.
35 Brems (2011: 163); see also more on how anti-discrimination legislation promotes economic and 
social rights, De Witte (2013).
36 See the cases where Article  1 of Protocol No. 12 has been applied: Maktouf and Damjanović v. 





Also an additional protocol of social rights has been proposed that would extend 
the Convention system to certain economic and social rights. Th is, however, was 
rejected by the Member States and their wish was to strengthen the mechanism of 
the European Social Charter.37 Th e Court has, interestingly, seen this as an argument 
in support of the existence of a consensus among Contracting States to promote 
economic and social rights when interpreting the Convention.38
Although the incorporation of economic and social rights into the Convention 
can be explained by the fact that there is no ‘water-tight distinction’ between socio-
economic and civil and political rights issues, and the Court, in practice, frequently 
gives weight to socio-economic rights, applicability of the economic and social rights 
in the Convention remains a sensitive issue.39 Th ere are also some discordant voices: 
it has been strongly argued that the Convention does not protect economic and social 
rights either explicitly or implicitly. Th e Convention instead protects economic and 
social aspects.40 Th is debate is, however, rather artifi cial and diff erences in views are 
more a matter of degree than constituting actual disagreement.
3. CASE LAW ANALYSIS: THE INTERPRETATIVE 
INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
In this section, arguments concerning social rights are analysed in order to fi nd 
out how social rights have been incorporated within the Convention through the 
Court’s interpretations. Th e overarching question is: how does the Court justify 
its interpretations? Th e case law data consists of eighty-seven judgments, and the 
arguments with regard to social rights and their justifi ability have been analysed 
carefully. Th e emphasis was on the reasoning of the Court, looking at how broadly 
social rights are taken into consideration and on which sources or arguments the 
Court relies when justifying its extensive interpretations.
Th e adopted categorisation follows the work of Cousins, who categorises the 
infl uence of social rights on each of the Convention provisions.41 Access to courts 
(Article 6) and the non-discrimination provision (Article 14) are, however, left  aside 
in this article. Th e case law is, on the whole, clear with regard to Article 6 and social 
rights. In Bulgakova, the Court stated: ‘[…] It is beyond doubt that pensions and 
No. 12); Sejdič and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27996/06, 34836/06, 22 December 2009, GC 
(violation of Article  1 of Protocol No. 12); Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v. Croatia, 
7798/08, 9 December 2010 (violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, hence, no need to 
examine the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12).
37 Recommendation 1415 (1999) Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning fundamental social rights.
38 See Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 34503/97, 12 November 2008, GC, para. 84.
39 See likewise Leijten (2013) p. 180; Clements and Simmons (2008: 426).
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related benefi ts, which are purely economic in nature, are ‘civil’ rights within the 
meaning of Article  6. […].’42 Also the non-discrimination provision and its social 
rights dimensions have already been studied.43 Th is article has chosen to present the 
most representative examples of each category where social rights’ infl uence is present.
3.1. CATEGORY 1: INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 
(ARTICLE 3)
Th e Grand Chamber case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece concerned an asylum seeker 
who claimed that his rights under Article 3 had been violated.44 Th e applicant claimed, 
inter alia, that the state of extreme poverty in which he had lived since he arrived 
in Greece amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Th e Grand Chamber 
stated that Article 3 does not cover an obligation for states to provide everyone in 
their jurisdiction with a home. Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give 
refugees fi nancial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living.45 
In the case in question, the Greek authorities were, however, bound to comply with 
their own legislation which transposes European Union law. Th e Union Directive 
2003/9 lays down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the 
Member States. Th ere is thus an obligation to provide accommodation and decent 
material conditions to impoverished asylum seekers.46
Th e Court had to determine whether, in the context of the Convention, a situation 
of extreme poverty and poor living conditions could raise an issue under Article 3. Th e 
Court emphasised that the applicant had lived for months in a state of the most extreme 
poverty: the applicant was unable to satisfy his most basic needs (for food, hygiene and 
place to live). Furthermore, his situation was not likely to improve in the near future.47
Th e Court came to the conclusion that the applicant had been the victim of 
humiliating treatment:
[…] the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability […] and 
must be held responsible […] for the situation in which [the applicant] has found himself 
for several months, living in the street, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, 
and without any means of providing for his essential needs. […] such a living conditions 
[…] have attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 […].48
42 Bulgakova v. Russia, 69524/01, 18 January 2007, para. 30 (emphasis added by the author). See other 
Article 6 cases, K.M.C. v. Hungary, 19554/11, 10  July 2012; Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 15764/89, 
20  February 1996; Couez v. France, 94/1997/878/1090, 24  August 1998; Annoni di Gussola and 
Others v. France, 31819/96, 33293/96, 14 November 2000; see also Cousins (2008: 107–129).
43 See Brems (2011: 158–162); Cousins (2008, 2009); and Leijten (2013).
44 M.S.S. (note 5).
45 Ibid. para. 249.
46 Ibid. para. 250.
47 Ibid. para. 254.





Th e majority, by sixteen judges, held that there has been a violation of Article 3. One 
dissenting judge notes the extension of Article 3: ‘[…] the Court did in fact admit 
the possibility of social welfare obligations of the State in the context of Article 3. It 
did so in the name of dignity, and relying on a theory of positive obligations of the 
State.’49
Th e Court justifi ed its extension of the interpretation of Article 3 by relying on 
the broad consensus at international and European level concerning the need for 
special protection for asylum seekers. It pointed out that, for instance, the Geneva 
Convention, the activities of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the 
commonly applied standards set out in the European Union Directive all show a 
consensus over protection of asylum seekers.50 Since the need for protection is so well-
founded and commonly shared, the Court decided to expand Article 3 to include the 
right for asylum seekers to certain living conditions.
A right to medical care in prison arose in the Güveç case.51 Th e applicant 
complained that he suff ered from psychological problems in prison and received no 
medical care. According to the applicant, this amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3.
Th e Court pointed out that the ill-treatment must meet the minimum level of 
severity in order to fall within the scope of Article 3. Th e applicant was only fi  fteen 
years old and he was detained in a prison with adult prisoners. Th e applicant was 
detained for fi ve years. Furthermore, the applicant had no adequate legal representation 
until fi ve years aft er he was fi rst detained. Th ese circumstances caused the applicant 
psychological problems which tragically led to his repeated attempts to take his own 
life.
Th e Court considered the duty to provide medical care under Article 3: ‘[…] the 
national authorities were not only directly responsible for the applicant’s problems, 
but also manifestly failed to provide adequate medical care for him. […].’52 Th e 
ECtHR continued: ‘Indeed, […] the trial court not only failed to ensure that the 
applicant received medical care, but even prevented him and his family from doing so 
by refusing to release him on bail […].’53
Th e ECtHR determined that Article  3 ‘imposes an obligation on the State to 
protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by 
providing them with the requisite medical assistance […].’54 Th e Court concluded 
unanimously that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 3.
49 Partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó: 102.
50 M.S.S. (note 5), paras. 251, 263.
51 Güveç v. Turkey, 70337/01, 20 January 2009.
52 Ibid. para. 93.
53 Ibid. para. 95.
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Th e Court does not have to do much in order to justify the positive obligation 
to provide medical assistance for persons deprived of their liberty: it is fairly self-
evident that such an obligation must exist in order to protect everyone’s right to life. 
Th e circumstances and negligence in the actions of the national authorities (both the 
prison authorities and the trial court) were so obvious in this case that the justifi cation 
for the Court’s decision does not require further reasoning.
3.2. CATEGORY 2: RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
(ARTICLE 8)
In Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, eight applicants claimed that the state had violated 
Article 8 since they had been arbitrarily deprived of the possibility of preserving their 
status as permanent residents in Slovenia.55 Permanent residents have many social 
rights, such as the right to a pension, the right to health insurance and to better work 
opportunities.
Th e background to this case was that the applicants were citizens of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the SFRY), and aft er Slovenia became 
independent the applicants did not apply for Slovenian citizenship. Consequently they 
became aliens unlawfully residing on Slovenian territory. Th eir names were ‘erased’ 
from the Register of Permanent Residents.
Interference in this case was quite clear because the state did not contest that 
the ‘erasure’ and its repercussions had had an adverse eff ect on the applicants and 
amounted to an interference with their private and family life under Article 8. Th e 
Grand Chamber did not depart from its previous fi ndings in fi nding that the ‘erasure’ 
had interfered with their Article 8 rights and continued to do so.56
Next, the Grand Chamber had to examine whether the interference was justifi ed. 
To be justifi ed the interference had to be ‘in accordance with law’, pursue ‘a legitimate 
aim’ and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Th e Court found that the Slovenian 
legislation and administrative practice which resulted in the ‘erasure’ lacked the 
requisite standards of foreseeability and accessibility. Consequently, the Court came 
to the conclusion that the interference was not ‘in accordance with law’.57 Normally, 
when fi nding that the fi rst justifi cation requirement is not fulfi lled, the Court 
concludes that there is a violation and does not examine the two latter requirements 
at all. In this case, however, the Court considered it necessary to examine the latter 
two requirements (legitimate aim and necessity).58
Its analysis of legitimate aim was rather brief, and the outcome was that the Court 
ruled that the state had a legitimate aim (to protect the country’s national security).59 
55 Kurič and Others v. Slovenia, 26828/06, 26 June 2012, GC.
56 Ibid. para. 339.
57 Ibid. paras. 346, 349.
58 Ibid. para. 350.





Social rights come into play when the Court examined the necessity requirement. Th e 
Court stated:
[…] the applicants […] enjoyed a wide range of social and political rights. Owing to the 
‘erasure’, they experienced a number of adverse consequences, such as […], loss of job 
opportunities, loss of health insurance, the impossibility of renewing identity documents 
or driving licences, and diffi  culties in regulating pension rights. […].60
Th e Court also reminded the state of its positive obligations under Article 8 including 
that of ensuring eff ective respect for private and family life.61 Aft er drawing attention 
to the positive obligations, the Court emphasised that the regularisation of the 
residence status of the former SFRY citizens was a necessary step which the state 
should have taken in order to ensure that failure to obtain Slovenian citizenship would 
not disproportionately aff ect Article 8 rights of the ‘erased’. Th e Court concluded:
Th e absence of such regulation and the prolonged impossibility of obtaining valid residence 
permits have upset the fair balance which should have been struck between the legitimate 
aim of the protection of national security and eff ective respect for the applicants’ right to 
private or family life or both.62
Th e Court was creative in its inclusion of social rights within the scope of Article 8: 
social rights belong to the eff ective respect of private and family life. Consequently, 
when evaluating whether the state has respected private and family life eff ectively, 
social rights, such as the right to health insurance and pension rights, must be taken into 
account. Furthermore, the Court unanimously emphasised the grave consequences of 
the ‘erasure’ of applicants’ Article 8 rights.63 Consequently, the interference was not 
necessary in a democratic society, and thus there was a violation of Article 8. Th is case 
is particularly representative of the incorporation of social rights within the scope of 
traditional civil and political rights: eff ective respect of private and family life also 
contains grounds for the fulfi lment of social rights.
In Fadeyeva v. Russia a social right to health and well-being under Article 8 was 
in question.64 Th e applicant’s home was located near a steel plant. Th e applicant 
complained before the ECtHR that there had been a violation of Article 8 on account 
of the state’s failure to protect her private life and home from severe environmental 
nuisance arising from the steel plant. Th e Government contested the applicability of 
Article 8 in this case. Th erefore, the Court had fi rst to decide whether the situation 
providing the subject of the applicant’s complaint fell under Article 8.
60 Ibid. para. 356. (emphasis added by the author).
61 Ibid. para. 358 (emphasis added by the author).
62 Ibid. para. 359.
63 Ibid. para. 360.





Should Social Rights be Included in Interpretations of the Convention 
by the European Court of Human Rights?
European Journal of Social Security, Volume 16 (2014), No. 3 263
Th e Court emphasised that, in order to raise an issue under Article  8, the 
interference must directly aff ect the applicant’s home, family or private life. In addition, 
the adverse eff ects of environmental pollution must attain a certain minimum level in 
order to fall within the scope of Article 8. Th e Court then pointed out that the offi  cial 
documents submitted confi rmed that the environmental pollution at the applicant’s 
place of residence had constantly exceeded safety levels. Moreover, the ECtHR paid 
special attention to the fact that the domestic courts recognised the applicant’s right 
to be resettled. Additionally, domestic legislation itself defi ned the zone in which the 
applicant’s home was situated as unfi t for habitation. Th erefore, the national courts 
had already recognised the existence of interference with the applicant’s private 
sphere.65
Th e Court evaluated the applicant’s claim that the pollution has been harmful 
to her health and well-being. Th e Court points out that, in this case, a very strong 
combination of indirect evidence and presumptions made it possible to conclude 
that the applicant’s health deteriorated as a result of her prolonged exposure to the 
industrial emissions from the steel plant. Th e Court continued:
Even assuming that the pollution did not cause any quantifi able harm to her health, it 
inevitably made the applicant more vulnerable to various illnesses. Moreover, there can 
be no doubt that it adversely aff ected her quality of life and home. Th erefore, the Court 
accepts that the actual detriment to the applicant’s health and well-being reached a level 
suffi  cient to bring it within the scope of Article 8 […].66
Th e Court analysed the complaint in terms of a positive duty on the state to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under 
Article 8(1).67 Next, the Court formulated two positive obligations which can arise 
from the eff ective enjoyment of right to respect of home or private life in the present 
case: obligation to resettle the applicant and obligation to regulate private industry.
Th e Court unanimously concluded that the state had not fulfi lled these positive 
obligations and, therefore, had failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
the community and the applicant’s eff ective enjoyment of her right to respect for her 
home and private life. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 8.
Th e outcome was in favour of the right to health and well-being. Th e Court, 
however, did not directly declare any social rights within its reasoning. Th ere were no 
references to the social rights conventions or instruments which protect everyone’s 
right to health internationally. Th e Court emphasised eff ective enjoyment of the 
right to private life and home and declared that there was a positive obligation on 
the state to resettle the applicant away from the place where her health is at risk. Th e 
argumentation could have been stronger and the Court could have stated the right to 
65 Ibid. paras. 81–86.
66 Ibid. para. 88.





health more clearly and directly by, for example, referring to Article 11 of the Social 
Charter (right to health).
3.3. CATEGORY 3: RIGHT TO POSSESSION (ARTICLE 1 OF 
PROTOCOL NO. 1)
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been considered by the ECtHR in a very wide range 
of social security cases in which social security is seen as possession.68 Th e ECtHR 
has confi rmed that states have a wide margin of appreciation with regard to national 
social security schemes. However, when legislation regulating access to such a scheme 
exists, it must be compatible with the non-discrimination provision (Article 14). Th e 
Court stated in Luczak:
[…] even where weighty reasons have been advanced for excluding an individual from the 
scheme, such exclusion must not leave him in a situation in which he is denied any social 
insurance cover, […] thus posing a threat to his livelihood. Indeed, to leave […] person 
bereft  of any social security cover would be incompatible with current trends in social 
security legislation in Europe.69
Th e Court unanimously concluded, emphasising the social rights’ perspective, that 
even though the state clearly has a wide margin of appreciation in the area of social 
security, the Government had failed to adduce any reasonable and objective justifi cation 
for the distinction in order to meet the requirements of Article 14.70 Th erefore, there 
was a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It must, however, be pointed out that the incorporation of social rights within 
the Convention is fully dependent on the individual national legislations concerning 
social rights. Th e Court in its interpretations of Convention provisions de facto 
protects and gives weight to nationally provided social rights. Th us, if the state decides 
to create a benefi ts scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with the 
non-discrimination provision.71
Social rights may also be involved under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as counter 
arguments to interference with property rights. In Ghigo, the case concerned balancing 
a landlord’s property rights against the tenants’ social rights.72 Th e applicant’s house 
68 See Cousins (2008: 17–45).
69 Luczak v. Poland, 77782/01, 27 November 200, para. 52.
70 Ibid. para. 59; see cases of social security as a possession and non-discrimination involved e.g. Koua 
Poirrez v. France, (note 32); Stec and Others v. Th e United Kingdom, 65731/01, 65900/01, 12 April 
2006, GC.
71 Th is similar interpretation praxis is also common to the UN Human Rights Committee, which 
interprets the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by giving weight to national 
social rights provisions, see e.g. Communication No. 182/1984, F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. Th e 
Netherlands.
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was seized by the Government under a requisition order. Th e house was let to a tenant 
and the applicant was entitled to receive a requisition rent for the use of his property. 
However, no rent had ever been fi xed or off ered to the landlord. Th e applicant 
invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and complained before the ECtHR that, due to 
the requisition order, he had lost control of his property for a long period of time, 
and he had been obliged to bear the obligations of a landlord without obtaining any 
compensation.
Th e Government pointed out that the state had a general interest in controlling the 
use of property. Th e general interest aimed at ensuring a just distribution and eff ective 
use of housing resources. It was maintained that the requisition order provided a right 
to housing and certain living conditions for everyone.
Th e second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 states that Contracting States 
are entitled to control the use of property in the general interest. Next, the Court 
examines whether the state’s measures are lawful, whether it had pursued ‘a legitimate 
aim’ and whether ‘a fair balance had been struck’ between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised.
Th e lawfulness of the measures was quickly ascertained (the national legislation 
fulfi lled the accessible, precise and foreseeable criteria).73 Next, the Court evaluated 
whether the Maltese authorities had pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest. 
Th e Court reiterated that the notion of general interest was necessarily extensive. 
Further, the Court noted that the national authorities were, in principle, in a better 
position than an international judge to appreciate what was in the general interest. Th e 
Court accepted the Government’s argument that the requisition and the rent control 
were aimed at ensuring the just distribution and use of housing resources.74 Th e Court 
mentioned explicitly that: ‘Th ese measures, implemented with a view to securing the 
social protection of tenants […], were also aimed at preventing homelessness, as well 
as protecting the dignity of poorly-off  tenants […].’75 Consequently, the impugned 
legislation had a legitimate aim.
Finally, the Court evaluated whether a fair balance had been struck between the 
general interest of the community and the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. In other words, the Court ascertained whether the landlord had to 
bear a disproportionate and excessive burden due to the state’s interference. In this 
connection, the Court referred to the doctrine that the landlord’s property rights 
must be ‘practical and eff ective’.76 Th e Court considered that the landlord had little or 
no infl uence on the choice of tenant or the essential elements of such an agreement. 
Furthermore, the Court observed that the compensation for the loss of control over 
his property was extremely low (less than € 5 per month) and could hardly be seen as 
73 Ibid. paras. 51–53.
74 Ibid. paras. 55–57.
75 Ibid. para. 58.





fair. In addition, the requisition had already lasted for 22 years. Taking all these things 
into account, the Court unanimously concluded that a disproportionate and excessive 
burden had been imposed on the applicant.77 Th us, a fair balance had not been struck 
and there had been a violation of the applicant’s property rights.
Th e Court took the state’s wide margin of appreciation into account and stressed, 
when the social housing was involved, that the national authorities must have 
considerable discretion in deciding on the extent of control over the use of individual 
property. However, the Court stressed that the discretion was not unlimited and that 
its exercise cannot entail consequences at variance with Convention standards.78 
Th e Court’s reasoning with regard to prioritising the landlord’s property rights over 
the tenants’ social rights seems justifi ed. Th e Court did not underestimate the aim 
of the state in protecting the social rights of others when controlling and limiting 
the applicant’s property rights. Th e disproportionality of the interference is rather 
obvious and if the state had managed to ease the consequences of its interference, the 
violation would have probably not been judged to have occurred.
Th e interference with landlords’ property rights in order to protect housing rights 
of others has been in focus also in the Grand Chamber Hutten-Czapska case.79 Th e 
same question had been decided by the Court before, for example, in the Scalabrino80 
and Mellacher81 cases, in which the Court emphasised increasing social justice as a 
legitimate general interest justifying the limitation of landlords’ property rights, and 
consequently, found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.82 In Hutten-Czapska 
the Court fully recognised the diffi  culty of achieving a balance between social rights 
and landlords’ property rights:
It is true that […] the Polish State […] had to balance the exceptionally diffi  cult interests of 
landlords and tenants. It had, on the one hand, to secure the protection of property rights 
of the former and, on the other, to respect the social rights of the latter, oft en vulnerable 
individuals […].83
In these cases, the state’s aim is to protect the social rights of tenants, and therefore 
it limits the Convention provision of the landlords’ right to property. From the 
point of view of social rights, the state is doing the right thing. Th is was explicitly 
admitted by the Court when it accepted the protection of the social rights of others 
77 Ibid. paras. 64–66, 69.
78 Ibid. paras.67–68.
79 Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 35014/97, 19 June 2006, GC.
80 Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy, 12868/87, 28 September 1995.
81 Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 10522/83, 11011/84, 11070/84, 19 December 1989.
82 It is worth mentioning that in Scalabrino (note 80) and Mellacher (note 81) the Court is not directly 
arguing for social rights, but instead, for social justice. Arguments based on rights have clearly 
become more visible and explicit in the twenty-fi rst century.
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as a legitimate general interest for interfering with property rights.84 However, the 
principle of proportionality must be kept in mind: the interference should not impose 
a disproportionate burden on landlords. In the Court’s practice this means that the 
level of rent should be suffi  ciently near the current market value, and the landlord 
should have some right to infl uence the contractual aspects of the tenancy. Th is 
sounds fairly acceptable and justifi ed: the protection of social rights should not be 
done at any cost and by neglecting the principle of proportionality.
3.4. CATEGORY 4: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (ARTICLE 11)
In the Grand Chamber case Demir and Baykara, the incorporation of wider trade-
union rights within Article 11 was in question.85 Article 11(1) covers everyone’s right 
to form and to join trade unions. Th e applicants complained before the ECtHR that 
the domestic courts had denied them the right to form trade unions and to enter 
into collective agreements. Th e main question was whether the Convention includes 
the right for municipal civil servants to form trade unions and the right to bargain 
collectively.
Th e Court started its reasoning exceptionally by outlining how international 
instruments aff ect the interpretation of the Convention. Th is was necessary since 
the respondent Government had argued that the Court was not entitled to create, by 
way of interpretation, any new obligations not already provided in the Convention. 
Turkey was not a party to Article 5 (the right to organise) or Article 6 (the right to 
bargain collectively) of the European Social Charter. Th e Court strongly rejected the 
Government’s claim that international instruments should not aff ect the interpretation 
of the Convention. Th e Court stressed that Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention 
determine the meaning of the terms and phrases used in the Convention. Furthermore, 
the Court reiterated the practical and eff ective interpretation and living instrument 
method. In addition, the Court stated that it must also always take into account any 
relevant applicable rules and principles of international law.86
Next, the Court pointed out that, when there is a set of rules and principles that 
are accepted by the vast majority of states or in international treaties, these ‘refl ect 
a reality that the Court cannot disregard when it is called upon to clarify the scope 
of a Convention provision’.87 Furthermore, the Court reiterated that it has never 
distinguished between sources of law according to whether or not they had been 
signed or ratifi ed by the respondent state.88
84 Th is line of reasoning is similar to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(fundamental rights are a legitimate reason to limit the free movement of goods), see e.g. C-112/00, 
Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich, 12 June 2003, GC.
85 Demir and Baykara (note 38).
86 Ibid. paras. 65–68.
87 Ibid. para. 76.





Th e Court pointed out that the member states declined to create an additional 
protocol of social rights within the Convention in 1999. Th e argument for declining 
the additional protocol of social rights was that, instead of creating a new protocol 
within the Convention, the mechanism of the European Social Charter should be 
strengthened. In relation to this case, the Court viewed this argument as a general 
wish in support a consensus among states to promote economic and social rights. Th e 
Court continued, and there might be some sarcasm involved: ‘It is not precluded from 
taking this general wish of Contracting States into consideration when interpreting 
the provisions of the Convention.’89
Turning to the detail of the present case, according to Article  11(2), lawful 
restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of these rights by members of the 
administration of the state. Th e applicants were municipal civil servants. Th e Court 
stressed that municipal civil servants, who are not engaged in the administration of 
the state as such, cannot in principle be treated as members of the administration 
of state and, accordingly, be subject on that basis to a limitation of their right to 
organise and to form trade unions. Aft er stating its interpretation under Article 11, 
the Court drew support to the right of public offi  cials to form trade unions from the 
ILO Convention of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.90
Continuing with the ILO Committee’s considerations, the Court pointed out 
that the right of public offi  cials to join trade unions is established several times, the 
only admissible exceptions to the right to organise concerning the armed forces and 
the police.91 Th e Court added that the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
adopted the same line of reasoning as regards municipal civil servants.92 Next, the 
Court referred to the European Social Charter to support its view.93
Th e Court also referred directly to Recommendation No. R (2000) 6 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and European Union’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, in which trade union rights had been recognised for civil 
servants.94 Finally, the Court observed that the right of public servants to join trade 
unions is now recognised by all Contracting States. Th e only restrictions concern 
the police, fi re service and armed forces.95 Demonstrating this consensus at the 
international and European level left  the Court no room to conclude otherwise: 
municipal civil servants cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 11. Accordingly, 
the applicants could legitimately rely on Article 11.
Aft er concluding that Article 11 included trade-union rights for civil servants, the 
rest was quite straightforward for the Court. Th ere was clear inactivity, at the national 
89 Ibid. para. 84.
90 Ibid. para. 100.
91 Ibid. para. 101.
92 Ibid. para. 102.
93 Ibid. para. 103.
94 Ibid. paras. 104–105.
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level, to put into eff ect the international agreements concerning civil servants’ trade-
union rights. Th e Court found that neither ‘pressing social need’ nor the reasons 
for the restriction were ‘relevant and suffi  cient’.96 Accordingly, the seventeen Court 
judges found unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 11 with regard to 
the failure to recognise the right of the applicants, as municipal civil servants, to form 
a trade union.
Next, the question about the right to collective bargaining had to be solved. Th e 
right to bargain collectively is not covered by Article 11(1) and is a pure social right. 
Th e trade union in question had persuaded the authority to engage in collective 
bargaining and to enter into collective agreements. Th e Court admitted that the right 
to bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements had not previously 
constituted an inherent element of Article 11. However, it argued that it had to take 
into account the evolution of praxis in such matters both at an international and 
domestic level. Th e Court refers to the ILO Convention where the right to collective 
bargaining is strongly protected.97
In addition, many references were made to the European Social Charter and the 
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. It also recognised that there was 
an undeniable consensus within the European states in favour of securing the right to 
bargain collectively.98 In the light of these developments, the Court openly departed 
from its previous case-law and accepted that the right to bargain collectively had 
become one of the essential elements of Article 11.
Aft er fi nding that collective bargaining was one of the essential elements of trade-
union rights under Article 11, there was no longer very much for the Court to balance. 
Th e explanation that civil servants, without distinction, enjoyed a privileged position 
in relation to other workers was not, according to the Court’s unanimous opinion, 
suffi  cient reason to interfere with their rights under Article 11.99 Consequently, there 
had been a violation of Article 11 with regard to collective bargaining.
Th e Court justifi ed its dynamic interpretation openly:
While it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that 
the Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents established in previous 
cases, a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutionary approach would risk 
rendering it a bar to reform or improvement […].100
In the Grand Chamber case of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, trade union 
rights in the Orthodox Church were in question.101 Th e priests and clerical staff  of 
96 Ibid. paras. 116, 119–126.
97 Ibid. paras. 147–148.
98 Ibid. paras. 149–151.
99 Ibid. paras. 165–169.
100 Ibid. para. 153.





the Romanian Orthodox Church wanted to form a trade union and the state refused, 
justifying this decision by citing the importance of maintaining the autonomy of the 
Church. Th e Court had fi rst to determine whether Article 11 was applicable in the 
present case. In doing so, the Court relied on the strong support for the right of all 
workers to form trade unions, as guaranteed in the ILO Conventions and European 
Union law.102 Consequently, the Court considered that, notwithstanding their 
special circumstances, members of the clergy fulfi lled their mission in the context 
of an employment relationship falling within the scope of Article 11. Consequently, 
Article 11 was applicable in the present case.103
Next, the Court examined whether the interference of Article 11 was ‘prescribed 
by law’, pursued ‘a legitimate aim’ and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Th e 
lawfulness requirement and the legitimacy of the aim were rather briefl y confi rmed 
and the decisive question identifi ed as the necessity of the interference. Th e 
proportionality examination diff ered from the Chamber’s judgment. Th e Chamber 
found that the national court had not taken suffi  ciently relevant arguments into 
account when refusing to register the trade union. Consequently, the Chamber found 
that there had been a violation of right to form a trade union. In contrast, the Grand 
Chamber’s majority, composed of eleven judges, considered that the principle of the 
autonomy of religious communities was a relevant reason to restrict the right to form 
a trade union for clerical staff . Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 11.104
Th e Grand Chamber’s emphasis on the principle of autonomy of religious 
communities over the trade union rights was mainly based on the argument about the 
lack of a European consensus on this matter.105 Th e minority, composed of six judges, 
was not, however, convinced that the national court’s arguments were suffi  cient to 
justify identifying interference with rights under Article 11. Th e minority came to a 
diff erent conclusion on the European consensus arguing that, although constitutional 
models vary greatly in this matter, none of the European states excluded members of 
the clergy from the right to form trade unions.106
Th e Grand Chamber took national and religious sensitivities carefully into account 
in this case. Religious autonomy of the Romanian Orthodox Church was considered 
to be of greater importance than the autonomy of churches in other European states 
and trade union rights had to take a few steps backwards. Th e previous interpretations 
of trade union rights, as highlighted in Demir and Baykara, would have led one to 
expect that a violation of Article 11 would have been found to have taken place also 
in this case.107
102 Ibid. para. 142.
103 Ibid. para. 148.
104 Ibid. paras. 167–169.
105 Ibid. para. 171.
106 Joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Spielmann, Villiger, López Guerra, Bianku, Møse and 
Jäderblom, para. 10.
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3.5. CATEGORY 5: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (ARTICLE 2 OF 
PROTOCOL NO. 4)
In Tatishvili v. Russia, interference with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 led, at the same 
time, to an interference with a number of social rights.108 Th e applicant was a citizen 
of the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). She continued to hold Soviet 
citizenship and in 2000 she became a stateless person. Th e applicant lived in Moscow, 
and her application for residence registration had been declined because she was not 
a Russian citizen. Th e applicant complained about the domestic authorities’ arbitrary 
refusal to certify her residence at the chosen address, which had substantially 
complicated her daily life and rendered uncertain her access to medical care. Th e 
Court decided to examine the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
Th e Court referred to the applicant’s submission that residence registration is 
the proof of residence in the Russian Federation, so that its absence had prevented 
her from exercising many social rights, inter alia, access to medical assistance, social 
security, pension and the right to possess property.109 Th e Court found that the 
authorities’ refusal to certify the applicant’s residence exposed her to administrative 
penalties and fi nes. Th e Court said nothing about the consequences for the applicant’s 
social rights. However, it is clear that there had been an interference with the right to 
liberty of movement.110
Next, the Court examined whether the interference was justifi ed. Th e fi rst 
requirement was that the interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’. Th e 
Government’s justifi cation for the interference was based solely on the argument of 
the unlawfulness of the applicant’s residence in Russia. Th is argument was, however, 
strictly rejected by the Court.111 Th e Court stressed that the application was refused 
because of a failure to submit a complete set of documents. It was never specifi ed 
which of the required documents were missing.
Furthermore, the Court observed that grounds for refusing the registration 
had not been laid out. Lastly, the ECtHR paid special attention to the case law of 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Th e Constitutional Court has 
held that the registration authority had a duty to certify residence, and there was 
no discretion for reviewing the authenticity. Th e ECtHR observed that the binding 
interpretation of the Constitutional Court was disregarded by the domestic authorities 
in the present case. Accordingly, the interference was not ‘in accordance with the law’ 
and this conclusion made it unnecessary to determine whether it pursued ‘a legitimate 
aim’ and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.112
108 Tatishvili v. Russia, 1509/02, 22 February 2007.
109 Ibid. para. 44.
110 Ibid. para. 46.
111 Ibid. paras. 39–41, 49.





Th e Court’s remaining task, to unanimously conclude that there was a violation of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, was then quite straightforward. Th e outcome was in favour 
of social rights which were also interfered with by violating the right to movement. 
Regrettably, however, the Court’s reasoning was silent on social rights. Th e Court merely 
referred to the applicant’s submission on the consequences of the interference with many 
social rights. Th e Court could have done more in its reasoning: with the help of positive 
obligations, the Court could have easily included social rights under the provision of the 
liberty of movement. Unfortunately, the reasoning of the Court remained on a rather 
traditional level and left  the arguments concerning social rights aside.
In Miażdżyk v. Poland, a restriction on the liberty of movement aff ected the 
applicant’s social rights.113 Th e applicant complained that the prohibition on leaving 
Poland for more than fi ve years constituted a disproportionate restriction on his 
liberty of movement (Article  2 of Protocol No. 4). Th e applicant was waiting for 
criminal proceedings and a restriction of movement had been imposed on him. Th e 
applicant was a French national and his life prior to his arrest in Poland had been 
based in France. His family, including three children, were located in France. He also 
had a right to medical care in France. Th e applicant had made nine requests for the 
restriction imposed on him to be lift ed. He cited, inter alia, his health problems. All 
the requests were, however, refused.
Th e Court’s balancing in this case was quite straightforward: the disproportionality 
of the limitation on movement was obvious. Th e Court concluded unanimously that ‘in 
view of the above’ the restriction on the applicant’s freedom of movement for a period of 
fi ve years and two months was disproportionate, particularly given that he was forced to 
stay for all that period in a foreign country and was not allowed to leave even for a short 
period of time. Consequently, there had been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.114
Th e right to medical care was one aspect of the rights that were interfered with due 
to the restriction of movement.115 By no means, however, was the right to medical care 
alone decisive: the eff ects of the restriction of movement were disproportionate as a 
whole and the social right to medical care was just one element among these.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Th e analysis of case law shows that the Court has evolved a rich case law praxis in the 
fi eld of social rights. Although the Convention’s text does not cover social rights, this has 
not stopped the Court from including social rights within the Convention’s provisions. 
Th e Court has openly broadened the traditional scope of Convention provisions and 
incorporated social rights within the civil and political rights. Th is should, however, 
be done in an overt and transparent way. If the Court fails to acknowledge the true 
113 Miażdżyk v. Poland, 23592/07, 24 January 2012.
114 Ibid. paras. 41–42.
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arguments which led it to support social rights in its decisions, then there is much to 
criticise in relation to considerations of legal certainty and justifi ability.
Th e Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinaft er, the CJEU) has likewise 
extended interpretations in relation to social rights in its case law. Social rights belong 
primarily in the fi eld of social policy, which does not belong to the Union’s exclusive 
competences as questions of social policy have been left  to the shared competences of 
the Member States and the Union (Article 4(2)(b) TFEU116). Economic policies are 
coordinated by the Member States (Article 5(1) TFEU). Furthermore, the protection 
and improvement of human health belongs to the Member States’ competences 
(Article  6(a) TFEU). Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights covers both civil and 
political and social rights. Th e implementation of the Charter provisions are, however, 
bound to the implementation of Union law (Article 51(1) Charter). It follows that the 
applicability of social rights which are provided by the Charter can only arise if it is 
linked to the implementation of Union law (e.g. to a certain Directive or Regulation).117
Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di 
Bolzano (IPES) and Others before the CJEU concerned the right to housing benefi t.118 
In this case, the national allocation of funds prevented the granting of social benefi t 
to a non-national. Th e Grand Chamber, composed of thirteen judges, had to decide 
whether such a mechanism was in conformity with the principle of equal treatment. 
Th e CJEU took social rights provided in the Charter seriously:
[W]hen determining the social security, social assistance and social protection measures 
[…] the Member States must comply with the rights and observe the principles provided 
for under the Charter, […]. Under Article 34(3) of the Charter, in order to combat social 
exclusion and poverty, the Union (and thus the Member States when they are implementing 
European Union law) ‘recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so 
as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack suffi  cient resources […]’.119
Th e CJEU further emphasised the Charter’s provision on social and housing assistance 
in the interpretation of the Directive in question and concluded that the benefi t in 
question must be considered as being part of core benefi ts within the meaning of 
Article 11(4) of Directive 2003/109.120
Th e CJEU concluded that Directive 2003/109 must be interpreted as precluding, with 
regard to the granting of housing benefi t, diff erent treatment for third-country nationals 
116 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012: 47–390.
117 For the social dimension of the European Union, see Rosas and Armati (2010: 187–192).
118 C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano 
(IPES) and Others, 24 April 2012, GC. Th e route which takes social rights into consideration in the 
Union law comes mainly through the fundamental freedoms (the free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital).
119 Ibid. para. 80.
120 Ibid. para. 92. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-





enjoying the status of long-term resident.121 Th e line taken by the interpretation of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR was interestingly similar in that both emphasise the prohibition 
of any diff erence in treatment on grounds of nationality in access to social benefi ts.122
Case law, both from the CJEU and the ECtHR, illustrates a consistent trend 
in relation to social rights: social rights are increasingly included within the 
interpretation of applicable law.123 Th is leads us to the question presented at the 
beginning of this article, namely whether it is legitimate for the ECtHR to read social 
rights into interpretations of the Convention. Th e answer is two-fold. Firstly, in order 
for the incorporation of social rights to be legitimate, the reasoning must be overt 
and transparent and the arguments, both for and against, must be stated. Secondly, 
justifi cation of the extended interpretations should be based on widely adopted 
international instruments. Furthermore, additional weight should be placed on the 
matter of whether the majority of the Contracting States have approved that line of 
interpretation. Similarities in case law praxis concerning social rights’ protection 
across the European Union is one way in which the legitimacy of the incorporation 
of social rights into the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights is 
increased. When both of the European courts are on the same side, it is hard to argue 
to the contrary.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Colin Lindsay and Donald Houston (eds.), Disability Benefi ts, Welfare Reform 
and Employment Policy, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, xv + 244 pp., 
ISBN 978–0-230–34994–0 (hardcover)
Disability Benefi ts, Welfare Reform and Employment Policy is one of the titles in the 
important Palgrave Macmillan series and project, Work and Welfare in Europe, in 
which a group of signifi cant professors, researchers, sociologists, economists from 
European universities and institutes try to provide, through detailed analysis and 
academic debate, future perspectives and useful answers to questions concerned with 
the problems of work and welfare in modern European societies. In thirteen chapters, 
this book examines one of the key problems of contemporary European society, that 
of the very high number of disability benefi ts claimants, placing special emphasis on 
the United Kingdom, where the numbers of claimants have been rapidly increasing 
in recent years.
One of the editors of this interesting book is Colin Lindsay, a senior lecturer 
in human resource management at the University of Strathclyde, UK who has 
had a signifi cant research career in the area of labour market policies and welfare 
reform, whose special research interests are on the relationship between health and 
employability and recent policies to combat labour market inequalities. Th e second 
editor is Donald Houston, a lecturer in urban studies at the University of St Andrews, 
UK, who has written many academic journal articles and reports spanning fi ft een 
years on subjects including benefi ts, unemployment and poor health. Th ese two 
editors, together with a group of twenty further authors from various academic 
disciplines, who specialise in the area of employment and disability benefi ts, have 
prepared a truly useful book for anyone interested in the reform of disability 
benefi ts.
Th e aim of the book is to promote measures which will be useful for policy makers 
in reducing the number of disability benefi t claimants. Th e problem of the high 
number of people claiming disability benefi ts in the UK has become more and more 
serious over the decades. According to the authors, ‘at the start of 2012, more than 
two and a half million people of working age were out of work and claiming disability 
benefi ts’. In the introductory chapter, ‘Fit for work? Representations and Explanations 
of the Disability Benefi ts “Crisis” in the UK and Beyond’, Lindsay and Houston lay out 
the major aims of the book and the research methods which are used, explaining that 





evidence on why benefi t rolls have risen and why some people are more likely than 
others to become long-term claimants of disability benefi ts; critically assessing the 
content and outcomes of recent policy in the UK, and comparing experiences in the 
UK with those of other welfare states’. One of the central issues of the book, present 
from the fi rst to the last page, is the idea of trying to explain the disability benefi ts 
crisis as resulting from a combination of three key factors – labour market change, 
employability and health problems. Each of these factors is analysed in detail in a 
specifi c chapter of the book ‒ Chapter 4: ‘Are Incapacity Benefi t Claimants Beyond 
Employment? Exploring Issues of Employability’(Green and Shuttleworth); Chapter 
5: ‘Redefi ning “Fit for Work”: Welfare Reform and the Introduction of Employment 
Support Allowance’ (Barnes and Sissons) and Chapter 6: ‘A Health Problem? Health 
and Employability in the UK Labour Market” (Warren, Garthwaite and Bambra) ‒ 
and recommendations are presented for possible policy countermeasures and further 
possible action.
Two of the book’s noteworthy strengths are its interdisciplinary approach and the 
presentation of cross-national research. Experts from a variety of disciplines including 
economic geography, social policy, sociology, occupational medicine, public health 
studies and law present detailed surveys, providing readers with a unique and clear 
approach which will be very useful to anyeone interested in disability benefi ts and 
related issues. Further, excellent comparative methods are evident in the cross-national 
research by authors who present comparisons of the UK with Germany, Sweden, Th e 
Nederlands and New Zealand – Chapter 9: ‘Germany: Attempting to Activate the 
Long-Term Unemployed with Reduced Working Capacity’ (Brussig and Knuth); 
Chapter 10: ‘Incapacity Benefi ts – Change and Continuity in the Swedish Welfare 
State’ (Ulmestig); Chapter 11: ‘From Dutch Disease to Dutch Fitness? Two Decades 
of Disability Crisis in the Netherlands’ (Berkel) and Chapter 12: ‘New Zealand’s 
Reform of Sickness Benefi t and Invalid’s Benefi t’ (Lunt and Horsfall). In each casse, 
recommendations are presented for possible policy countermeasures and further 
possible action. Th ese chapters give readers the opportunity to learn something new 
about the way other countries implement disability benefi ts reforms using a variety of 
measures. Th e measures applied in the included countries will be helpful for experts 
from countries which have yet to adopt reforms, in choosing the best corresponding 
model for reducing the number of claimants who receive disability benefi ts.
I leave the readers to enjoy the remaining absorbing chapters not described in 
this review, which also deal with disability benefi ts reforms in interesting ways. Th is 
book includes a number of case studies, statistical data and analyses of disability 
benefi ts claimants, as well as a number of fi gures and tables, which assist readers in 
understanding and comprehending this problem.
In summary, the book is an excellent choice for all who are interested in this hot 
topic, especially those engaged in research in the area of welfare reform and disability 
benefi ts, and for policy makers. It is very precise in style, and comprehensible even 
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Maria Korda, Th e Role of International Social Security Standards: An in-
depth study through the case of Greece, 2013, Cambridge: Intersentia, 763 pp., 
ISBN 978–1–78068–165–8 (hardcover)
Maria Korda’s book is published as volume 32 in the very well established Social 
Europe Series. It refl ects the recently renewed interest in international social security 
standards, formulated within the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and 
the Council of Europe. It might be anticipated that it would be quite a challenge 
to promote new (advanced) standards during a time of economic crises, when it is 
evident that there is a widespread trend towards reductions in social security benefi ts 
and an emphasis on individual (private) responsibility for income.
A challenge for researchers has been to explore the reasons for adopting, or not 
adopting, international social security standards and assembling evidence for success 
(or otherwise) in their implementation. Th ere have been several academic publications 
on these topics, mainly from Frans Pennings’ research group at the University of 
Tilburg, but also from social security scholars in other universities.1
Th is book comes from the Tilburg research group and comprises Maria Korda’s 
doctoral thesis. Th is explains the rather detailed introduction which includes a 
number of interesting historical insights and a developmental review of standards 
(revealing why, in the EU, any general harmonisation of social security was considered 
unnecessary),2 as well as a very systematic and precisely defi ned research problem. 
Th e main research question concerns the identifi cation of obstacles to the further 
1 For instance, Pennings (2006, 2007); Dijkhoff , (2011), Tineke (2011); Becker, Ulrich, Pennings and 
Dijkhoff , (2013).
2 Th e right to social security was only implicitly recognised with the inclusion of the social policy 
chapter in the primary EU law, mentioning the respect of fundamental social rights enshrined in 
the (initial) European Social Charter. In this context the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU 





promotion of the international social security standards in a developed social security 
system.
To provide a frame of reference, distinctive societal values and political obstacles 
are identifi ed. Among the most important ones are the petrifi cation of international 
social security standards aft er a certain period of time, and failing to take into 
account developments in national social security systems (e.g. reliance on the male 
breadwinner model, which has been superceded in many countries by a two-worker or 
a one full one part-time worker model). Other obstacles are identifi ed as well, including 
political pressures, a preference for soft  law mechanisms, a lack of fi nancial resources, 
a lack of administrative and statistical capacity, and even a lack of knowledge of the 
standards. National legislation may not be in conformity with international social 
security standards, and this can constitute an important obstacle to ratifi cation.
In the book, these obstacles are tackled not only from a legal, but also a social 
policy perspective. Such an interdisciplinary approach enhances the book’s interest, 
as it is informative to learn about the rationales behind the legal rules (the author used 
policy documents as well as conducting her own interviews).
It may come as a surprise that only one country (Greece) is selected as a case 
study. However, this choice is critically evaluated in the book itself and convincing 
arguments are provided for this decision (among them, the choice of a fully-fl edged 
social security system,3 a system that is under constant change, the impact of strict 
austerity measures, and the author’s language profi ciency,4 which made an analysis of 
primary sources, including legal, academic, political and other texts, possible). In this 
reviewer’s opinion, the book succeeds in overcoming the limitations of a single country 
study. Extensive use is made of the comparative method of research, emphasis being 
placed on a vertical comparison of the Greek social security system with international 
social security standards. Horizontal comparison at a higher (international) level is 
conducted as well, cross-references being made to ILO Convention 102, concerning 
minimum standards of social security, and Convention 128, concerning invalidity, 
old-age and survivors benefi ts).
Th e entire second chapter of the book is devoted to the ILO Convention 128, which 
makes it an excellent commentary on this third generation instrument (of advanced 
minimum standards). Th is includes an analysis of actes préparatoires and the decisions 
of the supervisory bodies. Convention 128 has not been ratifi ed by Greece, but it is 
appropriate to include it in line with the book’s focus on obstacles to the adoption of 
standards and their implementation.
Th e reader learns about the Greek social security system, which is divided into 
social insurance, national health and (categorical) social assistance (sub-) systems, 
3 It should additionally be stressed that some (newly established) countries mentioned in the book 
have not been bound by international social security standards only since the beginning of 1990s. 
Th is may be because the former state has ratifi ed them much earlier (e.g. ILO Convention 102 was 
ratifi ed by Yugoslavia already in 1955).
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in the core chapters of the book, i.e. in chapters three and four. Th e author explains 
why no general socially guaranteed minimum income exists in Greece. In these 
chapters, the reasons for (not) ratifying international social security standards and 
the relationship between national and international law are explored. In addition, a 
thorough analysis, comparing Greek social security legislation with these standards, 
is presented.
In chapter fi ve the fi ndings of the research analysis are presented and all of 
the research questions answered, based on a comprehensive assessment. Th e book 
concludes, in chapter six, with a discussion and recommendations. Th e author fi nds 
that there are obstacles, both of an ideological and a practical nature, which have 
resulted in a blockage of international social security standards.
Th e author is skilled in expressing her own ideas, especially in relation to the 
reconciliation of social commitments and economic freedoms, as well as how national 
and international barriers to the adoption and maintenance of respect for social 
security standards might be overcome.
As a result of it being a doctoral thesis, the book has a somewhat rigid structure 
and could be shorter in some parts. However, the extensive summary is welcome, 
as it provides the fi rst ‘taste’ of the book’s content. It also includes an extensive 
bibliography, appendices (with a list of people consulted and translations of the four 
most representative decisions of the Hellenic Council of State) and annexes (with 
ratifi cation status of international social security standards and the text of ILO 
Convention 128).
Th is book may be of interest, not only to a Greek audience, but also to non-Greek 
speakers, since the Greek social security system has been under serious strain. As a 
reader, one is eager to learn more, especially about developments in the Greek social 
security system aft er 2010 (which was the period of data collection for the author’s 
doctoral thesis). Th e author manages to mention and critically evaluate the latest 
ILO regulation, Regulation 202, concerning national fl oors of social protection, and 
expresses a wish for more fl exibility and recourse to soft -law mechanisms.
In conclusion, the book signifi cantly enriches the discussion of international 
social security standards and is highly recommended, not only for researchers, but 
also for practitioners and other stakeholders dealing with social security standards at 
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Becker, Ulrich, Pennings, Frans and Dijkhoff, Tineke (eds.) (2013) International 
Standard-Setting and Innovations in Social Security, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International.
Pennings, Frans (ed.) (2006) Between Soft  and Hard Law, Th e impact of International 
Social Security Standards on National Social Security Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International.
Pennings, Frans (ed.) (2007) International Social Security Standards. Current Views 
and Interpretation Matters, Social Europe Series 14, Antwerp: Intersentia.
Dijkhoff, Tineke (2011) International Social Security Standards in the European 
Union. Th e Cases of the Czech Republic and Estonia, Intersentia: Antwerp: 
Intersentia.
Ann Numhauser-Henning and Mia Ronnmar (eds.) Normative Patterns and Legal 
Developments in the Social Dimension of the EU, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013, 269 
pp., ISBN 978–1-84946–435–2 (hardcover)
Th is book analyses recent normative and legal developments within the social 
dimension of the EU (with a focus on labour, social security and family law), in the 
context of current societal and demographic challenges, the impact of the economic 
and fi nancial crisis, and the expression of a social market economy, already existing 
pre-, but strengthened post-Lisbon Treaty, which aims to balance economic and 
social concerns. For those who are familiar with the relevant theory, the title already 
gives away the overall theoretical framework: the analysis is underpinned by Anna 
Christensen’s theory of law as ‘normative patterns in a normative fi eld’ now featured 
in the Norma Research Programme, which also informs this publication. On this 
basis, the book explores legal developments and how they translate into normative 
patterns; the discussions are legal in nature and provided by legal researchers. Th e 
chapters are organised around three main patterns as developed by Christensen: the 
market-functional pattern; the protection of established position pattern; and the 
just distribution pattern. Th ese normative patterns are not hierarchically organised 
and, as Kaarlo Tuori explains in chapter 3, any tension between them is settled at the 
political level.
Given the focus and intention of the book, an introduction to the general 
underpinning theory of law as normative patterns in a normative fi eld very 
appropriately sets the scene for what is to follow. Both directly, and by contrasting it 
with other theories of law, the theory’s propositions and ramifi cations are made clear 
to the reader in the opening chapters by Ann Numhauser-Henning and Kaarlo Tuori. 
As initially explained by the editors, the subsequent contributions are not simply an 
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Th rough this approach, the book very interestingly combines an analysis of social and 
legal developments with their placement within Christensen’s theory, thus revealing 
how they can become more visible or readable when presented in the context of the 
theory and, in turn, how patterns come about in a normative fi eld. However, the 
degree of fi t between the analysis and the placement within Christensen’s theory, and 
the extent to which it is sought, is not entirely consistent throughout, as a result of the 
diff ering authorships.
On the basis of the approach described above, the authors’ work within various 
fi elds such as labour law, social protection of the elderly, family law and children’s 
rights, social security and pension systems and family-work life reconciliation is 
presented and the resulting picture reveals certain patterns, changes in patterns, 
problematic or less visible balances between patterns and the need to rethink old or 
assumed balances.
In relation to the protection of established position pattern, Niklas Bruun discusses 
the impact of EU mandated austerity measures on the social policies of those Member 
States which received bailouts. In this context, Portugal not only stood out for its 
degree of compliance but also saw unique interventions by its Constitutional Court 
against those measures which, it was claimed, violated fundamental principles such 
as equality and proportionality. Th ese characteristics could have justifi ed a deeper 
analysis of the Portuguese case (even if, at the time of writing, the execution of the 
bailout package was still ongoing), particularly when elucidating the social impact 
of economic and fi scal consolidation measures. On children’s rights, Titti Mattsson 
very illuminatingly describes the contradiction between the growing national and 
international recognition of children as subjects and holders of rights and the failure 
to account for their best interests or to include their voices in decisions that concern 
them, arguably due to the lack of adequate procedural tools. In this connection, it 
would be interesting to explore further how new family forms (a change which 
Mattsson also describes) might also translate into new needs or adjusted needs that 
should be refl ected in the notion of best interests. Moreover, although fully agreeing 
with Mattsson’s call for an adequate materialisation of children’s participatory rights, 
I believe that the discussion would benefi t from an approach that also addresses how 
that call might be reconciled with protective concerns that remain valid. 
Th e risk of neglecting still prevalent gendered social practices may also work to 
prevent such opportunities from taking eff ect in practice. Also, more generally, one 
could question the equal conceptual positioning of work-family balance and work 
life commitment as opposing poles. Th e fi rst of these concepts, work-family balance, 
already contains elements of the second and, what is more, already contains the 
balancing exercise which the author places outside and against an opposing pole. Th e 
debate is then between two poles, where work concerns are found in both but family 
concerns only in one. Might a better approach be to place the debate wholly within the 





In my view, Deakin’s analysis stands out as particularly eye-opening for its call 
for a ‘new theoretical synthesis in both economics and law’ that is actually able to 
understand ‘labour law as a mode of market governance’ (p. 159) rather than as an 
exogenous element to be balanced against it. Votinius employs Christensen’s theory 
as a ‘heuristic’ to discover other normative patterns and specifi cally that of Gender 
Diff erence, in order to explain and expose how EU rules on the parenthood-work 
relation are structured. Finally, Fudge’s analysis of labour market segmentation and 
precarious work within the Just Distribution pattern provides further evidence of the 
diffi  culties brought about by confi ning legal analyses of discrimination to questions 
of comparability as hitherto framed in the EU. Fudge emphasises how the regulatory 
comparative approach of the atypical work directives reinforces a hierarchy of 
employment protection.
Th is book is a highly important contribution where it succeeds in achieving exactly 
that which it proposes. It both clarifi es understanding of current legal developments 
as placed within their particular contexts, and provides a vivid illustration of the 
relevance of wider theoretical frameworks to developing an understanding of law in 
abstract terms, as well as in relation to its concrete materialisations. Th erefore, it is 
relevant for researchers in legal philosophical fi elds as well as for those engaged in the 
study of EU and national social law; at the same time, it will undeniably be of interest 
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